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RULES OF ORDER: OR SO TO SPEAK
fcy
Arthur E. Blank
Adviser: Professor Stanley Milgram
How members of a social unit acquire their shared . 
knowledge about the social world was approached in Sherif's 
(1935* 1936) writings on norm formation and in.the 
phenomenological descriptions of Schutz (1971* 1973) and 
Berger and Luckmann (1967)* Both traditions presume that 
shared understandings originate in face-to-face encounters, 
but they diverge in that the phenomenologists argue that 
talk, and the construction of "typifications," plays a 
prominent role in the acquisition of shared knowledge. For 
the phenomenologists, a "typification" enables members to 
categorize behavior as a known event and permits individuals 
to consider disparate behaviors as belonging to the same 
class of events. Furthermore, "types" are presumed to be 
known to, and useable by, any other member of the social 
unit even though the details of the original encounter 
are masked by the "typification."
• • •111
The research reported here is an attempt to explore the 
formation of "types," and examine the role that everyday 
conversation may have in the construction of shared 
understandings. By varying how members come to acquire 
their knowledge about the social world— through direct 
participation or through the. words and deeds of others— a 
series of four studies was conducted. The first part of 
each study always begins in the same manners participants 
are requested to judge how far in front of the screen a 
figure from a Julesz stereogram appears to be. The later 
part of each study always has one member who continues to 
see, or has been told about, the extended figure while (s)he 
interacts with a partner who views, unbeknownst to the other, 
a recessed figure. The task to be solved remains the same 
as that in the first part: to reach a decision about 
extension. This alteration in perspective was to provide 
a challenge to the knowledge formed during the first part 
of the encounter and to make visible any taken-for-granted 
assumptions that may have been acquired.
Contrary to expectations, in the majority of the 
interactions, 60.71$, the alteration in perspective was 
never uncovered. An analysis of the members’ talk revealed 
that during the first part of the study the participants 
constructed a vocabulary and exchanged a set of expressions 
with each other that took the meaning and reference of 
those terms for granted. As there was no challenge to this 
usage, in the later parts of the study the partner who saw
or was told about an extended figure continued to presume 
that these words can be re-used unproblematically, and the 
task was presented to the partner with a vocabulary that 
masked the exact reference of the expressions. With this 
vagueness as to reference, the individual who saw recession 
used the "meaning" of these words to describe the recessed 
display (s)he saw and successfully concealed the disparity. 
It is argued that these expressions presumed useable by any 
other be considered "typifications."
By examining what is concealed and by understanding
i
the role talk plays in this masking, the issue of what 
members are presumed to "share" is addressed. As the notion 
of "sharedness" is also at the heart of the concept of norm, 
some of the implications of this examination for the concept 
of norm are examined.
v
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. . . any object which remains uncontradicted 
is ipso factor believed and posited as absolute 
reality.
William James, 1890 
Principles of Psychology 
Vol. II, p. 289
There seems to be a single starting point for 
psychology, exactly as for all other sciences; 
the world as we find it, naively and uncritically. 
. . .Most people live permanently in a world 
such as this, which is for them the world, and 
hardly ever find serious problems in its 
fundamental problems.
Wolfgang Kohler, 19^7 
Gestalt Psychology,
P. 7
. . . the everyday life-^orld is to be understood 
that province of reality which the wide-awake 
and normal adult simply takes for granted in the 
attitude of common-sense. By this taken-for- 
grantedness, we designate everything which we 
experience as unquestionable; every state of 
affairs is for us unproblematic until further 
notice.
Alfred Schutz, 1973





Rules of order: Or, so to speak
By choice of words and design, social psychology has 
positioned the individual in a matrix of social influence 
and causation. What more appropriate way to reflect this 
social nexus than through the concept norm, for the term 
directs our concern to the social sharedness of, and social
Arestraints on, behavior and thought. Out of the array of 
conceptual expressions available to us as psychologists, 
what can it mean for social psychologists to have selected 
that general and- abstract constraint on thought and action 
called norms?
In the mid-30's Muzafer Sherif (1935. 1936) embedded 
the concept of "norm" in a general problem: if we survey
the anthropological literature it is clear that there are 
various and contrasting immediate and natural perceptions 
of the social world. These numerous and culturally 
influenced modes of a "preparedness to see in the nature
A cursory glance at introductory social psychology 
texts confirms this conception of norm— that they are 
assumed to be socially shared and that they place real or 
imagined constraints on thought and action (Berkowitz, 1976; 
Brown, 1965? Hollander, 1976; Newcomb, Turner, and Converse, 1965; Secord and Backman, 196^; and Worchel and Cooper, 1976). 
Also Rommetveit's (195*0 monograph explicitly draws our 
attention to the presumption that these cognitive and 
behavioral restrictions are shared frames of reference.
that surrounds us much to what another period would be 
totally blind" (Sherif, 1936, p. 6*0 raised a set of 
intriguing questions. First, how do we account for a 
particular manner of knowing the world which arises in one 
social unit and not in another; second, how do we account 
for the apparent sharedness of these ways of being prepared 
to see the world within that social unit; and third, how 
do we account for the apparent naturalness of these ways of
knowing the world? The concept of "norm" assumes that
!
(a) social actors are able to make the appropriate social 
discriminations, and (b) that these social demarcations are 
shared and not idiosyncratic: i.e. any other member of that 
social unit in those particular circumstances should be 
capable of making similar distinctions.
In part, Sherif sought to link these issues by 
postulating a psychological need to develop a frame of
3reference, but this leaves vague the specifics of how the
2The use of the term social unit is meant to convey that 
at any one time within a society and across societies there 
exists more than one way of knowing the world. The term norm 
then also relies on an assumption of the social distribution 
of knowledge. The question of why one form of knowing 
dominates becomes a critical concern and is artificially 
separated here. But in claiming that there are different 
ways of being prepared to see the world, I am not implying 
that there exist different cognitive processes or capacities 
(Cole & Scribner, 197*0 • At any time the depth and breadth 
of the expression shared is undetermined.
^The research of Alexander, Zucker, and Brody (1970) has 
critiqued this postulation of a need to develop a stable 
framework. A reply in support of Sherif can be found in the 
writings of Pollis, Montgomery, and Smith (197*0*
critical components of norms— their reference to an immediate, 
natural, and shared frame for perception and action— develop. 
The questions can be rephrased to ask: as members of a 
social unit, how do we come to acquire the socially shared 
stock: of knowledge which permits us to act and think as 
recognizably competent adult members of a society?
If we assess the research in social psychology most 
closely aligned with Sherif's concerns we can determine how 
these issues have been answered. But when we examine the
i
"arbitrary tradition" literature (Rohrer, Baron, Hoffman, & 
Swander, 195^; Rose & Felton, 1956; Jacobs & Campbell, 1961; 
Weick & Gilfillan, 1971; and Moschetti, 1977) it becomes 
evident that there has been a shift in emphasis. Rohrer, 
et al., basically replicated the original Sherif research 
and pursued the question of persistence: how durable is the 
laboratory induced norm. The authors concluded that an 
individual will retain the experimentally established norm 
for a period of at least one year. The research of Rose and 
Felton utilized Rorschach tests to create an experimental 
culture, and by replacing subjects to gauge the type of 
culture formed (open or closed) and the type of cultural 
transmission which occurred (invention, borrowing, and habit 
formation).
Citing the original Sherif research, the work of Rose 
and Felton, and the conceptual arguments of Gerard,
Kluckholm and Rapoport (1956), Jacobs and Campbell
formulated their empirical task to be one of understanding 
"the perpetuation of 'cultural' characteristics that 
transcends the replacement of individual persons" (p. 6^9)* 
Guided by Sumner's dictum that the "mores can make anything 
right," the authors utilized the autokinetic effect to 
address the question of whether a functionless norm would 
persist over time. That is, would an experimentally induced 
norm of 15 inches of apparent motion endure if there was a 
'normal' assessment of approximately 8 inches of motion?
As with Rose and Felton, persistence was scrutinized by 
replacing culturally sophisticated subjects with culturally 
naive subjects. The resulting alteration in judgments of 
apparent motion would be how the duration of the norm was 
measured. Under the laboratory constraints provided, the 
arbitrary norm was not transmitted for more than four or 
five generations. The authors attributed the brevity of 
the tradition to: (a) the role of autonomous decline; (b) the 
role of forgetting; and (c) the influence of new members. 
Jacobs and Campbell concluded that mores could not adequately 
account for how traditions were perpetuated. In 1967, Sherif 
also addressed the persistence of norms and replicated the 
Jacobs and Campbell study. He concluded that the durability 
of a norm will deteriorate as its arbitrariness increased.
Weick and Gilfillan (1971) v/ere critical of the 
concept of arbitrariness employed by Jacobs and Campbell,
and separated "warranted" from "unwarranted" arbitrariness.^ 
The authors argued that the rapid decline of the norm could 
be explained as a result of the combination of unwarranted 
arbitrariness and the seemingly unreal assessment of 
apparent motion-^-that is, the press of reality was not 
considered. In contrast to Jacobs and Campbell, and Sherif, 
Weick and Gilfillan argued that in ". . . a  situation where 
a bit of artificial culture is not blatantly unreal nor 
unwarrantedly arbitrary, and only a tendency to spontaneous 
innovations counteracts tradition, we would expect to see 
adherence increase with age" (p. 181). Thus, if aligned 
with the "pressures of reality" a warranted arbitrary 
context was deemed sufficient to account for the perpetuation 
of a tradition. The results of their game study supported 
their hypotheses.
The research of Moschetti (1977) criticized the Weick 
and Gilfillan work on at least two grounds. First, Moschetti 
noted that a salient aspect of interaction, communication 
between the subjects, was omitted from the study and suggests 
that had there been communication the distinction between
^"We will use the phrase 'unwarranted arbitrariness' to 
refer to those situations where real and relevant differences 
exist among choice alternatives, but these are ignored and 
the choice is made on a nonevidential basis. A situation of 
'warranted arbitrariness' exists when the choice alternatives 
are equally valid and where real and relevant differences 
are inconsequential." (1971* P* 180)
unwarranted and warranted arbitrariness would not have held. 
Second, Moschetti cites the writings of Pareto to argue that 
the persistence of a norm is due not to its actual and 
objective effectiveness but to its presumed effectiveness:
"the actors can be mistaken concerning the causal contingency 
between the tradition and the outcomes in the situation"
(p* 79) • However, as there was no actual transmission of 
the tradition in this study the claim can not be assessed.
The concern with comprehending why and for how long
I
norms or arbitrary traditions will persist is critical, but 
it represents a shift in emphasis. To specify the conditions 
under which norms endure is vastly different from inquiring 
how some individual(s) acquire social competency— under­
standing the process by which social knowledge is formed 
and transmitted. But while these studies do not critically 
examine this issue, they do rely upon some presumptions about 
these processes. For in successfully producing something 
which could be maintained, something had to be formed and 
transmitted. How has each study accomplished the construc­
tion of a social convention, a slice of socially shared 
knowledge? It was precisely this formation of a socially 
constructed "preparedness to see"— a norm— which made the 
autokinetic effect so dramatic. And that a human artifact, 
a social convention, has been produced in each of these 
studies should serve to remind us that a notion of'feonvention" 
is also at the core of what it means to employ that general
and abstract constraint on human thought and action called 
"norm."
Sherif's (1935* 1936) reliance on anthropological data 
brings into relief the argument that the world of "norms," 
though natural and shared, is an arbitrary world. The 
social traditions common to one setting are not necessarily 
common to any other setting. Whatever traditions are 
involved we are left with the broader task of coming to 
grips with and displaying how these "norms," "preparedness 
to see," acquire their apparent naturalness and commonality 
within some social unit. In that each study in the "arbi­
trary tradition" literature proposes that a social tradition 
was generated, each study has let the process of that 
production pass without comment.
It is incumbent upon the discipline to account for how 
a particular frame of reference has become common. Indeed,
I would maintain .that if we do not conceptually and empir­
ically grapple with how social traditions and conventions 
are formed and become shared the concept of "norm" will have 
little explanatory value. For all we will know is that 
members of a social unit have this knowledge and are capable 
of using it, but we will lack an in-depth comprehension of 
how that social knowledge was formed.
This request to study the formation of social knowledge 
is similar to the urgings of Moscovici:
The proper domain of our discipline (social
psychology) is the study of cultural processes
8
which are responsible for the organization 
of knowledge in a society . . . for the 
codification of inter-individual and inter­
group conduct which creates a common social 
reality with its norms and values. (1972,
P. 55)
and Pepitone:
The third stage of inquiry for a social 
psychology of normative social behavior is 
the most important and the most divergent 
from the way social psychology is organized 
at the present time. It deals with the 
origin of normative values and beliefs.
(1976, p. 61*9 )
How can we begin to probe the problem as to how that social 
artifact— a socially constructed slice of life— was formed? 
Sherif (1935» 1936) did put forth some basic assertions as 
to how norms came to be formed and shared. Fundamentally 
the concrete interaction of individuals was considered 
sufficient to create knowledge, momentarily. And it was 
further suggested that alterations in the social context 
would influence the knowledge formed and result, perhaps, 
in emendations to it.^
•̂ The durability of this knowledge— its "emergence and 
standardization" and its "gaining of authority and prestige" 
(Sherif, 1936, p. 87)— is a process which is extendedin 
time. Though Sherif labeled the knowledge formed during the 
interactions "norms," I want to reserve that expression for 
a "preparedness to see" which can be demonstrated^to be 
durable. I will consider what was made known during the 
encounters a slice of knowledge— a temporarily shared 
understanding. Obviously, the question of how well what 
is formed in the experimental encounters persists is the 
concern which has been addressed by the "arbitrary tradition" 
literature.
Other presumptions ahout the conditions of knowledge 
construction can be explicated by paying careful attention 
to the experimental constraints reported in the literature.
It is apparent that any subject in these experiments was 
placed in a context where a set of instructions defined a 
task to be solved. As Sherif originally intimated, this 
pragmatic involvement with a task at hand would play a role 
in framing how the social world would be known and what
would be shared by the parties to this encounter. But note
»
that what is finally considered to be normative, is not 
unilaterally invoked. It is a consequence of the members' 
negotiations with each other, and it is this socially 
arbitrated and socially constructed artifact which is 
transmitted to future generations and renegotiated if the 
knowledge becomes removed from the press of reality (Weick & 
Gilfillan, 1971)- Is this how some social knowledge comes 
to be formed,, shared, and perceptually natural: that the 
concrete actions of individuals engaged with the pragmatic 
and mundane considerations of a task at hand generated a
6This process of negotiation is clearest in the studies 
of Sherif, and Rose and Felton, though it exists in the 
other studies— especially at the time of replacement. In 
the Sherif research, individual judgments converge to form 
a near consensus as to the judgment of apparent motion. In 
the other studies, a newcomer can alter this assessment—  
argue about how far it "really" moves. One critical issue^ 
here is the equivalent status of the participants. Differing 
configurations may lead to alternate assessments and the 
ability to "control" reality.
10
manner of knowing the world? Sherif's endeavor to demon­
strate the formation of a "norm" in an ambiguous context 
appears to have worked under these constraints, and to have 
been replicated in the experimental settings of the 
"arbitrary tradition" research.
At this point it is interesting to proceed to the 
writings of others who are attempting to elucidate the 
processes "by which any body of knowledge comes to be 
socially established as a reality" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967» 
p. 3). The phenomenological descriptions of Alfred Schutz 
(1971, 1973) represent an attempt to characterize how the 
objective world is socially experienced, and how an indi­
vidual incorporates the existing stock of social knowledge.
In explicating these problems, Schutz presents a conception 
of everyday life which can be heuristically compared with 
the work of Sherif. Schutz argues that the social world 
which we encounter daily seems natural and unproblematic 
for us because it is a social world resting on a circumscribed 
set of social presuppositions which the member of the social 
unit can take for granted. The research of Harold Garfinkel 
(1967) has empirically pursued the writings of Schutz and 
provides an apt demonstration of the problem.
The term "anthropologically strange" is employed by 
Garfinkel to indicate that there is a body of taken for 
granted social knowledge which is presupposed by members of 
the social unit, and to suggest a manner of displaying that
11
knowledge— by taking the position of an outsider or by 
disrupting the social unit. This tactic of disruption makes 
visible the domain of typically invisible^ social rules 
which we, as members of some unit, must rely upon in order 
to make recognizable to our self and to others the social 
world which we naively know. As with norms, it is this 
reliance on socially shared presumptions which enable the 
actor to proceed with his everyday life. For example, in 
one study students were asked to pretend to be boarders in 
their parent's home. This wrenching of a socially shared 
assumption— superficially rendered as, that if you left my 
home this morning as my son, daughter, wife or husband I 
expect to find you as a member of that same social category 
when I see you later— created consternation and strain for 
both the subject and the parent. The parents expended a 
great deal of effort to restore events to their typical, 
usual, and recognizable pattern so that the interaction 
could again proceed normally and naturally. That we can 
rely on this usual, mundane, pragmatic, uneventful, and 
remarkably regular world points to its naturalness. That 
we presume it is shared with others, to its taken-for- 
grantedness.
^Invisible is not to be taken as meaning unconscious.
It refers to a domain of behavior and thought called non- 
conscious by Bern (1967). Bern also uses the concept of 
taken for granted to refer to a system of social beliefs 
which inhibit the ability to envision alternate modes of 
thought and action.
The force of this conjecture can he further demonstrated 
by noting the tenuous position which a foreigner is placed 
in when visiting a non-familiar culture. The writings of 
E. T. Hall (1966, 1973» 1977) relate numerous instances 
where individuals mistakenly assume that their natural and 
usually tacit social preparedness to see can be unalterably 
applied in alien settings. The research on proxemics (Hall, 
1966) argues that Americans and Arabs employ different 
physical distances from their partners when conducting 
business transactions. The closeness of this distance for 
the Arab is unsettling to the Americans used to a greater 
degree of physical separation. What is perfectly "natural"
O
becomes problematic for the actors. The ability to 
accomplish a smooth interaction is in jeopardy, and the 
potential for insult and embarrassment has arisen. In 
discussing how time is a culturally embedded concept, Hall 
(1973) provides another example. An American diplomat 
arrives in the host country and seeks to contact the 
appropriate diplomatic counterpart. Having made an appoint­
ment to meet with the diplomatic representative of the host 
country, the American arrives at the scheduled time. After 
waiting for 10 to 20 minutes, the American begins to resent
QProblematic is intended to convey that what is usually 
done or seen uneventfully becomes an issue. The event does 
not proceed smoothly and the issue of social competency, 
for self or other, may arise.
13
the delay and feel insulted. The social assumption which 
has been unwittingly transported is that there is a "correct" 
amount of time to keep someone waiting. But the judgment of 
"correctness" is culturally embedded, and the host's 
conception of waiting time differs from the visitor's. The 
possible departure of the American, and his feeling of 
insult, would not be readily comprehended by the host.
The tactic of disruption and the concept of "anthro­
pologically strange" are useful to demonstrate that the 
discomfort and social bizarreness are the result of the 
violation of social conventions automatically employed and 
culturally shared. The possible estrangement from the 
context points to the error made and its usually unproblematic, 
taken-for-granted aspect.
The display of differences is not to raise the issue of 
how we account for the differences, but to direct our focus 
to a topic already raised: how do we explain the culturally 
entrenched and shared procedures for seeing and acting that 
are present in some social unit. If we can agree that the 
concept of "norm," and its components of sharedness, 
naturalness, and convention, refers to what an actor must 
know in order to be acknowledged as a competent member of a 
society, then our use of "norm" must account for each of 
these issues. Given the surface similarity of the taken-for- 
granted world and norms, can we gain any further directions 
from, the phenomenologists as to how social knowledge is 
formed?
1^
To describe how the social actor comes to know the 
social world, Schutz (1973) and then Berger and Luckmann 
(1967) make use of the concept of "typification." The idea 
of "typification,” or type, refers to the individual's 
abstraction from detail those ingredients which permit a 
member to identify a specific event as a socially known 
type. In a specific interaction, it is assumed that the in- 
depth details and uniqueness will be subsumed under a broad 
category. Berger and Luckmann illustrate this concern by 
noting how social detail is lost when the participants 
locate the interaction under the broad rubric of "mother-in- 
law trouble." Aaron Cicourel (197*0 is similarly concerned 
with how a particular incident is recognized as belonging to 
some general class of events. He draws from the writings of
gSchutz and Chomsky's theory of generative grammar^ to argue 
that norms are surface elements for which a sense, a meaning, 
is ascribed by deep structure. Cicourel labels this
^Cicourel is in an ambiguous position vis-a-vis Chomsky's 
theory of generative grammar. He borrows the notion of 
surface and deep structure, but does not accept the 
rationalist dimension of the theory. Further, Chomsky is 
explicit about the nature of the rules which enable one to 
move from surface to deep structure; Cicourel is not.
ChomsTcy is also hesitant about.the applicability of his 
approach to areas outside of linguistics, but the suggestive­
ness of the approach is worth pursuing— even if it is 
discarded later. In addition, the formulation of the problem 
as one of recognizing a particular event as a member of some 
broader category permits a tentative link to be made with 
the research on pattern recognition in cognitive psychology 
(Neisser, 1967)*
assignment of sense "interpretive procedures" and suggests 
that a particular encounter is identified as an instance of 
a general class by specification of meaning. The "interpre­
tive procedures" which allow a social member to select from a 
display those socially germane particulars that will permit 
the categorization of the event are assumed shared by the 
members and are, in part, formed prior to language.
Whether or not a generative concept is warranted, the 
problem of how a member realizes that a specific encounter 
belongs to some general category is a critical addition in 
understanding what has to be reckoned with when we attempt 
to dissect the issue of knowledge acquisition. An example 
from the research of Latane and Darley (I970) -will illustrate 
the concern. In their explanation of helping behavior,
Latane and Darley present a decision tree which has at its 
first and second nodes the problem of recognition. The 
authors report an incident— someone lying on the floor, 
someone who fell from a chair, someone screaming— which must 
first be categorized as an incident requiring assistance 
before any other decision as to help or not to help will be 
implemented. As the Kitty Genovese case documented, this 
categorization is not straight-forward and the decision is 
not made with ease. What are the shared procedures that 
members must utilize so that a unique instance can be 
recognized as belonging to a general class of events?
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Within the framework of "interpretive procedures" or 
"typification," norm represents a summary term which enables 
individuals to conveniently categorize an entire range of
10possibly disparate behaviors as members of the same class.
By selecting a category the details and uniqueness of the
action are hidden in the dimensions which are shared with
other events in the category. To a large extent then the
concept of "type," the assignment of sense, the notion of
"norms," are assumed to be idealizations of specific
incidents. However, Schutz carefully argues that with the
process of typification:
It should be emphasized that the interpreta­
tion of the world in terms of types, as under­
stood here, is not the outcome of a process of 
ratiocination, let alone of scientific concep­
tualization. . . . Thus typifications...on the 
common-sense level— in contradistinction to 
typifications made by the scientist— emerge on 
the everyday experience of the world as taken- 
for-granted without any formulation of judgments 
or of neat propositions with logical subjects 
and predicates. (Schutz, 1973, p. 120)
As with norms, typifications appear natural and are
presumed shared with others. This assumption of sharedness
is expressed by noting that experience is anonymized in a
type: any other member of the social unit is thought, in
principle, to be capable of recognizing and duplicating the
category. It is shared for it is not supposed to be a
unique incident tied to the personal biographies of the
10Mischel's (1973) use of trait as a summary term raises 
similar issues. However, it must be stressed again that types 
and norms are not thought of as being equivalent, just 
analogous.
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actors. Given the resemblance with norms, will considering 
how types are formed offer any more details as to how 
socially constructed knowledge comes to be acquired and 
shared?
Schutz, and then Berger and Luckmann indicate that a
type evolves from a "situationally adequate solution to a
problematic situation" (Schutz, 1973, p. 231) and is taken-
for granted-until-further-notice. When a typification
becomes problematic, Schutz argues that the resolution will
be guided by the principle of "pragmatic motive": the member
will question only that knowledge which permits him or her
to master the problem. At the time of the disruption, the
uncritical attitude toward the taken-for-granted social
world may be sustained, modified, or abandoned. But only
that knowledge which is called into question by the disruption
is challenged. In that a type is formed and altered within
and in response to specific contextual constraints another
similarity with norm formation is revealed. A further linkage
with Sherif's discussion of norms is that typifications are
assumed to be shaped within the bounds of face-to-face
interactional settings. The writings of Berger and Luckmann,
and Schutz, diverge from Sherif in that they claim that talk
11plays an essential role in type construction.
11Schutz, and Berger and Luckmann refer to language.
I am using the expressions talk, speech conversation, 
discourse, words, utterances, and exchange of words to follow 
the accepted linguistic practice that language refers to a 
grammar and talk to use in context— pragmatics.
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While Moschetti (1977) did address how pervasive speech
is during interactions, he offered no suggestions as to its
possible function on norm formation, maintenance, or 
12transmission. In order to create and sustain cultural
products, discourse played an integral part of the Rose and
Felton experiments but no systematic, or even cursory,
examination of that discourse was provided. Given the
prominence of talk in everyday life, it is surprising that
social psychologists have not paid more attention to the
conditions of its use and its possible contribution to the
13structuring of shared knowledge. ^
In the writings of Schutz and Berger and Luckmann, 
conversations during face-to-face interactions involve:
(a) the process of externalization— the placing of subjective 
intent into speech; and (b) the process of objectivation— by 
placing my experience in words I make available to myself 
and others the "elements" from which a common world can be 
constructed. Discourse is then linked to type construction 
for it enables the parties to the face-to-face encounter to
12Moschetti actually referred to communication. I am 
concerned with talk. Obviously non-verbal components are 
an integral part of the communicative picture, and at times 
may outweigh the verbal message (Argyle, 1967).
*^The handbook article by Miller and McNeil (1969) and 
the text by R. Brown (1965) tried to draw our attention to 
some of the issues involved with speech and language. With 
the recent upsurge in sociolinguistics (Bauman & Sherzer,
197^, Gumperz & Hymes, 1972, Hymes, 197^J and Fishman, 1968, 
1972, 1975)t some corrections in this omission have begun.
comment on, comprehend, and categorize their experience for 
self and others. Out of an exchange of words during an 
interaction a typification results. But the typification 
stands in a special relationship to the encounter. For as 
Schutz asserted, the detailed step-by-step development of 
the interaction (its "polythetic character") is caught with 
a theme (its "monothetic grasp"). And it is this thematic 
grasp which is a type and which is taken-for-granted-until-
ikfurther-notice.
This retention of a sense is assumed responsible for 
the eventual sedimentation of knowledge and for how specific 
incidents are recognized as having been previously 
experienced— as a particular instance of a-general class. 
During face-to-face encounters talk provides the elements 
from which a shared world can be negotiated and constructed. 
And what are negotiated and constructed through dialogue and 
presumably shared and taken-for-granted are typifications.
1 | lTo prevent a possible misunderstanding, I am not 
arguing that talk is the way knowledge is formed and shared. 
Obviously, some of the "arbitrary tradition" research 
succeeded in producing something without speech. Even for 
Schutz it is in principle possible to construct a type without 
words. I am only arguing that talk is a prominent means by 
which such knowledge is formed, shared, and sustained._ 
Furthermore, if the interaction is not novel but familiar the 
typifications are selected from "a system of relevances and 
typifications as it exists at any historical moment . . 
which ". . . i s  itself part of the social heritage as' such 
is handed down in the educational process to the members of 
the in-group." (Schutz, 1973» p. 120)
The expositions of Schutz, Berger and Luckmann, then 
raise the phenomenological claim that discourse is influential 
in coming to know a world that is naively and uncritically 
shared. Is there any empirical research which can support 
the theoretical claims made about the role of talk during 
interaction? The research of J. S. Sachs (19&7. 197**) and 
Bransford and Franks (1971) offer some interesting suggestions 
that are worth briefly examining. Sachs was concerned with 
whether subjects would recognize a previously encountered 
sentence if that sentence had been either semantically or 
formally (syntactic but not semantic change) altered. The ■ 
research clearly demonstrated that semantic alterations were 
readily noted while formal changes were not, and that the 
loss of detail about the exact wording of the sentences 
occurred rather quickly— within 27 seconds (1967) 311(1 23 
seconds (197*0 • Sachs concluded that the memory for meaning 
was retained, and that this memory was not dependent on the 
original form of the sentence nor was the meaning retained 
the simple summation of the individual words (1967)* In 
197**» Sachs noted that the meaning stored did not necessarily 
correspond to the temporal order of the input.
Bransford and. Franks' (1971) research attempted to 
investigate that memory is "not for individual words or 
sentences" but for "wholistic semantic ideas." A series of 
sentences were presented to the subjects, and during the 
recognition task these original sentences were given to the
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subject with a sentence that.combined the semantic sense of
the original sentence. The subjects had never seen this
sentence, but "recognized" it as having appeared more
frequently than those sentences which were actually
presented. Furthermore, the subjects were very confident
that these sentences had been part <?f the original set of
sentences. Bransford and Franks concluded that:
In general, Ss did not store representations 
of particular sentences. Individual sentences 
lost their unique status in memory in favor 
of a more wholistic representation of semantic 
events. (1971. P* 34*8)15
As the unit of analysis in the research cited is 
sentences and not conversational discourse, the empirical 
support for Schutz is at best indirect. What is corroborated 
is the general argument for the retention of some thematic 
grasp— a construction in which details are lost in favor of 
a summation, a sense. If these are warranted arguments, 
typifications should not necessarily be assumed to be direct 
replicas of the specific ingredients of the conversation.
That is, the speech which is being employed for the 
construction and negotiation of an event need not produce 
a summary statement that has as its marker any of the 
specific expressions that went into the evolution, of the 
theme. Or, to paraphrase Sachs and gestalt psychology, the
"^Research by James and Hillinger (1976) severely 
questioned the results produced by the Bransford and Franks 
experiment, but leave the general position— a constructivist 
interpretation— unscathed.
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typifications are not the simple summation of individual 
words.
The connection between talk and typification is then 
preliminarily construed to be: (a) that talk permits 
individuals to place their subjective intent into words * 
which are then manipulable for self and others; (b) this 
objectivation provides the elements from which a common 
world can be shaped; (c) the selection of elements from the 
world sustains typifications which have allowed participants 
to locate the event into either an already existing category 
or to generate a new category; and (d) these types represent 
a manner of pragmatically knowing a particular world which 
is taken-for-granted-until-further-notice. .• But is this 
outcome particularly astounding when Posner (1973) notes 
that:
It has long been known that human memory 
is not developed for the exact reproduction 
of previous events, but has rather evolved 
for the purpose of abstracting the general 
form of events, (p. 44)
What is striking then is not that a sense is constructed, 
or that abstraction from detail occurs, but that every 
interaction has the potentially confining and unintentionally 
produced social construction of a "preparedness to see."
Does the social use of speech have the paradoxical result of 
constraining knowledge at the same time it is being inter- 
actionally employed to create knowledge?
The question frames a dilemma but is overdrawn if it 
implies that any knowledge can be produced. It has been 
noted that in the construction of a type, or of a norm, 
actors are pragmatically engaged. Talk is then assumed to 
mediate between the task one is involved with and the actor’s
subjective intent. From the constraints of the task at hand,
socially constructed knowledge may be formed or recognized 
as an instance of the general class. As Berger and Luckmann 
attest:
. . . most conversation does not in so
many words define the nature of the world.
Rather it takes place against the background 
of a world that is silently taken-for- 
granted. (1967, p. 152)
Yet it seems implausible to argue that- the mere use of 
speech is sufficient to construct a new type or to result in 
the classification of the engagement into an existing scheme 
of typifications. Are there any specifiable conditions 
which can suggest when a thematic grasp will occur? G. H. 
Mead (1934/1962), W. James (D. Schultz, 1969), A. Schutz 
(1973.) and A. Kaplan (1964-) have each commented on the 
separation between a continuous stream of experience and the 
reflection on that experience. It seems reasonable that a 
context which causes the members to reflect on their activity 
may occasion the grasping of a theme. One possible reading 
of the "arbitrary tradition" literature is that at the point 
where information had to be transmitted, the subjects looked 
back, at their prior experience and generated an abstract
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schemata. Garfinkel's tactic of disruption and Hall's 
foreigner examples also suggest that when the context is 
made problematic, reflection takes place. The research of 
Sachs, and Bransford and Franks demonstrated that subjects 
will schematize when presented with a recognition task, but 
whether the experimentally imposed meanings are the same 
ones that the Ss would have produced is left open.
It does not appear implausible to suggest that a 
socially constructed sense, a typification, will occur at 
points of reflection, and we can argue that a backwards 
glance at prior activities will come about when (a) a 
request to transmit information occurs, (b) a disruption in 
the social context makes the setting problematic, and (c) a 
natural request for reflection is provided— a probe that 
requests an explanation of what has transpired.
Given that- reflection may happen at any of these 
prompts it would be incorrect to assume that (1) typifications 
emerge solely as a summary statement at the end of the 
conversation, and (2) that a single type is the outcome of a 
pragmatic encounter with the world. It is assumed that a 
type or thematic grasp is a backwards, reflective look at 
lived experiences i.e., it is post-hoc. What remains entirely 
open are the particular thematic grasps that may evolve in a 
particular interaction.
While we may suggest that types occur at the point of 
reflection, it must be apparent that a critical issue is still
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unresolved. Specifically, how does any member decide which 
elements are to form the edifice for the typifications? It 
can be tentatively proposed that what is selected for the 
types are the situationally adequate "results" of the 
pragmatic encounter. Omitted are the non-pragmatically 
related details and the step-by-step construction of the 
socially arbitrated locating activity. At the time of 
reflection the preceding activity becomes known, typified 
and taken-for-granted, by its "result(s)."
Why presume that typifications are a "result" of 
pragmatic encounters? There are two reasons: first, Schutz 
defined types as solutions to a problematic situation and 
one manner of defining solution is in terms of its outcome, 
its results; and second, Schutz makes the assertion that it 
is the result which is objectivated as knowledge. And with 
the close analytic connection between typification and 
objectivation, it seems plausible to suspect a similar 
mechanism for type formation.
The assumption behind the conjecture(that the social 
construction is omitted is the claim by Schutz that 
typifications are anonymized— the "result" is thought to 
any.-one*s product, and as such doable and recognizable 
by any competent adult member of the social unit. This 
process of anonymization loses the social authorship of the 
construction, for if retained these details would demonstrate 
that the outcome is highly contextualized, the product of
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16unique biographies, and not any-one*s result. The 
pragmatic loss of the arbitration provides an event for 
any-other.
A further aspect of anonymization is pertinent here.
As the negotiated "result" is transmitted to others, and 
then to someone else, the outcome is further removed from 
the situation of origin, as this distancing from the 
original situation increases an unembedded result is handed• 
over matter-of-factly, as the way things are. The recipient 
knows that part of the social world through the situationally 
detached typifications of others and not .through the active 
constructive work of the original problem solving attempt.
It is then apparent that the initial parties to the 
construction stand in a different relationship to the 
socially negotiated knowledge than does the recipient. The 
founding members to the construction know of the results 
embedded and arbitrated character while the receiver of the 
transmission may not.
As the recipient is further removed from a knowledge 
of the "results" construction, what takes place when prag­
matic constraints make the types problematic? How readily 
will the member who knows the world through the talk of 
others— through second-hand typifications— renegotiate its
joke's failure as noted by the comment 'you had to 
be there,.' indicates the teller's inability to make the joke 
anyone's .
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outcome? To the extent that the recipient has accepted the 
transmission matter-of-factly, as an outcome doable and 
recognizable by any-other, and is unaware of the socially 
negotiated fundament of that "result," it is assumed that it 
will be harder to reinsert a constructive process: i.e., the 
outcome will be less readily re-negotiated the further 
removed the recipient is from the original construction.
Have we progressed in answering the original query: 
how do we as members of some social unit come to acquire the 
socially shared stock of knowledge which enables us to think 
and to act as recognizably competent adult members of a 
society? Sherif's (1935» 1936) basic formulation has been 
retained but the function of talk and typification are now 
affixed as critical dimensions. In assessing how shared 
social knowledge is acquired, we can now state the following 
conjectures:
Given a problematic context
la: talk during an interaction provides 
the elements from which a common 
world can be constructed;
lb: reflection on this preceding talk 
generates typifications which select 
from this step-by-step process those 
elements which permit the grasping 
of a pragmatic result;
2: the transmission of this result to 
others omits its social construction 
so the results can look like anyone’s;
3: as the "knower" of the result is
further and further removed from the 
original situation the harder it is 
for that recipient to renegotiate the 
result.
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It then appears that the conversational discourse of 
interacting adults pragmatically engaged with a task at hand 
will provide the elements for the negotiation and construction 
of a "preparedness to see"; and which upon reflection produce 
typifications that shall remain unproblematic until-further- 
notice.
To empirically address the phenomenological claims 
about the relation of speech to knowledge construction and 
type formation, a context must be discovered or created that 
enables the parties to the interaction to become pragmatically 
engaged in a problematic situation; to offer the opportunity 
for reflection; and to allow different stances toward the 
situationally shaped knowledge. However, any-empirical 
setting that attempts to verify these conjectures amongst 
interacting adults is methodologically confounded.
For the participants who enter the context are 
sophisticated adults who are immersed in, and continually 
rely upon a system of cultural recipes that permit social 
comprehension and action. In such encounters where there 
already is the "background of a world that is silently 
taken-for-granted" (Berger & Luckmann, 19^7, p. 152), talk 
is already presumed to be a system of anonymized typifica­
tions, and a type is a "variation on typifications already 
on hand, however plain and ill-defined they may be" (Schutz, 
1973, p. 232).
Though the participants' talk-in-context presumes a 
world of pre-existing shared knowledge and types, a novel 
environment can "be created and sustained in an experimental 
setting. The construction of such a context would make the 
"stock of knowledge" on hand problematic and offer the 
opportunity to observe the formulation of shared knowledge 
and the grasping of a theme. The stimulus utilized to 
support such a context must enable the members to become 
pragmatically engaged with it, and allow them to come to 
"know" it in line with some task-at-hand. Yet the members 
must be surprised by the same stimulus at some future point 
so what they have come to know through their conversation 
can be challenged. The stereograms developed by Bela 
Julesz (1971) are appropriate stimuli.
When seen without a visual aid, the stereogram appears 
to be a series of dots but when viewed through a set of 
color-coded goggles a previously- hidden figure becomes 
visible. The figure seen appears to separate from the 
center of the previously undefined visual field and to 
either move forward and out (extension) or back and away 
(recession) depending on the color arrangement of the 
goggles. The ability to project and sustain an extended 
or recessed image provides the opportunity for the partici­
pants to be engaged with and come to know a particular 
visual world which can be socially and consensually 
validated through talk about that world. By exchanging
the goggles this socially formed world can surprise its 
members. That is, in an experimental setting where each 
participant begins by viewing an extended figure, it is 
possible to solve a problem related to that display— how far 
in front of the pattern of dots is the figure that appears. 
The next part of the context would proceed by presenting 
one of the. original members or a new partner with a pair of 
goggles which made recession visible, while the other member 
continued to view extension. The problem to be.resolved 
remains the same as the one presented earlier, but the 
alteration in visual alignment disrupts the prior resolution 
and permits the occasion for reflection on what has been made 
known and the possible renegotiation of the task. And with 
such a context and task we can begin to address the con­
jectures put forth about the consequences of talk.
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METHOD
Overview: Four exploratory studies have been devised which
can: (a) sustain a novel and problematic context during 
which an experimental task is to be solved; (b) provide an 
opportunity to experimentally manipulate the occasion for 
reflection; (c) offer the chance to renegotiate the initial 
solution; and (d) manipulate how a member acquires the 
information about how the task is to be performed. Each 
study has at least two parts and begins with two (2) subjects
viewing an extended Julesz stereogram. The subjects are
asked to arrive at a cooperative judgment about how far in
front of the pattern of dots the figure that appears is. The
ensuing dialogue allows the subjects to consensually validate 
their judgments, and the manner of knowing constructed in 
these contexts refers to the derivation of a particular 
solution to the task at hand. The later parts of each study 
begin with one member, either one of. the original pair or a 
new member, wearing a set of color-coded goggles which makes 
the figure in the stereogram appear recessed. The other 
partner continues to view an extended figure and the task to 
be resolved remains unchanged. The later part of each study 
is then shaped so that the manner of knowing which emerged 
during the initial interaction is made problematic and open 
to renegotiation. In addition, the new member's stance
toward the negotiated knowledge is such that (s)he is 
informed about the visual world and the task to be performed 
either through their own speech and sight or through the talk 
and explanation of others.
Materials: The stimuli presented in all four studies are
Julesz stereograms— either a diamond or triangle. When the 
stereograms are viewed a set of goggles are worn which have 
red and green acetate lenses. When the goggles worn have red 
acetate over the right eye and green over the left, the figure 
appears to move forward and out from the center of the visual 
field (extension). If the colors are reversed, the figure 
appears to have receded back and away from the center of the 
display (recession). At all times a 3 x 5 ’unruled index card 
with the experimental problem typed on it is on the table and 
in full view of the subjects. Also on the table in front of 
the participants is a Panasonic RQ-32^S cassette recorder 
with three SONY F-2? microphones attached. The stereograms 
are projected on an American Optical Hs Opaque Projector 
1000.
Study One (The Base):1^
Subjects: •Seven teams of subjects from the Brooklyn College 
17'The rationale for the first part of each study should 
be clear, it offers an opportunity to acquire some knowledge 
about the world. With the variations presented in the second 
part of the studies we offer the occasion for reflection and/ 
or transmission of the first solution. But most importantly 
we can- ascertain how the stance of the "knower"— the person
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subject pool were used for a total of lk subjects, 5 males
and 9 females, ranging in age from 17 to 20.
Procedure: There are two parts to this study and the same
two subjects (si and s2) participate in each part. In the
first part of the design, the Ss are requested to enter the
experimental room and to take seats at the table. On the
table in front of them are two microphones, a cassette
recorder, two sets of goggles, and an index card with the
experimental problem typed on it. Behind them is the opaque
projector and another table.
The subjects are told that the experiment is concerned-
with how individuals reach solutions to problems and are
read the following instructions:
Let me explain the first part of the experiment 
in more detail. As I've said we are concerned 
with how individuals reach solutions to 
problems. The pattern of dots that is now 
projected on the wall (screen) provides the 
problem that you will have to solve. On the 
table in front of you are a pair of goggles.
When you place the goggles over your eyes a 
figure which is not apparent without the goggles 
will appear. It may take some time for the 
figure to become clearly visible. The tape 
recorder is present to record how you both go 
about solving the experimental problem.
Once the figure appears the problem that you 
must solve ijs to mutually come to an agreement 
on how far in front of the pattern of dots the 
figure that appears is. This part of the 
experiment is over when you have cooperatively
whose knowledge will be challenged— influences the ability to 
renegotiate the results. As such, with the exception of study
1, the names given to each study are meant to evoke how that 
"knower" acquired what was known— directly through his or her 
own experience or vicariously, through the experience of others.
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agreed on how far in front of the dots the 
figure is. The problem must be solved jointly, 
and in no case can the experimenter be asked for 
help once the experiment has begun.
When the lights are shut off you may place 
the goggles on. Take a few moments to adjust 
to wearing them. You can begin to solve the 
problem as soon as the shape has become clearly 
visible. So you do not forget what the problem 
is, it is typed on the index card in front of you. 
Again, the problem is to mutually come to an 
agreement on how far in front of the pattern of 
dots the figure that appears is.i8
When the problem is resolved with the first stereogram 
(a diamond), the subjects are asked to remove their goggles 
and rest their eyes. During this rest period a second 
stereogram (a triangle) is projected on the screen. The 
second part of the experiment begins when the E returns the 
goggles to the participants. However, as the second part is 
always constructed to provide reflection on the previous 
experience, the E randomly selects one of the subjects and 
presents that subject with a set of goggles whose color 
arrangement is different than those worn in the first part.
18The detailed instructions for each of the studies is 
in Appendix A. As there are different sets of color-coded^ 
goggles the subjects stand in a set of possible relationships 
to each other and to the experimental instructions. The set 
of possible relations are spelled out in Tables 1 and 2 in 
Appendix B. But each study proceeds in the first part by 
having the subjects each wear goggles that enable- them to see 
an extended display— that is the goggles have red acetate 
over the right eye and green over the left. What the subjects 
view then matches the experimental task which requires a 
judgment about extension. The conditions which are omitted 
provide other interesting twists to what can be accomplished. 
But they are omitted so that the studies, given their 
exploratory nature, can be standardized as much as possible.
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The other subject is given the set of goggles previously
worn. The randomly selected S now views a recessed triangle,
while the partner continues to see an extended one.
Before the goggles are put on, the experimenter tells
the subjects that:
You can proceed as you did in the first part 
of the experiment. Your task is again to 
mutually come to an agreement on how far in 
front of the pattern of dots the figure that 
appears is.
Study Two (The Repeater):
Subjects; Seven teams were used for a total of twenty-one 
subjects, 13 females and 8 males, ranging in age from 17 to 
36.
Procedure: As with study number one there are two parts to
this study, but there are now three subjects (si, s2, and 
s3). Prior to starting the experiment, the subjects are 
informed that they will be participating in a study which 
has multiple parts, that they will be randomly assigned to 
these parts by drawing lots, and that the study is concerned 
with how individuals reach solutions to problems. Once the 
part assignment is completed, si and s2 enter the laboratory 
while s3 remains seated outside.
When si and s2 enter the room they are read essentially 
the same instructions provided to the subjects in study number 
one. The modification made is that they are told that one of 
them, but not which one, will have to take part in the second 
phase of the experiment and explain to the person waiting
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outside what the experimental task was and how it was 
solved.
With the resolution of the task the subjects are asked
to remove their goggles and one of the Ss— as determined by
the initial random selection— leaves the room and asks s3
to enter. This departing S is also asked to remain outside
so that (s)he can take part in the debriefing. When the new
subject enters, (s)he is told:
As you know the person you are seated next
to has participated in the first part of the
experiment. This individual will now explain 
to you what the experimental task was that 
had to be solved, and how it was solved in 
the first part. When this is done both of 
you will have to reach a cooperative solution 
to the same problem that was solved in the 
first part. In no case can the experimenter 
be asked for assistance once the experiment 
has begun.
The new subject (s3) is presented with a pair of 
goggles which show a recessed diamond, while the remaining 
subject (si or s2) continues to wear the goggles which show 
an extended diamond. In this study, and studies three and 
four, the stereogram viewed in all parts is a diamond.
Study Three (The Watcher-Hearer):
Subjects: Seven teams were used for a total of twenty-eight
subjects, 20 females and 8 males, ranging in age from 17 to
53.
Procedure: Though there are still two parts to this study,
a team is composed of four subjects (si, s2, s3» and s*0 .
As with study two, the members are initially introduced to
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the study and randomly assigned to the part and role that
they will have. When si and s2 enter the room they are given
the same introduction that the subjects for study one were
provided with. In addition, they are informed that another
subject, the watcher-hearer (s3), will observe them while
they solve the task and that in the second part of the study
it is that individual, s3, who will explain the task to the
last subject, s*K
After this introduction is given to si and s2, the
third subject is brought into the room and told:
As the other subjects work on the experimental 
problem you will watch them and hear them solve 
it. It is important that you pay attention to 
their efforts for even though you will not be 
wearing goggles it is your responsibility in 
the second part of the study to explain to the 
subject now waiting outside what the experi­
mental task was and how it was resolved. After 
you do that you will be asked to solve with that 
person the same problem that was solved here.
During this part of the experiment you can 
not offer any advice, nor can the subjects ask 
for your help. Once they have solved the task 
feel free to ask them any questions you think 
are necessary to know for the second part of 
the experiment.
The major modification that occurs in this study is that 
one member— the watcher-hearer— observes two members solving 
the task but has no first-hand knowledge of what they see as 
(s)he is not wearing goggles. What the watcher-hearer can 
know is only what (s)he observes or hears. After the first 
part of the study concludes, it is this third subject who 
must convey the task demands to a new, and sighted, partner
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who views a recessed diamond. When the original pair, si
and s2, depart and a fourth subject enters, (s)he is told:
As you know the person you are seated next 
to has participated in the first part of the 
experiment. This individual will now explain 
what the experimental task was that had to be 
solved and how it was solved in the first part 
of the study. When this is done both of you 
will have to reach a cooperative solution to 
the same problem that was solved in the first 
part. When I shut the lights off you can put 
on your set of goggles. The other person is 
not wearing goggles, and can not put them on.
In no case can the experimenter be asked for 
assistance once the experiment has begun.
Study Four (The Hearer):
Subjects: Seven teams were used for a total of twenty-eight
subjects, 12 males and 16 females, ranging in age from 17 to
Procedure: While there are still four subjects (si, s2, s3»
and s*0 there are now three parts to the study. The subjects 
are again introduced to the experiment and randomly assigned 
to parts and roles. The first part begins when si and s2 
enter the room and are read the same instructions as 
presented in study number two. At the conclusion of the 
task, one member leaves and requests another to enter. This 
new member— the hearer— is told by the remaining subject what 
the task was and how it was solved. During this explanation, 
neither member wears goggles, and the hearer only knows about 
the task through the comments of his or her partner. When 
the explanation is concluded to the satisfaction of the 
participants, the remaining member of the original pair
(si or s2) departs and asks the last and fourth member to 
enter the room. When this subject enters, the third part of 
the study begins with a similar set of instructions as 
presented in the second phase of study number three. And 
the hearer who has no visual access to the stereogram 
explains the task demands to a partner who sees a recessed 
diamond.
Subjects: Overall a total of 91 subjects, 33 males and 58
females, were recruited from the Brooklyn College subject 
pool, and each subject was randomly assigned to a study, a 
part, and a task role. The subjects were all taking 
introductory psychology courses and ranged in age from 17
RESULTS
Two different descriptive approaches will he used to 
assess the transcripts: one quantitative and the other 
qualitative. The quantitative analysis seeks only to set 
a background for the more detailed qualitative description 
of the conversations. And the qualitative component will 
attempt to systematically explore the dialogues and 
sensitize the reader to relevant issues.
I. Quantitative Description
Of the 91 subjects who participated in the studies,
four (*0 (two in study two and two in study four) could not
see both extension and recession. However, three of these
subjects took part when it was necessary to see extension,
and each of them could see the extended figure. The
remaining subject could only see recession, and served in
the second part of the experiment when recession was what
was supposed to be viewed. All of the subjects who took
part in the studies were then able to see what they were
19intended to see. *
■^Each subject was asked to describe what (s)he was 
seeing in as much detail as possible at the conclusion of the 
experimental chore but prior to the debriefing. The first 
subject requested to give a description was always the 
individual who was seeing a recessed figure. After this 
description the goggles were switched and the same subject 
was again asked what was seen. After this the partner who
kl
(a): Time to Reach Solution
As the members in the first part of each* study begin by 
seeing an extended diamond they are presented with a straight­
forward tasks to mutually decide how far in front of the rest 
of the display the diamond appears to be. In that each study 
begins in the same manner, the time taken to resolve the 
experimental task during the first part is not expected to 
vary between the four studies. With the movement to the 
later stages of the studies, the task becomes more complex 
and with the discovery of the perceptual alteration more 
difficult. If we can assume that an increase in task 
complexity and difficulty will be reflected in an increase 
in the time taken to resolve the experimental.chore, we 
would expect that the later parts of each study will take 
longer to complete than the first part. Furthermore, the 
third conjecture suggests that it will be harder to renego­
tiate the task the more removed the "knower" is from the 
original context. As such there is a presumed direction of 
difficulty as we proceed from Study One (the Base) to Study
had either extension or nothing was asked to describe what 
(s)he was seeing, beginning with extension. After this 
description was completed any subjects who were waiting 
outside were brought in and asked to provide similar^ 
descriptions, one at a time and starting with extension.
This check enabled us to determine what it was that the 
subjects were viewing if it was not explicit^in^talk. Though 
each subject went through this process even if it was obvious 
from their discussion what was being seen, this permitted 
us to verify that the subjects could see both extension and 
recession.
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Four (the Hearer) and we would now expect the times taken 
to finish the task to vary between the studies— it should 
take less time to complete the task in the later parts of 
the first study than the second, third and fourth studies 
and so on. The times taken by the subjects to conclude the 
task is shown in Table 3 and the following points emerge:
Table 3
Mean Time (in seconds) Taken 
by Subjects to Conclude the 
Experimental Taska




Four 105.80 ' 286.91
a. In order to make the parts 
comparable, part 1 excludes the 
time in study 3 when the subject 
asks questions of the Ss, and 
part 2 excludes that part of the 
study 4 which has the old Ss 
explaining to the new S what has 
occurred.
First, the first part of the studies show more 
variability than originally anticipated as studies two and 
three appear to take considerably longer to conclude than
do studies four and one. A one-way ANOVA on the means for
part 1 shows a significant difference (F 3,24 - 3*77
p < .05), and a Scheffe test at the recommended level of
.10 (Ferguson, 1971) reveals a significant difference for
the comparison between the means of studies three and four
(F' 3, 2k= 6.99 p < .10). An examination of Study Three
shows that there is one interaction which takes quite a
while to conclude and which brings up the overall mean for 
20that study. If the analysis is adjusted to exclude this 
interaction, the one-way ANOVA is no longer significant.
Yet, there is the suggestion that some differences between 
the studies may exist as the times taken to conclude studies 
two and three are still longer than the times taken for 
studies one and four.
Second, while it seems that the second part of the 
studies take longer to conclude, with the exception of Study 
Four (t = -2.47 P <-05) these differences are not statis­
tically significant. Third, the supposed direction of 
difficulty in part 2— an increase in time from study One 
to Four— appears to be only weakly suggested. And fourth, 
the one-way ANOVA on the means for part two reveals no 
significant difference so the anticipated variability between 
the studies has not occurred.
^^With this interaction omitted the mean for Study Three 
becomes 249.20. It should be noted that the time taken to 
conclude the task is not being considered as a measure of 
cognitive processes.
4-4-
However, an important qualification must be made. A 
task was presumed to be more difficult only when the
perceptual anomaly between the parts was discerned. In the
21majority of cases (17/28 or 60.71?o), the anomaly was never 
revealed. It then is necessary to separate those cases where 
it remained concealed. In scrutinizing those cases where a 
difference was noticed (Table 4-), it is clear that the second
Table 4-
Time Taken (in seconds) by Subjects to 
Conclude the Experimental Task when the 
Difference Between the Parts Is Noticed





Two 258.5 4-26.84-81.8 677.3
318.4- 366.7
Three 806.? 912.7
Four 115-5 24-3.4-30.4- 399.114-3.8 617.3
21That such a substantial number of teams did not 
unearth the perceptual differences between the parts is an 
integral part of the qualitative analysis which follows. The 
breakdown of those cases which found a difference and those 
which did not is listed in Table 10.
part of the studies always took longer to complete. But 
even in this analysis there does not appear to be any strong 
support for the assumption of increased difficulty as we 
proceed from Study One to Study Four. If this particular 
argument is to be maintained we must find support for it 
elsewhere than the analysis of time.
(b): Distances Reached
Requiring the subjects to arrive at a decision about 
distance and then having that outcome passed on to someone 
else is the closest this research comes to replicating the 
"arbitrary tradition" literature. It is then interesting to 
probe the data to see if any comparisons can be made.
One initial difference between this work and the earlier 
research must be elaborated before any similarities are 
discussed. In the "arbitrary tradition" research the subjects 
always work with the same task, but in these studies if a 
disparity is revealed, the different parts take on a 
radically altered nature. To make the appropriate comparisons 
at least two criteria have to be met:
a: that the same figure be seen in both 
parts;
b: that the subjects do not realize they 
have varied relationships towards the 
stereogram.
Some further criteria need to be specified before we can 
proceed to contrast the data. These additions are:
c: that reaching a distance is part of 
the task conveyed to a new member;
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d: that the earlier decision be given 
• to the new member;
e: that the task is seen as being a cooperative venture.22
There are five (5) cases which satisfy the criteria 
listed above, but before making any statements about what 
this data represents a further discrimination between this 
research and the "arbitrary tradition" literature should be 
made. The studies presented here have a very short life. 
What is transmitted is done only once or twice, while the 
earlier work had generational cycles of at least four. Any­
thing that appears to be transmitted should not be thought 
of as a norm. The five cases are listed in Table 5. and the
Table 5
Distances (in inches) Reached 
Across Parts
Study^ Part 1 Part 2
One ---- ----
Two 9 8.6 to 912 12
12 12
Three 2a 2 to 3
Four 5 6
a. The actual responses here were 
a "couple of inches" and a "few 
inches."
22These criteria automatically exclude all of Study One 
where two different stereograms are viewed, and the eleven
closeness of the distances derived in both parts is 
suggestive. It seems plausible to propose that what the 
"arbitrary tradition" research produced is also generated 
here with talk, though weakly. A previous decision has 
been created and transmitted, however short-lived.
(c): Talk Assessed
The results presented here provide the first entry 
into the discourse, and the coding offered should be 
considered as a preliminary grid— suggestive and descriptive 
rather than conclusive. Furthermore, as no inter-rater 
reliability is available for the talk coded here, this
23analysis of the C-acts should be interpreted cautiously.
The coding scheme used was borrowed from Cole, Dore, 
Hall, and Dowley (1978) and permits the coding of 
conversational acts (C.-acts) into eight broad categories:
(1) requests; (2) responses; (3) descriptions; (^) statements 
(5) acknowledgements; (6) organizational devices;
cases where a difference was discovered. Criterion (e) is 
related to (d) in that the remaining S may suggest that it 
is only the new member who has to provide a distance. In 
this case the remaining partner does not need to rely on 
the prior decision and everything is left up to the new 
subject. In these cases there is then no issue of something 
being transmitted and maintained.
^ A n  additional problem should be indicated: that some 
of the coded utterances could fit more than one category. 
That a C-act, or speech act, can serve a multiplicity of 
functions and can be equivocal is a well recognized problem 
in the literature (Labov & Fanshel, 1977? and Dore, 1977)*
(7) performatives; and (8) miscellaneous utterances. In 
using these categories a word, phrase, clause, or sentence 
was assessed to see if it was a C-act. No unit larger than 
a sentence was coded and the Cole et al. classificatory 
scheme was abbreviated as we omitted such concerns as topic 
shifts, grammatical form, illocutionary force, and inter­
actional value as these issues seemed less relevant to the 
task at hand. The distribution of the discourse is shown 
in Tables 6 and 7, and in each study the bulk of the
Table 6
Conversational Act Analysis of Discourse 
.by Study for Part One
Category Study 1 Study 2' Study 3 Study 4
Requests 27-2 21.9 23.3 25.2
Responses
•  r
24.0 17.2 13.7 21.3
Descriptions 10.2 14.0 20.9 22.5
Statements 17.8 20.2 19.6 10.6
Acknowledgements 16.3 18.2 17.5 16.'9
Organizational 0.0 1.7 0.6 0.0
Performative s 0.0 0.9 1.8 0.0
Miscellaneous
. 4.5 ..liS ...2.5 _3^i
Total Percent 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0
Total C-Acts 2 46 441 755 254
k9
Table 7
Conversational Act Analysis of Discourse 
by Study for Part Two
Category Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study k
Requests 22.9 2k.6 22.3 2 6.6
Responses 18.0 15.5 lk.6 18.0
Descriptions 16.0 19.2 22.5 16.7
Statements 22.8 22.7 22.0 23.k
Acknowledgements Ik.5 13.6 15.3 12.8
Organi zational 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0
Performative s 0.9 1.2 0.1 0.3
Miscellaneous k.9 3.0 3.2 2.2
Total Percent 100.0 100^0 100.0 100.0
Total C-Acts kk9 572 690 718
utterances (75% or more) fall into the first four categories—  
requests, responses, descriptions, and statements. While it 
may not be surprising to find that in this particular context 
the subjects spend a good deal of their time exchanging 
information and describing what they see, their restriction 
to the topic suggests their involvement with the task-at- 
hand. Indeed that the conversations recorded here seem to 
minimize small talk, restrict greetings, and downplay the 
side sequences which occur in other conversational contexts
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should serve as a reminder that the conversation is topic 
constricted and limited in a certain "way— it is what can be 
called task-focused-talk.
As with the description of time taken to reach a 
solution, we would presume that the talk recorded in the 
first part would show somewhat similar patterns— with the 
divergence occurring in the later parts of each study. The 
first point to note is that if we examine the total C-acts 
coded for the first part of each study (Table 6) the 
variability between the studies suggested in the time 
analysis resurfaces: studies two and three show a higher 
number of C-acts than do studies one and four. Again, as 
with the analysis of time, the same interaction in Study 
Three is inflating the total C-acts. This encounter 
contributes about of the C-acts (309 out of 755 C-acts), 
but even if we exclude this interaction the number of C-acts 
coded for studies two and three remain higher than studies 
one and four. While it is possible that the increase in 
C-acts is in part attributable to the presence of an 
observer in Study Three, this could not be the explanation 
for Study Two. So again the issue of a possible difference 
between the initial conditions of studies two and three from 
those of studies one and four arises.
When we compare the Tables, we can see that with the 
exception of Study Three the number of C-acts increase from 
the first to the second part of each study. The higher
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number of C-acts is in part a result of the explanation that 
the members must provide to each other in the later parts of 
studies two, three, and four. But as no explanation is 
required for Study One, we can suggest that some of the 
additional talk is occurring for reasons other than providing 
an explanation of the task.
Another point can be raised if we compare the first 
four categories as they appear in Tables 6 and 7 . As noted 
in the analysis of time, there again seems to be less 
variability in the later part of the studies than in the 
first part. For example, Table 6 shows that across studies 
the category of "descriptions" ranges from 10.2$ to 22.5$
(a range of 12.3$). whereas in Table 7 the -range is much 
narrower (from 16.05 to 22.5$). A similar statement could 
be made about the other three categories.
While this classification of the discourse raises some 
concerns about what is happening in the conversations, it 
does not reveal what we wanted to get at: the construction 
of typifications. And in a very real sense the heart of the 
proceedings remains masked— the role that talk may have in 
concealing the altered visual perspective. A closer, more 
focused and detailed examination of the transcripts is 
required.
II. Qualitative Description
It is the burden of the qualitative description to 
provide a more nuanced and precise formalization of the role
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talk may play in developing a shared social world. To begin 
to move to this detailed examination of the discourse, I 
want to present, without analysis, the entire first part of 
two face-to-face encounters which occur in Study One (the 
Base), and ask some straightforward questions about these 
exchanges.
Consider first transcript # 12: 
hum
I would say...a foot...I don’t know 
it's hard to tell
I know...it's hard to say...I hate things 
like this...a half a foot? A foot?
It's really tough. My first impression 
was a foot.
A foot?
What did you say?
I don't know. I would think maybe a foot, 
or something like that, 
uh huh




Should we put down the same dimensions?
It's about eight or nine inches? 
yeah, I guess so 
yeah
alright... that was easy 
Ok...now what?...now what?
Ok, have you reached an agreement? 
yeah 
yeah
and then transcript #3 :
si: see it? 
s2: yeah
si: how far do you think it is?
s2: mmmmm...mmmmm...a foot...what do you say?
si: it's less...it looks like eight inches,





















sl: you don't think it's any less than a foot? 
s2: uh no...I'd say it's really about a foot?
Turn your head a little bit and see if you 
can make the background come out before and 
then see how much...can you see that? 
sl: nnno
sl: I still think it's like, you know, a little 
less
s2: I'd say 10 inches...is a little less, no 
more than, not less than 10 inches 
sl: no I think it's like 10 
s2: ten inches? 
sl: yeah
s2: I'll go along with that 
sl: ten inches 
s2: yeah
How is it that these numbers, 10 inches, one foot, 
and a continual reference to some-thing, "it," are heard as 
being germane to the experiment: for the participants, for 
E, and for the reader? How is it that these exchanges can 
be considered to have reached a satisfactory conclusion 
for these parties? Obviously, the appropriateness of the 
talk has been shaped and influenced by the experimental 
instructions. In these two interactions, the protocols 
provided, as Berger and Luckmann noted " . . .  the background 
of a world that is silently taken for granted." The members' 
dialogue is heard as being responsive to the experimental 
task and as correctly resolving the problem because each of 
the participants, and E and the reader, share the same 
instructional set and rely on the presumptions included 
within that frame. While this may answer the questions 
just posed, it is incomplete for it does not articulate what
5^
that taken-for-granted world is nor specify the precise role 
that the instructions play.
(a): An Entry Point
To elaborate these issues, I want to connect two topics
raised in the introduction— Sherif-.'s discussion of norm
formation and the phenomenological concern with the taken-
for-granted world— with the concept of figure and ground. In
writing about norm formation, Sherif cites Koffka's statement
about the basic decomposability of the relationship between
figure and ground:
. . . the ground has a very important function 
of its own. It serves as a general level . . . 
upon which the figure appears. Now figure and 
ground form a structure, consequently-the, 
former can not be independent of the latter.
On the contrary the quality of the figure 
must be largely determined by the general 
level upon which it appears. (Sherif, 1935. 
pp. 37-38)
Sherif then adds:
The ground is especially important in social 
psychology. Studies in social facilitation 
would gain much sense if the subtle relation­
ships between figure and ground were taken 
into consideration. For example, when two^ 
people are talking in a public theater their 
conversation and behavior are tinged by the 
properties of the whole atmosphere. (1935. 
p. 39)
Figure and ground relations are then not to be found or 
presumed only in a perceptual domain but are meant to 
encompass social relations. Two senses of figure and ground 
can then be offered: a literal or physical sense, and a 
metaphoric or social sense.
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But in either domain what emerges as "figure" can not 
be divorced from its relation to some "ground." The issues 
of norm formation and taken-for-granted make similar points 
in that what stands forth as figure— normative or culturally 
appropriate— takes place against some set of social 
presuppositions which serve as "ground"— "a preparedness to 
see." Even if these grounds can not be articulated. Within
the context of these studies, the instructions provide a
detailed and explicit ground from which talk and action can 
emerge and be "heard" and "seen" as responsive to the task- 
at-hand. In each study the protocols structure the following 
grounds:
i: that there is a non-visible event yet to 
be seen (FUTURE) 
ii: that with a visual aid the two dimensional 
display before them will unveil this still 
non-visible dimension (GOGGLES) 
iii: that this as yet unidentified dimension 
will be some figure (FIGURE) 
iv: that this figure will stand in a set 
relation to the visual display seen 
without the visual aid (RELATION) 
v: that the emerging figure will appear to 
be in front of the two dimensional display 
(EXTENSION) 
vi: that the separation between the two
figures can be assessed along some scale 
of distance (DISTANCE) 
viis that the determination of the distance 
is to be cooperatively achieved 
(MUTUALITY)
viii: that each member will see the same visual 
display and have the same relationship to 
it (SAMENESS) 
ix: that one of the members will have to 
explain the problem to a new member 
(RIGHTS)
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x: that the same problem will be addressed 
and repeated in later parts of the 
study (REPEATABILITY)24
During the first part of the experiments the instructions 
will then accomplish two things. First, they will formulate 
a set of relevant concerns that will both guide and constrain 
talk; and second, they will provide the grounds from which 
the conversation can be "heard" as relevant to the task-at- 
hand. If the analogy between figure and ground, talk and 
instructions, is to be taken seriously we need a way to 
assess these two claims.
If the instructions do orient the participants to the 
task and do establish an opening set of relevant domains, 
we can check the first claim by examining each initial query 
or opening comment. For a question or opening gambit should 
address one of the ten points listed— either implicitly or 
explicitly. However, there is one additional tactic that 
may arise:
xi: that any participant who does not 
understand the instructions can ask 
that they be repeated or clarified 
(CLARIFICATION)
ph The instructions obviously present more information than . 
is noted in these ten points. For example, the Ss are told 
that there is an index card on the table, that the mikes are 
on, and that E can not be asked for help. These issues will 
arise in talk and are important, but as they usually arise 
when trouble occurs in the second part of the experiments 
they are left out. Also, points (i) through (viii) and (x) 
are operative in each study, whereas (ix) is not a part of 
study number one. Furthermore, point (ix) will become an 
issue in the second part of studies three, four and two.
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In examining the opening comments, there are only three 
instances (3/28) which fall outside these eleven concerns.
Of these three cases, two occur between friends who start 
with "Are you ready, Sal," and "Dirty pictures." The 
remaining exception is a query to E as to whether the study 
is going to be timed. It is plausible that this remark can 
be accounted for by the stopwatch held by E. After this 
temporary diversion, each of these conversations return to 
the concerns specified in the instructions.
We can examine the second point by returning to the 
dialogue previously cited. It must be noted that what- is 
not said is as important as what is said. In each 
conversation neither member identifies the figure seen (a 
diamond), and each reference to an "it" works off the 
instructional presumption that they see some-thing which is 
the same-thing for each of them. As neither partner objects 
to this formulation, "it" can stand in place of the more 
specific designation, diamond. Besides this omission, the 
partners never clarify the relationship of the diamond to 
the rest of the display— that it is "in front." And in 
transcript #3 , we find the expression "how far do you think 
it is?" Again, as there is no protest about this usage by 
the partner a distance is offered.
As with "it," this less specific phase takes for granted 
the presumption that the same-thing is seen and that each 
partner sees the figure in the same manner— as an extended
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image. The presumption that each member sees what'the
"other" views legitimates their use of synonyms. A variety
of expressions, less specific ones, are able to stand in
place of "diamond" and "in front" which if unchallenged
permits the exchange of numbers and the resolution of the
experimental problem. And enables the members to continue
believing that the reference and meaning of these alternate
designations are unproblematic.
With the emergence of these synonyms we can see how the
members heard their talk as germane to the task at hand.
But it is not necessary that members remain silent about what
is viewed, and we can contrast these dialogues with ones
where the presumptions are considered a topic to be discussed.
Consider transcript #20, part 1, study
sl: what do you see? 
s2: a diamond
sl: yeah...it's a diamond. How far in 
front does it look? 
s2: urn...it looks about 
sl: I don't know maybe a foot 
s2: about a foot? 
sl: yeah looks good 
s2: yeah
sl: that was quick 
s2: fair enough
sl: Ok...we're supposed to let him know?
and then transcript # 17, part 1, study 2:
s2: do you see a figure? 
sl: yeah
s2: Ok can you tell me what you see? 
sl: it's a diamond shaped square, smaller 
than the other one, it's in front of 
the larger one 
s2: now I'm having difficulty because, uh,
I don't see that. Are both of your, uh, 
both of your glasses have a colored
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screen, do your lenses have a colored 
screen? 
sl: right
s2s only one of my lenses has a colored 
screen 
sl: what do you see? 
s2: as I see it, although you know I,
there may he a problem here, cause I 
have astigmatism and use only one eye.
It may require that uh...we need both 
eyes to uh see that 
sl: is the eye with the ast... 
s2: Oh now I see, now it's coming into 
focus. Ok how far away do you assume 
that it is from the uh... 
sl: a foot? 
s2: a foot 
sl: what about you
s2: well yeah, uh, I...I guess it's a foot.
Can you think of any other way of 
verifying that? 
sl: that's what I don't understand, it just 
seems a foot but I don't know how come 
it seems a foot 
s2: a foot Ok
sl: when I close one eye it disappears 
s2: yeah, well that's why I wasn't seeing it 
for a while, because I was having to focus 
both eyes...Ok the thing is that this is 
an illusion anyway 
sl: uh huh
s2: and uh whatever we say is incorrect
sl: right
s2: so uh...hum
sl: do we have to know why it appears in 
front of the other one or do we just 
have to say how much 
s2: ...how far in front... 
sl: just how far
s2: in front of it it appears...I find it 
difficult to say anything...because I 
know that it's not really from it...I,
I, well you want to say a foot? 
sl: yeah, that sounds good to me 
s2: and uh, my problem is I don't want to 
say anything 
sl: you don't want to say anything? 
s2: do you feel that way at all?...any conflict 
in saying that it's a foot when you realize 
that it's just an illusion?
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sis you're right about it being an illusion, 
it's not really a foot...but it appears 
to be a foot 
s2: it does?...Ok as far as appearances... 
since we can't be sure, I guess... 
anything will do. If I said six inches 
would you agree with that? 
sl: um...it looks like more than' six inches 
s2: Ok, you're pretty sure that it's a foot 
and you’re seeing with two eyes and I'm 
only seeing with barely two, so...OK 
we'll agree then 
sl: Ok
s2: Ok, it appears to be a foot 
sl: alright 
s2: Ok
These two conversations clearly demonstrate that some of 
the instructional presumptions may be placed in words and 
evaluated. The shape can be identified and the relationship 
specified. However, an issue is brought out in transcript #17 
which has not appeared before. For the first time "new" 
topics are placed on the floor and the subjects briefly 
discuss the color of their goggles, the question of whether 
the image seen is really an illusion, and how a precise 
figure can be derived. But note that these topics are placed 
on the floor for a specific reason: one of the partners, s2,
is having difficulty either in seeing or agreeing to a 
distance. When some problem arises the members can put these 
difficulties into words for each other, yet these "new" 
topics are not bizarre. They are related to thetask-at- 
hand and are heard and understood as pertaining to the 
member's ability to reach some solution to the experimental 
chore. While the preliminary concerns structured by the 
instructions constrain the task and what is talked about
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they are not binding. In the face of an obstacle whatever 
is needed to resolve the problem will be talked about.
A further point needs to be addressed, and it is similar 
to the one raised in the brief examination of transcripts 3 
and 12. After the participants conversed about the relation­
ship and shape seen, after the presumption of sameness is 
verified, the specific designations were replaced by synonyms. 
We again see "it" employed as a substitute for "diamond," and 
"far away" sometimes used as a replacement for "in front."
The range of synonyms used by the participants in the first 
part of the study to replace the specific designations are 
presented in Table 8.
What this table permits us to see is the subtle evolution 
of a member's vocabulary. As long as these terms go 
unchallenged, the participants have available to them a 
variety of expressions, each of which is presumed inter­
changeable with the more precise designations. For members 
who rely on the supposition of a shared world, these phrases 




Synonyms Employed by the Members in
the First Part of Each Study
Figure In Fronta
diamond . far away
it far forward
small figure far
little thing in sticking out
the middle
square further away






geometric box towards me
baseball diamond far from the screen
triangle from the dots
shape front of the dots 
.in front of you 
close to us 
far from the dots 
away from the square 
far from the center 
close to the screen 
from the screen 
from the back
a. The issue of synonyms to express the 
relationship is intriguing. There are a 
variety of orientations which can be 
taken. And if we include as synonyms 
body position we can add such phrases as: 
close to me, adjusts to us, in front of 
machine, and moves back with us.
Table 9 allows us to determine the number of conversa­
tions which specified the figure seen and its relationship to 




Number of Conversations which use Specific 










One 3 7 3 6
Two 5 7 k 7
Three 6 7 3 6
Four 5 7 k 5
Total 19 28 Ik 2k
a. During any conversation members can use 
either the specific'expression or the 
synonym.
That the "figure" is more frequently specified than the 
relationship is clear, but what is interesting is that in 
50?* of the transcripts the precise relationship of the diamond 
to the rest of the display is not articulated. And that in 
some encounters, k, it is not even expressed with synonyms. 
However, some comment about the figure is made in each 
conversation.
All of this may appear a rather tedious way to state the 
obvious: that the experimental instructions provide the
"silent background" for the members' conversation and frame 
a set of pragmatic concerns. Simply put, the members' 
dialogue allowed them to complete the task at hand. But more
6b
than this has been accomplished. A vocabulary has evolved 
which represents a history of the interaction and which 
depends on the presumption that the members share a common 
visual world. In knowing in detail the taken-for-granted 
world and the range of expressions the members use to convey 
this detail, we can offer a way to see how "new" realities 
emerge and a means by which the original conjectures can be 
assessed.
(b): The Presentation of a Problem
With the conclusion of the first part of each study 
there are two culturally sophisticated members who have 
developed a vocabulary to express what they know about the 
figure and its relationship to the rest of the display. In 
the later parts of each study, one of these members speaks 
with, or conveys the task demands to a partner whose 
perception of the stereogram is altered— a recessed diamond 
is viewed. But as the enculturated member is ignorant of 
this switch, (s)he enters the other phases of the study 
initially relying on the presumptions which have worked 
before and on a vocabulary which takes these suppositions 
for granted.
The perceptual disparity introduced into the later 
parts of each study was to provide a challenge to these 
presumptions, and have the culturally knowledgable member 
reflect on his or her prior experience. It was this
backwards glance at lived experience which was to provide 
the occasion to watch for the formation of a type. The 
problem to be raised is that in the majority of these 
conversations (60.17$, 17/ 28), no disparity was revealed.
That the perceptual modification is systematically 
concealed represents a surprise and suggests that a critical 
experimental manipulation failed to work as planned. But 
before this conclusion is accepted, we need to assess two 
questions: (1) did something occur between the participants
so that their dialogue did not permit the unearthing of this 
anomaly; and (2) did a member's positiori--as a direct or 
indirect knower— towards the display influence the ability 
to discern a difference?
It is important to note, however, that there are two 
ways to decide whether or not a difference was discovered. 
First, we can consider a difference to have been recognized 
when the culturally knowledgable member realizes that there 
has been a shift to recession for the partner. If this 
procedure is employed, 67*86$ (19/28) of the conversations 
never locate the disparity. The second way of counting 
differences is to consider that any alteration between the 
parts which the members argue makes the parts incompatible 
represents a difference, regardless of the dimension on 
which the irregularity is noticed. With this method, 60.71$ 
(17/28) of the interactions do not find a difference.
Table 10 shows the different methods of counting, and it
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Table 10 











One k 0 3
Two 3 0 k
Three 0 1 6
Four 2 1
Total 9 2 17
is apparent that differences are not located on the 
"correct" dimension— recession— only for studies three and 
four. Furthermore, there is no study where the anomaly is 
uniformly discovered. Even in study 1, where the same 
participants serve in both parts of the encounter, the 
difference remains concealed in three out of seven inter­
actions. Also, if we consider the column which shows the 
number of differences discovered on the proper variable, 
the uncovering of a difference appears systematic. The 
individuals in study 1 were more likely to discover the 
irregularity than those in studies two, three, and four.
Why is the perceptual alteration so difficult to find? 
Here for example is the entire transcript (#3) for the
2Ksecond part of a conversation which occurred in study 1:■ J
e: Any questions? Just begin whenever 
you are ready, 
si*: I'd say a foot and a half 
s2**: No it's less...more like 
si: What?
s2: fifteen inches, fourteen? 
si: could be ... fifteen? 
s2: (to e) fifteen!
It should be noted that the only way a difference can be
discovered is if S** mentions it. But would the raising of
a difference be sufficient for the disparity to be
discovered? Consider, for example, transcript #22 from
study 1 which has the following exchange:
si**: I think, I think we're looking at it 
differently 
s2*: Wha, I don't think...it makes much of 
a difference 
si: I think we’re seeing it differently' 
s2: urn, it's definitely a rorschach...I 
see a whole bunch of faces in there 
...gee...maybe eighteen inches...no 
less
si: eighteen inches...less?
So a difference can be raised by S** but this does not mean 
that the difference will be heard, or taken as a relevant 
difference— that the presumption of sameness no longer works. 
Indeed, in this example the disparity is reworked in a manner 
that effectively returns the dialogue to the task of finding 
.a distance.
-**: indicates the subject whose perspective is unaltered 
and whose goggles have red acetate on the right eye 
**: indicates the member who sees recession— and for study 1, 
the member whose perspective is altered between the parts 
+: indicates that no goggles are being worn
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Has the difference been so easily dismissed because
the relevant dimensions of in front and behind have stayed
out of their talk? Transcript #29 (study 3, part two)
produces the following conversation:
s3+: Ok, so how far away do you suppose 
- uh, it seems to be about. . .uh. . .1
don't...eight feet from it...it 
seems to be behind the screen 
s3 • it seems to be behind? 
s^: yeh, behind the screen 
s3 • cause they kept saying that it was 
s^: uh huh 
s3 : in front of
s^: no, it isn't coming...it's about...
it's a foot square 
s3 : a foot square? 
s^: standing on its end, right?
directly in the middle of the uh 
s3 : cause it says here...how far in front...
it appears to be 
s^: oh, oh
s3 : so maybe they were sitting at a different 
angle?...I don't know 
s4: (laughs)
s^: in front? huh...it seems...Oh yeah right.
It's in front of the uh...it seems to be 
a hole, out, out like a diamond shape 
s3 1 right
s^: with the pattern set back
s3 i right, so how far is the diamond in front?
s^: from the front of the pattern its uh...
it could be about 2 feet 
s3 : sounds alright, we're finished.
Here the difference always seems to be on the verge of being
explicitly formulated, yet the subjects manage to come up
with a judgment that satisfies both participants. Is it
that the alteration is neatly tucked away by changing in
front to from the front?
These examples are a limited set of what happens
repeatedly in the talk when the disparity remains hidden,
and on many occasions when it is revealed. But this leaves 
us at a very simple position, and the attempt is to offer 
some further discussion so that the conversations can be 
more carefully scrutinized and more systematically explained. 
How can we begin this analysis and make the examples noted 
above and those yet to come more clearly demonstrative as to 
what talk is accomplishing in these encounters and where it 
is accomplishing it— what space does talk fill?
(c): Concealing a Disparity
In scrutinizing those transcripts which do not reveal 
the perceptual alteration, it is useful to clarify whether
or not the member has access to the original instructions
26 ' provided by E. This information is displayed on Table 11
Table 11
Members’ Access to the Original Instructions3
Part Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study ^
One sl+,s2+ sl+,s2+ sl+, s2H-, s3- sl+, s2+
Two sl+,s2+ s_+,s3- s3-, s*f~ s_+,s3-
Three (na) (na) (na) s3-, s*J~
a. (+) means that there was direct access to the 
original instructions; (-) means that there was 
indirect access— through the talk of others; and 
(na) means that this part was not applicable for 
that study.
.The expression subtext and text will be used as a 
substitute for instructions and talk and assume the same 
relationships i.e., subtext is a backdrop for text.
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and it is clear that in studies 3 (the Watcher-Hearer) and
U- (the Hearer) the last subjects (s3-, s*i~) have no first
hand knowledge of the original instructions and can only
know the task demands from the information conveyed to them.
In studies 1 (the Base) and 2 (the Repeater) there is at
least one member who always retains access to the original
subtext. The studies can then be separated along a dimension
of direct versus indirect knowing, and it should be indicated
that it is only study 1 (the Base) where no transmission of
the original protocols is required. In the other studies,
27the culturally informed partner’s ' instructions will 
direct and frame the task just as the initial instructions' 
did— regardless of the modifications introduced.
As it is only the first study where no retelling of 
the task demands occurs, it is instructive to examine those 
three conversations where the difference remained masked.
We can begin with a dialogue already cited (transcript 3, 
part 2):
^In discussing these transcripts we need a terminology 
to designate what task the subjects perform. As such any 
member who sees recession and is presumed to potentially offer 
a challenge will be called a foil or spoiler and is noted in 
the transcripts by S**. A member whose perspective remains 
unaltered and who has actually seen the stereogram (s*) will 
be labelled an old member, an original member, a culturally 
informed member op task conveyor. The member in study three 
who never views the stereogram but who overhears the conversa­
tion will be called either the monitor or the abstracter- 
hearer. And the person in the fourth study who is toldabout 
the task demands by an old member, and who in turn relays it, 
will, be labelled a recipient-hearer.
si*: I'd say a foot and a half 
s2**: No it's less...more like 
si: What?
s2: fifteen inches, fourteen? 
si: could be...fifteen? 
s2: (to e) fifteen!
The first point to be raised is to again note that for the
anomaly to be found, the foil (s2) must place the switch into
speech so that the partner (si) can offer comments and
possible corrections. As long as the foil remains silent
about the alteration, si can continue to silently and
unproblematically rely on the presumption that what has worked
before works again. Indeed with s2's muteness about the
difference, it appears as if both members abide by the
supposition that what held sway in the first part does so
again. The spoiler's quietness about the change in her
perception successfully masks the discrepancy which exists
between the partners— that one views an extended triangle
while the other sees a recessed one. If we assume that both
participants continue to depend on the belief that they see
the same-thing an error appears to have been made. But if
the spoiler thinks that si also sees recession— for this
would enable her to suppose that the same image is shared—
while si believes his partner sees extension, the "error" is
visible only from the stance of an E who "knows" that the
members "really" view altered stereograms.
As the difference is kept out of words, it is not certain 
that the foil did see something which was counter to her
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previous experience. In the debriefing, however, this member
(s2) expresses the disparity and asserts that she knew there
had been a change but that she remained silent because it was
necessary to reach a mutual decision. So while we can not
argue that the foil uncritically invoked the original
presumptions, we can indicate that s2's speechlessness about
this disparity permitted her partner to trust his previous
experience'and continue believing that once again they each
saw the same visual display. The mistake made, however, remains
invisible to si.
We suggested earlier that comments about the irregularity
can be made but that they need not be heard as a correction of
the subtext. In Study One, the remaining dialogues v/here the
disparity remained concealed fall into this category. This
problem can be illustrated by considering transcript 21, part 2:
si*: see it? 
s2**: yeah, I see it, urn
sis it looks fa, further away than the 
other one
s2: it looks like that, the image is on 
the screen and the rest is behind it 
or something like that like it's 
behind it 
si: yeah
s2: does it look like it's cut out? 
si: yes 
s2 : yeah?
si: it moves with you? 
s2: what?
si: and it moves with you 
s2: yeah
si: this is more like the...urn this is 
further 
s2: behind?
si: do you agree with that?
.s2: behind it right? you mean
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si: yeah
s2: yeah that's what I think too 
si: it's further away than the other one was, 
right? 
s2: yeah
si: so we said fourteen last time...maybe 
eighteen, twenty inches? 
s2: behind, behind the picture right? 
si: yeah
s2: urn...I guess around eighteen? 
si: yeah, eighteen 
s2: eighteen?...Ok
It is si's perspective that is unaltered, and who starts 
the exchange with previously accepted synonyms— "it" and 
"further away"— which express what is being seen. While the 
presumption of a repeatable world lurks beneath these 
expressions, the foil does raise the salient issue. That the 
triangle, or more accurately "it," is behind. Yet the person 
who views an extended display appears to accept a description 
of recession. How is this possible?
Three answers seem plausible. First, as with the 
previous conversation, the member whose perspective is 
unaltered may hear the difference but decide not to voice 
it because a mutual decision is required. Second, as the 
dialogue never clearly articulates the exact figure and 
ground relationship, all that is available in words is that 
one thing is designated as being behind some other thing.
A description whose vagueness can accommodate either recession 
and extension and enable an agreement to be reached. Or 
third is the possibility that "behind" is being misheard: 
it is not taken as indicating a perceptual change, but rather
as a state of confusion. That is, as si's orientation to 
the stereogram remains the same, (s)he can rely on the 
previous and current visual experience and accept that what 
has been ratified once can be depended upon once more— right 
now, at this moment. As the foil also participated in the 
initial interaction which was unproblematically concluded, a 
dispute which arises over the presumption that the same world 
can be invoked suggests to si that the "other" is confused, 
not seeing properly, or mislooking. The offering of a 
correction, "behind," is then not first heard as depicting 
an altered perspective.
While all three answers work, the third one is supported 
by si's remarks during the debriefing. This member maintains 
that the foil was confused and that "behind" really meant in 
front. The remaining interaction for the Base (study 1), 
transcript 22, fits the same pattern in that statements which 
the foil makes to suggest that the same world can not be 
relied upon, presumed to be shared, are not taken as 
corrections (page 68), and are literally talked away by the 
partner whose perspective.is unchanged. At least for study 1, 
while differences may stay masked because the anomaly is 
never precisely placed into a comment-able domain, to speak 
about the disparity is no guarantee that the corrections will 
be properly heard— that the member who continues to assume 
a shared visual world should no longer do so.
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As we move from the Base study, the original protocols 
are accessible to new partners only through the details 
conveyed by the culturally informed member. And this old 
member has no reason to suspect that the current and prior 
experience is no longer shared. Like study 1, study 2 (the 
Repeater) has each individual viewing the stereogram, and 
transcript 13» part 2, begins with the task-conveyor (s2) 
separating what is seen with the goggles and what is viewed 
without them.
s2*: Ok, here see take them off for a
minute...now you see how this here, 
it's a square, right, you see red 
and green? 
s3-3Hf: yeah
s2: now, Ok, when you put these goggles 
on you're going to see another square 
and it looks like a little, a little 
square, and it's gonna look like it's 
projected forward,- so what we have to 
do is figure out together how far 
away it is from the back square, that 
little square that's forward. So put 
on your goggles and stare at it, and 
then you'll see like it's projected, 
it's closer to you...do you see it? 
s3 ’• uh hum
s2: Ok take a look a while...now when you 
think you can tell me how far away it 
is...then we'll come to an agreement 
on distance from it.
The task-conveyor (s2) places into words those aspects
of the display which will enable the partner to complete the
experimental problem— task demands are conveyed (what to look
for and what to do with what is seen). But in the first part
of this interaction, no precise figure was identified and the
figure to ground relation was never articulated clearly. In
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the opening transmission, a similar non-specific vocabulary 
is again employed, and we see the use of synonyms--little 
square, far away— which imply that the foil (s3) sees what 
the culturally informed member views and which assume that 
these expressions can be unproblematically used again.
Yet as the culturally informed member does not detail 
what it is that is in front, s2's terminology can be made to 
fit a display where any two items are separated from each 
other. The phrases which hint at extension--"projected 
forward," "closer to you"— are too general and easily 
adjusted to conform to the recessed stereogram which the 
foil views. Indeed, s2's request for a judgment about "how 
far away it is" is carefully answered by the spoiler (s3):
s3 : it's about one foot away 
And an expression which only requires that one item be at 
some distance from another is used to conceal the disparity 
and resolve the task.
I want to argue that the expression "far away" as used 
by the task-conveyor is not carelessness. It is an expression 
with a history, and is spoken by the conveyor because it is 
presumed that the foil has the same orientation to the 
stereogram as the original member: what is "far away" from
what will again have a clear and unproblematic reference and 
meaning. The spoiler, however, has to take these words and 
apply them to a visual world where recession is seen. The 
new member (s3) successfully does this and the task is
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resolved. It should be noted that in contrast with the Base 
study, the spoiler has no access to the original instructions, 
and to have raised the question of a difference this member 
would have had to be oriented by the task-conveyor.
The reciprocal use of "away" allows the resolution of the 
experimental problem and the masking of an anomaly. But this 
disparity has the potential of being unearthed at some future 
time, for "away" covers two contrary locations: for the
conveyor "away" means "in front," whereas it means "behind" 
for the foil. The completion of a task where the perceptual 
irregularity remains cloaked but where the potential for 
uncovering the disparity remains, I will call a pragmatic 
agreement. What has yet to be brought out is that the 
spoiler's muteness about recession catches the transformation, 
the beginning creation, of a new, but silent subtext.
We can explore this construction in transcript 16, 
part 2, study 2 (the Repeater), where the use of "away" and 
the lack of an explicit figure to ground relationship allows 
the evolution of another pragmatic agreement:
si*: Ok you're supposed to look through these 
goggles and you're supposed to, you're 
going to see a figure in front of this 
s3**: yeah
si: thing on the screen 
s3 : yeah
si: and you have to determine how far 
away it is from the screen, how you 
know. What's the difference between 




s3: alright...I'm not good at that but 
alright...hee hee 
si: is it comin, now (inaudible) Ok, so 
s3 : what is the thing, you mean the box? 
si.: what do ya see, what do ya see? 
s3: I see that red thing 
si: right, so 
s3: Ok, it's done (???) 
si: so how far away from the screen does 
it look?
s3 : doesn't look like, like, it's on it 
si: but doesn't it look, doesn't it look 
closer to you, than... 
s3 j than what?
si: than the screen? you have to, you 
have to determine 
s3: yeah
si: the difference between 
s3 : that square in the middle? 
si: shape, and yeah whatever, the diamond 
shape and, and the whole screen, how 
far apart... 
s3: Oh...about a foot 
si: Ok
s3 : now is that all we're supposed to do? 
si: yeah...we're finished 
s3 s this is the whole thing? 
si: ha ha 
e: what did you decide? 
si: tell him!
s3 : are you, did you look at these glasses? 
si: at those, no 
s3 : alright, a foot 
e: Ok
As with the term "away" the vocabulary which the 
culturally informed member (si) uses must be heard against 
the details of her previous encounter and her awareness of 
the original subtext. In the first part of the interaction, 
si and s2 discussed "how far away it was," "how far away 
from the dots it was," "that it was comin out" and, in 
referring to the figure, "it," "figure," "shape," "something 
like that" and "object." To repeat the point, in that context
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it was unproblematic for the participants to use these 
expressions, synonyms, in place of the more specific words. 
What was "away" from what and what "it" referenced was clear 
and presumed shared, and the appearance of these synonyms in 
the second part of the study are immersed in that presupposi­
tion. And as with the conversation just presented (transcript 
13) these looser phrases enable the foil (s3) and the task- 
conveyor to again manage to hide the "fact" that two different 
displays are being referenced.
The task-conveyor's instructions direct the foil to find 
some aspect of the stereogram which can satisfy the dimension 
of "away" and as such s3 is guided by the old member’s 
instructions just as si remains directed by- the original, but 
silent subtext. But a critical difference exists between the 
hearer (s3) and the speaker (si). For as noted, the speaker 
can hear himself or herself in terms of the silent subtext-- 
that "away" really means "in front"— but with no access to 
that mute background the hearer must take the talk-as-heard- 
as-grounds.
It is not just that the foil remains divorced from the 
perceptual details of the partner, (s)he is also separated 
from the history of "away" and takes.the expression as 
offered— as a public word useable and understandable by any- 
other. To accept the talk-as-heard-as grounds is to try to 
use the words in the spirit they are presented— as public 
words useable without difficulty by any partner. And it is
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the spoiler's attempt to employ the phrase as if it were any-
p Oone's that enables s3 to present a judgment about distance.
That this phraseology is offered as if it were accessible 
to any-one, and taken on those terms unwittingly lays the 
foundation for the transformation of the original subtext and 
the construction of a new version for the foil. The 
representation of the problem as one of assessing the separa­
tion between the diamond and the screen carries for s3 the 
silent dimension of "behind" and for si "in front." With this 
mutual silence there is also a deafness, for there is no way 
for s3 to hear that extension lurks behind si's "away," or 
for si to hear recession. Each remains ignorant about the 
perceptual depth of the other's use of "away,1; and there is 
no knowledge that the other means any-thing else than what 
is said.
To determine if anything else can be discerned as to 
why the visual disparity is not discovered and what it is 
that talk is accomplishing, we need to investigate studies 3 
and ty. We can start with study 3 (the Watcher-Hearer) where 
one member has the opportunity to both see and hear the 
partners resolve the experimental problem. Consider the 
.entire first part of transcript 7?
^^With this recognition that the foil tries to use the 
words in the spirit presented, we can better grasp the claim 
made in transcript 13 that the expressions which hint at 
extension are made to fit recession.
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si: you're ready? 
s2: yeah
si: Ok, I don't see any number, I see uh 
e: could you speak a little louder 
si: a box, oh yeah sure, I don't see any 
. number do you see a number? 
s2 : a number? no
si: like you .see a geometric box in front 
of you, right? 
s2: yeah
si: right...how far 
s2: it's all one color 
si: uh huh (inaudible) uh huh how far do 
you think it's- out? 
s2: five inches
si: uh huh, I'd say like half way between 
where the table ends and the screen... 
s2: I think it's closer to the screen? 
si: you know 
s3+: could you talk louder please 
si: yeah, sure
s2: it gets, I think closer to the screen 
si: excuse me
s2 : it gets closer to the screen 
si: you think it's closer to the screen? 
yeah, to the screen...uh...it moves 
anyway 
s2: oh god
si: if you go more to the side it seems 
to go closer towards the screen... 
right? 
s2: yeah
si: well, I think it's your guess cause 
I figured it out
(reading index card) to mutually come 
to an agreement on how far in front 
s2: the figure that appears 
si: yes, yeah...in other words, in feet, 
inches,...I'd say about twelve, let's 
say fifteen inches 
s2: from the screen?
si: yeah...alright, uh a foot is what?
A foot's like this? Fifteen to eighteen? 
s2: about fifteen
si: fifteen?...I say eighteen...wanna 
compromise...sixteen and a half 
s2: sixteen and a half 
si: Ok that's what I think uh huh...you
know what...you move backwards it goes 
further away from the screen right? 
s2: uh hum
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si: if you go forward it looks like it's 
closer so from what position do you 
want to estimate it? When you're 
sitting nearer or further?...now 
it looks as far in front as the table 
ends...see where the table ends? 
s2: yeah
si: now look up, right, like that, isn't 
it about even now? 
s2: no I still think it's further back 
si: you still think it's further back? 
s2: just a couple of inches though 
si: Ok 
s2: like
si: than figure what the screen is from 
the table is what...2 feet. Twelve 
wha now twenty inches 
s2: yeah
si: twenty inches uh huh...we've come to 
an agreement 
e: Ok what did you agree to? 
si: twenty inches
There is a great deal of conversation here about the 
partner's orientation to the screen and the effect that body 
movement has on assessing the distance. But the full dimen­
sions of the task and the problem are silent for the monitor 
(s3). Neither member (si or s2) finds it necessary to bring 
these issues into a comment-able domain, and they use a 
series of synonyms with each other that we've encountered 
before. What does the abstracter-hearer, who wears no goggles, 
ask, and how do the other members respond? The next phase of 
the study continues:
s3+J the goggles help you see anything? 
s2: yeah
si: yes, the goggles take away the green 
dots, I think, no 
s2: it's all one color
si: it's all one color, but these goggles 
are green and red...one is green the 
other is red. The two lenses on the
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one eye so, so on one eye you see it 
takes away the green, on the other eye 
you one takes away the red dots... 
that's the only thing I can say, and 
...and if you move hack and forth it 
goes close as you closer and further 
as you go further, if you move sideways 
it moves also 
s3: you, you're trying to find out how 
far away, away from you? 
si: yeah...that's it...uh want to add some 
thing?...no? I'll do all the talking 
e : do you feel that you have enough 
information to proceed to the next 
part of the experiment?... It1s up 
to you. 
s3: it's not much, but 
e : Ok
It is intriguing that the 3-D effect of the goggles are 
not clarified for the monitor (s3), for this is the most 
salient dimension of the task. Instead the subjects who view 
the display clarify the colors of the lenses. But note the 
vocabulary that the culturally informed members use when 
talking with s3-* it's the vocabulary which si and s2 have 
unproblematically employed with each other. And the task s3 
repeats is responsive to those comments and what was overheard 
and seen. The entire dimension of some-thing which is being 
assessed as being in front of some-thing else is omitted from 
the dialogue. The abstracter-hearer (s3) starts the next part 
in the following manner:
s3+: Ok what they had to do, they had to
see how far away this thing was from
the table right?
Ok
s3 • ...mutually come to an agreement how
. far in front of the pattern...
s^: I can't see it
8/+
s3 : they had. to see how far the dots were 
from the thing, you know from the 
outside of the pattern, right, and 
what they did, they would like move 
from side to side, and back and forth 
you know, and they would add inches, 
they say when they move back with the 
goggles on that this thing, this 
thing moves closer you know, move 
back also when they moved, an, and 
they moved from side to side also 
s^: yes
s3: and they uh star, I don't started 
adding inches and feet and came up 
with twenty feet 
s^: twenty feet? 
s3: twenty inches 
s^: twenty inches
s3 : that's how they came to uh, you know 
I couldn't hear them very well, they 
were mumbling 
s^: they were moaning? 
s3 : mumbling
s^: Oh...so I'm supposed to figure out 
how far away the dots are 
s3 : we have to figure out 
s^s from us
s3 : yeah, the dots are, right...mutually 
come to an agreement how far in front 
of the pattern of dots the figure that 
appears
s^s how far the front of the pattern is? You 
see...with these things on it's two 
different things. This is amazing... 
there's like a...tri... 
s3: well I haven't seen through the goggles 
but I asked them, one's red. What does 
it look like? 
s^: wha?
s3 : what does it look like 
s^: it's, there's a, there's a triangle, a 
diamond and urn the dots inside the 
diamond are further away than the 
outside ones 
s3 : so then we have to figure out together 
how far they are 
s4: well are we supposed to, we do the 
inside ones or the outside ones? 
s3 : well here...this
ski mutually come to an agreement on how 
far in front of the pattern of dots... 
oh alright, Ok
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s3s since I'm looking at it with normal 
(unintelligible) I don't see it 
s^: uh, uh...in front...Ok well it's not 
that far...it's only about... 
s3 : they either said 20 inches or 20 feet 
s^: they couldn't have said 20 feet 
s3s yeah, I know, twenty, it had to be 
twenty inches 
s^: I'd say it's about...oh god...I can't 
tell in depth, you see it's going in
s3: I can't tell cause it just looks
normal to me you know, like dots... 
move back a little, see what it does 
...do they move? 
s^: yeah they move further away, well this
is supposed to be done from back there
or up here? 
s3 j well they said you can, you can move 
anyway, move to the side and see what 
happens
s^: can I, it doesn't matter, this is 
amazing. How (unintelligible) I'd 
say it's about 10 inches. I don't 
know how they got 20 inches 
s3: I. ten inches? 
s^: yeah, that's what I'd say 
s3 : we have an agreement 
e : Ok
What the monitor (s3) has acquired from the original 
problem solving team (si and s2) is their short hand 
vocabulary which presumes that the meaning and reference 
of the expressions are and will again be apparent to any- 
other. With the introduction of the foil, s3 conveys what 
is known about the world by offering these public words with 
the assumption (hope?) that their use will be unproblematic 
for the foil. But all that the abstracter-hearer knows is 
what (s)he has heard or seen, and s3 is literally bound by 
that information and can add nothing else for s^ in the face 
of a problem.
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The shape can not be identified by the monitor, and 
s3 can only begin to acquire a feel for this from the foil's 
description. The spoiler (s*f) can describe the stereogram on 
a critical dimension— in depth— but not having been informed 
of its importance s3 is not clear how to use this information. 
The only task demand provided was that some-thing must be 
found which can satisfy an assessment of "far away." And as 
the foil must rely on s3's words in order to know how to use 
the stereogram before him, some dimensions of the stereogram 
are found which can fit the task demands and permit the 
resolution of the experimental problem.
The foil has accepted the vocabulary from the monitor 
as it was offered— as public words useable by any-other. So
again two disparate displays remain tucked av/ay beneath 
expressions which presume-one subtext but rely on another.
The problem encountered in the Repeater study (study 2) has 
resurfaced here. In accepting the spoken words as ground, the 
monitor is separated from the details which could explain the 
origin of the expression and presents these words to an-other 
who again uses them but quietly slips in different details.
But there is a critical alteration here. With the 
departure of the original team (si and s2), the new members 
(s3 and s^) are literally caught in a web of words presumed 
useable by any-one:
s3 j well I haven't seen through the 
goggles but I asked them.
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What the unintentional consequences are for these indirect
knowers who are captured by a vocabulary assumed useable by
any-otherf needs to be more forcefully documented. Consider
the following dialogue (transcript 6, study k, part 2) where
a culturally informed member conveys to the recipient-hearer
what has transpired:
s2+: Ok what happens is he gives you 
these goggles that are red on one 
side and green on the other, Ok?
And when you put them on, even 
though you don't see anything, 
you only see'now, it looks like 
. a diamond, a diamond shape, like 
this comes out of the screen and 
comes at you...Ok? And what he 
asks you is how far in front does 
that shape appear...to be in front 
of the screen, Ok? . In other words, 
when- you’re looking at that thing 
it just looks like there is one 
flat surface, right? But... 
s3+ : right 
s2 : but when you put on the goggles 
with two different colors it 
looks like something comes out 
and is standing right in front 
of that 
s3j I see
s2: in front of that! So you see that 
and you see a diamond shape in 
front of it 
s3: Ok
s2: and he wants to .know how far away 
that shape is 
s3 : the diamond shape? 
s2: from the screen 
s3 : uh huh
s2: Ok?...and uh I thought it was twelve 
inches and she thought it was eight 
so we all, we decided 
s3 : yeah
s2: it was ten inches from the screen. Ok? 
s3 : yeah 
s2: got it?
s2: you say what? He gave you two goggles
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s3: one for each 
s2 j a red and a green?
s3 ' no, one, one pair of goggles with red 
on one side and green on the other 
s3: Ohhh, and green on the other side 
s2:. right
s3 j is the glass white, or is it red 
glass
s2: it's colored, it's red plastic 
s3 j ohh, the glass is colored 
s2: right
s3 : with a red plastic and a green plastic
s2: right
s3: Ok, and the
s2: and when you look through it 
s3 : when you look through it...at those 
goggles...at those things there, those 
patterns 
s2: yeah
s3 : you saw diamond shapes that were
s2: one diamond shape
s3 •* one shape?
s2: one shape
s3s Ohh, only one
s2.: right, one shape
s3 : that came off the screen towards you 
s2: towards us, right
s3 : right...and he asked you how near, how 
far from the screen do you think it 
was?
s2: right, from the screen, right 
s3: I see...that's all?
was there any problem in the pattern, 
then? anything to solve, just that 
alone? 
s2: that's it 
e: Ok? you're ready? 
s3• uh huh
Neither participant wears goggles here, and the task 
conveyor tries to lead the recipient-hearer through the 
problem very carefully. The shape is identified, and there 
is an attempt to specify what is in front of what. And we 
see that s3 's repetition of the task— ...and he asked you how 
near, how far from the screen do you think it was?— is
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accepted by the old member. But this terminology is a short 
hand and, as we know from the other conversations, contains a 
possible "error" if it is repeated in that manner to the foil 
(s^). How s3 transmits.the task demands becomes critical and 
the dialogue begins:
s3+: Ok, urn, well you know, you have on 
the glasses, right?
: yeah
s3 : you're looking at those patterns...
now what you're supposed to see, you're 
supposed to see a diamond shape coming 
off the screen towards you 
sty: yeah
s3 : right in front of the goggles 
s^: yeah
s3 : before you had the goggles on you 
saw a flat screen, didn't you? 
sty: yeah
s3 : there was no shape,, now you have the 
goggles on you see a diamond shape , 
coming off the screen, towards you, 
right? 
sty: right
s3 • now the problem is how far do you think 
that diamond is from the screen? 
s^: how far do I think?
s3 : yeah, the diamond shape, how far do you 
think that diamond is from the screen? 
twelve inches, ten inches, eight inches 
how far?
sty: Oh, you're saying from, from the 
background? 
s3 i yeah from the background, from the 
pattern, how far do you think it is? 
s^: the diamond is? 
s3 : right
s4: I would say approximately two and a 
half feet
s3 : (inaudible) two and a half feet? the 
diamond is towards you two and a half 
feet?
s^: you're saying how far the diamond is 
from me? 
s3 * no, from the screen
ŝ -: yeah, yeah there's a pattern in the back 
and there's a diamond
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S3: right
s^: in front, right?
s3 : right
s^: you're saying how far is that diamond 
from the hack of the pattern? 
s3 s right
What has happened here? As set into words hy s3, it 
seems clear that the diamond shape seen is to be in front.
But the foil, s^, "sees" recession yet agrees to a description 
of, indeed seems to offer a description of, extension. Where 
we previously had extension called recession, we now have the 
opposite: recession labelled as extension. To understand
what has happened three points must be assessed: (1) the 
relation of the recipient-hearer to the foil; (2) the 
perspective of the foil; and (3) the vocabulary utilized.
First, as we've indicated, s31s indirect access to the 
original task limits what can be known and talked about. We 
must realize, however, that for this recipient-hearer there is 
no visually accessible entity that can be used to verify what 
(s)he has been told. It is literally correct to claim that 
for this member the three-dimensional world exists in no­
place but in-words. Yet this individual must convey and 
describe a location, must lead this new sightful(l) partner 
to some-place. A translation problem has emerged. For the 
recipient-hearer must describe to the foil some location that 
can satisfy the "seeing" of the new partner and can be 
considered as meaning the "same" thing which the recipient- 
hearer knows.
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Second, this movement between no-place and some-place
must be managed by an exchange of words. And it is s3's
offering of a public vocabulary which the foil must use as
a guide to the material before him. And it is the spoiler's
attempt to use the terms of the task demands in the spirit
offered that has led his perception to the wrong-place.
Let me try to demonstrate this by citing two segments
of dialogue as evidence. There.is the just reported exchange
about the stereogram as it arises between s3 and s^:
s^: you say how far the diamond is 
from me? 
s3 : no from the screen 
s^: yeah, yeah there's a pattern in the 
back and there1s a diamond 
s3: right
sty: in front, right? 
s3 • right
s^s you're saying how far is that diamond 
from the back of the pattern? 
s3: right
and then there is s V s  description of the stereogram during
the debriefing while wearing the goggles worn above:
s^: what am I seeing? 
e : yeah
s^: well, what I'm seeing is a...is a
pattern a square shaped pattern with a... 
diamond shaped hole in the middle with 
the same pattern in the background you 
understand? There's a diamond shaped 
hole in certain said square, right? With 
the same pattern in the background 
e: why don't you take those goggles off and 
try these on...and describe to me whether 
you're seeing the same thing or not 
' s^: exactly the reverse, I'm seeing the same 
thing but reversed. This time there's a 
diamond square coming out and then 
there's a square in the background.
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The recipient-hearer has presented the foil with the 
problem of locating some event— a diamond shape— that could 
be considered as being in front of something else. It is 
this sighted member’s (the foil, s*0 task, in part, to take 
these words and try to manage that seeing and locating, just 
as it is the recipient-hearer's chore to determine whether the 
talk and seeing of s^ matches what has been conveyed— whether 
they are talking about the same-thing.
If we examine the foil's description during the 
debriefing there is a clear reference to some "diamond-shaped 
hole," and-that it is this "diamond shape" which is viewed as 
being in front of some-thing else— the pattern in the back­
ground. What is this "diamond shape"? When the stereogram 
is looked at with the visual aid there is a hole in the center 
which has as a frame, or border, the outlines of the diamond 
which is extended or recessed. I want to suggest that this 
is the "diamond-shaped hole" which the foil takes as the 
place to locate the recipient-hearer’s chore: to find a
diamond shape which can be considered in front of something 
else. And when s^ agrees that there is a diamond in front, 
it is this center frame which is being referenced.
As the recipient-hearer remains located in no-place (only 
in words), it seems reasonable to accept a current partner's 
comments about a "diamond shape" as meaning and referencing 
the same "diamond shape" that the task-conveyor spoke of.
With the foil finding some shape which satisfies the recipient-
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hearer, "diamond shape" functions just as "far away" did: 
it enables different perceptual details to be unintentionally 
substituted behind the "same" phrase.
Once again the perceptual anomaly is masked and a 
resolution reached. But with the departure of the task- 
conveyor, there is no way for the foil and the recipient- 
hearer to realize the alteration which has taken place, now 
or in the future. Related issues are highlighted in the 
conversation shown in transcript 9. study 3, where most of 
the original subtext is not available to the monitor:
s3+: are there dots around it? 
sty**: yeah, there's many dots
s3s I think you're supposed to find out how 
far the dots are from...are they equally 
around it? '
s^: the dots? are they equally around the 
square? 
s3: yeah
s^: there's no real dots, I mean, I mean, I 
see a lot of just rectangular 
s3 : red shapes? 
ŝf-: types of shapes 
s3 s how far are they from it? 
ŝ -: uh, the, they're right on the outside of 
it. They're inside of the square and 
they're outside of it. All around it... 
anything else? 
s3: I think that's it...I don't know 
s^: am I supp, it looks like, it's like urn, 
it looks like the square is in the back 
of...the um...the actual...you know, 
like you have the face, and then you 
have like a square in the. center, then 
it looks like that's behind it, like 
that's almost a window, a square window 
and behind it I see more of the uh 
rectangular items 
s3• yeah 
s*f-: is that it? 
s3: I think so
94-
s^: what, what's that supposed to, what 
does that say? 
s3: I don't know...there's no ' pattern of 
dots in there? 
s^: I see, um, let me see, I see, yeah 
I see a pattern...it looks like.
What do you mean by a pattern? You 
mean like a set pattern, where, like 
you know, like a plaid shirt would 
have a set pattern throughout the 
whole entire shirt? 
s3 s yeah, only it's a bunch of dots and 
a figure in the middle 
s^: let me see, I don't, I don't see a 
set pattern at all, like, like I see 
you know, it doesn't um it's not 
like it's uniform, you have a certain 
pattern repeated many time, it looks 
just like you know all jumbled up 
s3 j is there a distance between the dots? 
s^: between the dots? 
s3 : the pattern?
ŝ -: um, yeah like there are white spaces 
I don't know if those are supposed to 
be anything part of the formation or 
if that, that's supposed to be, I 
guess the white space you could call, 
yeah that's the distance between the 
uh, the uh, diamond and the dots.
With the foil, the monitor tries to accomplish the task 
demands which the task-conveyor expressed— of finding some­
place where distances can be offered. But a problem arises 
for the foil reports a multitude of possible places where 
distances can be used. The monitor caught by words presumed 
useable by any-one can not now obtain those silent, missing 
details requested by the foil. The abstracter-hearer's 
problem is that she does not know what place to lead the foil
to, nor know whether the things and places described by the
foil are the "same" things and places she has heard mentioned. 
At the same time the foil is immersed in an attempt to use
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the words offered by s3 but finds an uninterpretable 
stereogram. The utterances of s^ can be heard as a request 
for assistance in locating the correct place. Perhaps it 
can be paraphrased as: "Look, I can tell you what I see,
but I need your help to tell me if I'm looking in the 
right place," or "How do you want me to use what I see before 
me," or "I need your help, your talk, to put the display in 
order for me." Or in the language developed here— what 
satisfies the place you described to me.
With the loss of the subtext but with the knowledge 
that some task must be completed, the monitor and foil 
locate some-place that concludes the experimental chore.
Yet by not knowing how to hear the many places offered, the 
task concludes hesitantly and in the wrong place. Once 
again the disparity between the parts remains hidden from 
view. And we return to the unintentional consequence 
mentioned earlier: that the monitor, the recipient-hearer,
and foil's efforts to re-use the public words— to take the 
talk-as-heard-as-ground— let's them slip in a disparate world 
and unwittingly substitute different perceptual details 
beneath the "same" terms.
The massiveness of the member's inability to reveal 
the disparity is a surprise, but it does not represent a 
"failure" of the experimental manipulation. Rather it
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29demonstrates a consequence of having taken the transmission ' 
in the spirit offered— as words whose meaning and reference 
will again be unproblematic to any-other. In accepting a 
•vocabulary of synonyms, the foil, monitor, and recipient- 
hearer are caught in an attempt to make the display fit the 
words. With such an effort, two disparate worlds can rest 
side by side, unnoticed. And the old member, believing in the 
repeatability of the task, can find it hard to hear a 
difference.
30These negative cases have sensitized us to possibilities 
which could have remained unseen had only differences been 
found, and as such represent a discovery. But as it was 
precisely the finding of the irregularity which was to probe 
the original conjectures, it is premature to conclude the 
analysis without examining those conversations. How do they 
confirm, disconfirm, or modify what has been presented?
%*his formulation excludes study 1 where there is no 
transmission, though the issue of heard differences includes 
it. Study 1 raises some interesting questions for future 
research. As the same Ss participate in both parts, what 
separates those who bring up the disparity from those who 
don't? What would happen if the disparity were heightened so 
it could not be avoided? As the results for study 1 are a 
surprise no probing answer can be given, but I suspectthat 
the presumption that the experience is unchanged is_quite^ 
strong, and hard to overcome for the member whose vision is 
unaltered.
•^Negative in the sense that they are counter to the 
presumption that the anomaly would be discovered.
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(d): The Revealing of a Disparity
We can begin our analysis of these conversations with 
transcript 151 study 1 (the Base) after the goggle switch has 
been made s
s2*: do you see it? 
si**: yeah, it's coming...1 don't see it that 
well though, yeah, now I see it 
s2: it's a triangle, right? 
si: right
s2: it's far away, right? 
si: what




How are we to take this piece of discourse? The exchange
begins with a ratification that the partners again see the
same figure— a triangle. S2 uses expressions that have worked
in the first part, "far away," and "further away," and carry
the implication that the partner's perspective remains
unchanged. Yet this presumption is a concern for si and she
proceeds to place that issue into words:
si: it looked like it's right on top 
of it?
s2: you think it's right on top of it? 
si: well, well what does it look like to 
you?
s2: it looks very far to me 
si: behind it?
s2: behind it? Coming towards me, it looks 
like it's, the patterns here...and the 
triangle like out here 
si: so you mean, the triangle closer to, to 
the thing? 
s2: no, it's further, further 
si: it's closer to you? 
s2: it's closer to me 
si: it doesn't look that way to me
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s2: huh, you want to switch seats again?
si: I don't know, wait let me see
s2: maybe you don't see the right triangle
Two points need to be made about this exchange. First
is the careful, almost hesitant, checking which the foil, si,
engages in to ascertain whether her relationship to the
stereogram differs from her partner's. And second is s2's
continuing reliance on the supposition that this relationship
is unaltered. A claim evidenced by "maybe you don't see the
right triangle." The final portion of the conversation
continues:
s2: maybe it's your glasses
si: maybe...are we allowed to switch?
s2: you want to?
si: I don't know
s2: let's try it
si: you sure?
s2: Oh, no wonder why. It's the glasses.
Now it's right up, in the pattern 
si: yeah, uh huh
s2: ...it's right in the pattern, right? 
si: so now we don11 know what to say? 
s2: the problem has to be solved...depends 
on who's wearing what goggles... 
si: that's true, that's right. So how do we 
solve it?
s2: we can't, we, we'll solve it on one 
person's glasses, probably 
si: that's nice 
s2 : hum?
si: with those glasses like, I, I even 
thought it was in back of it 
s2 : uh hum 
si: at first
s2: I see it right...right in the pattern 
si: right
s2: know what we'll do? We'll use those 
glasses...both of us...and we'll solve 
the problem 
si: alright. So I'd say this like...twice, 
twice the distance... like
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s2: four feet 
si: four feet
s2: yeah, I think it's about four and a half 
feet
si: four and a half?
s2: ha, it's not much closer...so we're using 
my goggles and we 
si: alright




s2: we've solved the problem
What we could previously raise only as a possibility 
in the conversations where the disparity remained hidden is 
visible here: the reworking of a pragmatic agreement. The
initial exchange which presumed a continuing, unaltered, and
shared perspective could be renegotiated once the foil makes 
the switch noticeable. But we have something here that has 
not previously been encountered. With the realization that 
they no longer see the same-thing, the foil raises a telling
point: "So now we don't know what to say."
What has been used as a silent guide for their talk—  
the instructions, their previous experience and shared 
vocabulary— can no longer be unproblematically invoked for 
the major presumption that they have retained the same 
orientation to the stereogram has been violated. Yet they 
must find something to say, for the text still demands, as 
s2 notes, that "the problem has to be solved." And as their 
speech starts to explore the details of their perspectives, 
it enables them to place in words— for self and other—
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for the first time those dimensions of the 'world which will 
enable them to complete the task.
Consider also transcript 11, study 1 (the Base) where 
the opening remark in the second part is the offering of a 
difference:
si**: this one is 
s2* : it's further, it's further 
si: this is different, you know what I 
see? I see them in different ways.
Sometimes the triangle seems like it's 
behind...the screen. Sometimes the 
big...uh...the square seems like it’s 
behind the screen 
s2: I can't see that...it's further out 
than the first one though, isn't it?
It is...definitely.
Again, for the partner whose orientation remains the same
and takes the previous encounter for granted, it is hard to
hear the difference raised as one that indicates an alteration
in that previously shared perspective. Not surprisingly, s2's
last comment invokes their previous interaction and reinvokes
the claim that they still see the stereogram in the same way—
as further out. The spoiler, si, will continue to assert a
difference, but s2 will reply with:
s2 : you really can't see it as being, as 
being further but...than the first 
time?
Given their prior experience, the experimental protocols,
and the current perception of s2, s2 still presumes, though
hesitantly, that the foil is having difficulty seeing.
Indeed, s2 isn't the only one who makes this assumption:
si: maybe if I look away from it for a 
second I'll see it...Ok?
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and eventually s2 will ask the foil: 
s2: you're not lying?
The issue of veracity brings to the fore the concern
with whether the previous and current experience can be relied 
31-upon. We can display this point by paraphrasing the
discourse in the following manner: s2: "now look, first we
saw the same thing, and now all of a sudden you claim we
%
don't. And what's more, I still see it as in front, just 
like the instructions say I should. Are you fooling with me?" 
The foil recognizes the power of the partner's claim— that 
the shared history they have continues to be shared— in his 
own attempt to re-examine the stereogram.
Again, a difference in perspectives is hard to hear for 
the member who remains immersed in an experience which repeats 
what has come before. As in the previous transcript, the 
foil will continue to suggest that a disparity exists and
31The point of all these analyses is to try and select 
those aspects of the discourse which seem most germane to 
the empirical problem. The issue just discussed (veracity) 
indicates that there are additional topics and issues which 
can also address what is "really" happening in the talk.
For example, we can consider s2's comments as a challenge 
to the foil's social competency which si must re-assert.
This will not be achieved until the partners discover that 
different goggles are worn, and s2 can alleviate the attack
by claiming that they were both right.
In addition, we can also examine how members rely on 
social knowledge they bring into the experiment with them-- 
e.g., how to bargain and use numbers. Each level of concern
will add some further dimension to the analysis, for there
is no one thing that is "really" going on.
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eventually he will offer the guess that the goggles have been
switched. After si's comments about "looking away" the
interaction proceeds:
s2: switch to the, to, to the red side 
si: Ok
s2: is there a red side 
si: yeah
s2: on your goggles? 
si: right, there’s a
s2: Ok switch to it, when you switch to 
it do you see no triangle at all? 
si: right 
s2: just a flat
si: right, it has to be both of them: 
s2: Ok the green also? 
si: you have a green side on the right? 
s2: on the left
si: uh huh...ha, ha there’s the solution, 
that's what it is. They did give us 
different goggles 
s2: they did? 
si: yeah
s2: they switched the lenses 
si: Ok
s2: that's our solution 
si: Ok, we figured it out, alright 
s2: but still that's not really the 
solution
si: you pulled a switch on us, hey 
s2: you can't really say it's a 
solution because 
si: sure
s2: how far is it from the screen? It 
was right near you 
si: Oh
s2: we're both right, ha ha 
si: yeah that's the solution. We both 
see it differently so we can't agree 
. on it 
s2: yeah, Ok 
si: Ok
The essential point here is what can be accomplished when 
the anomaly is discovered. The "knowers'" direct relation to 
the original subtext and equipment permits all aspects of the
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task to be placed before the members. In the face of a
disparity a reason can be sought. And by bringing forth what
had been previously silent and unproblematic— the effect of
the goggles— an answer found.
Contrast this with the following conversation from
study k (the Watcher-Hearer), transcript 20. First there is
the explanation given by the task-conveyor in part two to the
recipient-hearer (s3)s
s2+: Ok, he has these goggles over there 
and when you put one on a figure 
shows up in the pattern...and you 
have to decide how far in front of 
the pattern the figure is 
s3+: that's all 
s2: that's all
s3: Oh, so now I take the goggles and put
it on, right now?
s2: no, when the other person comes in
si: so what am I supposed to do right at
this point? 
s2: you're supposed to understand what 
I'm telling you 
s3: take the goggles, put it on, look at
the figures and then you have to figure 





in front of the dots
in front?
right
of the goggles it is?
in front of the dots the figure appears 
to be
The recipient-hearer, s3» knows that "in front" is a
critical dimension of the task and she will take this talk-'
as-heard-as-ground and offer it to her partner, the foil:
s3+: look with the goggles you're supposed
to look there and see the dots, how far 
the dots are in front of the picture... 
that's how I understand what I'm
supposed to do. I don’t have goggles, 
haven't looked at it so I don't know
(15.2 seconds elapse here)
s^**: what is it they saw?
s3: how far the dots are in front of the 
picture
s^i um, the dots are not, they're not...
they don't seem to me...in front of it... 
they don't seem in front, they're in back 
it, it looks like 
s3: she said it was in front to me...she 
kept repeating 
s^: she said it was in front of it? 
s3: uh huh...I'm merely repeating what she 
said to me...cause I have not put on,
I haven't actually put on the goggles.
The recipient-hearer is right. All she can do is repeat
what has been told her. And as what she has been told was
stripped of its detailed history, the foil's request for the
specification behind those public words can not be provided.
But with the unearthing of a difference, listen to the
question the foil asks:
ŝJ-: how could one see one in front 
and one see one in back? That's
what I'm trying to figure out...
makes one of us wrong.
And who is to answer this question? It is precisely the
recipient-hearer's indirect knowing that prevents her from
doing anything but "merely repeating." Nothing can help her
locate those silent details which the task-conveyor has kept
out of talk. Of course, the foil can describe what he is
seeing, even misdescribe it, in an attempt to help his partner
ŝ *: and then there's a triangle, there's 
a kinda like a triangle, you know, in
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the dots, right it has a kind of 
triangle, it has another surface 
you know behind it
But again, as s3 notes, she has only one recourse:
s3• I'm taking your word for it...I 
don't see any of that cause I'm 
looking with my bare eyes
The participants are caught with a disparity they 
can not resolve and they begin to seek some alternative 
resolution:
s3: are we supposed to find out what we 
see one with goggles and uh the other 
one without the goggles? Is that what 
it is? 
e: well
s3: what I see with my bare eyes? 
e : you resolve the problem according 
to the information that's been 
handed, presented to you by the other 
person
s3: but it doesn't, but does the problem 
consist in finding out what that
represents say like as a work of art,
as a painting, or something, whatever? 
e: I can't help you, you just have to 
resolve the problem as you see fit
In discovering the disparity, the foil and the recipient- 
hearer encounter what the task-conveyor has taken-for-granted 
and stayed silent about: that the meaning and reference of
the words would be unproblematic. And with no procedure for 
uncovering that quiet history, the current partners (s3, s^) 
are left with public words they can not re-use. The foil and
the recipient-hearer are unable to find a reason for the
alteration, and can not re-negotiate the problem as can
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members who retain access to the full context (the direct 
32lmowers).
There is another dilemma which has arisen here for 
either the monitor or the recipient-hearer: whose account
is to be accepted in the face of a disparity? It is an 
interesting question to speculate on and I want to suggest 
that it is the current partner's description which will be 
accepted. It is almost as if the recipient-hearer or the 
monitor will abandon what (s)he is told in deference to the 
"seeing" of the current partner, the foil. Is this what s3 
conveys when she asserts— "I'm taking your word for it"?.
This conjecture is supported by the exchanges which occur 
in transcript 8, study 3 (the Watcher-Hearer)r
s3+: it's behind? 
sV**: it's behind, right
s3: you think it's behind, so how far. 
behind is it?
This dialogue concludes a long introduction where the 
abstracter-hearer has conveyed the information that the 
diamond is in front of the screen. The monitor readily 
accepts the foil's description that it is "behind," but she 
repeatedly requests to use the goggles'. All of which the
32^ In this encounter the members do proceed to accomplish 
some task--to describe the stereogram in as much detail as 
possible. But it is not clear whether this pushing forward 
on some task is a result of their inability to rework the 
original problem or an implicit direction given in E's 
comments. The other encounters seem to conclude when the 
difference is realized— that is for studies 3 and
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foil turns down. During the debriefing, s3 clearly states 
that her request to use the goggles was because she was 
confused about the discrepancy between the parts. And that 
she decided to take the spoiler's "word" for it because he 
was there, with her.
When differences were concealed our,analysis suggested 
that pragmatic agreements allowed the members to uninten­
tionally combine two disparate worlds. In the conversations 
where the irregularity was revealed we see support for the 
rest of the conjecture— that the agreement could be unravelled 
and reworked if at least one of the participants retained 
access to the full details of the original subtext. But note 
that in the Bas-e (study 1) and Repeater (study 2) studies the 
differences unearthed are always located on the "proper" 
dimension— noticing the alteration from extention to recession. 
As we move to the Watcher-Hearer (study 3) and the Hearer 
(study *f) studies we begin to find that differences found are 
not necessarily located on the "proper" dimension. Consider, 
for example, transcript 27, study 3, where the monitor over­
hears a great deal of the conversation between si and s2. 
However, much of their dialogue was devoted to discussing 
whether the stereogram was an illusion, and how the movement 
of their bodies influenced their judgments of distance. Again, 
what the monitor knows are the public expressions presumed 
useable by any-other and it is only with what has been caught 
in words and deeds that the abstracter-hearer can direct the
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foil. The introduction given to the foil proceeds as 
follows;
s3+: well you know, those 2 girls they were 
seated over here and they saw this and 
then they put the goggles on and it 
seems, I didn't have the goggles on, that 
um, the dots seem to come closer to them, 
and a distance between the dots and the 
backwards, you know background. And they 
were trying to come to a, come to a 
conclusion about how far away the dots 
actually were away, from you know, from 
there, there was sort of a diamond 
shaped figure that appeared and that 
you know they were trying just to see • 
how far it was and they tried different 
angles and they saw from different 
angles that it appeared different 
distances, um, it was hard for them to 
come to a conclusion, but they finally 
realized that from different angles, it 
appeared differently and the closer up 
to it, it seems closer to the background, 
but the further back you go the dots 
seem further away from the back, and 
that's more or less I guess about it, 
you understand?
After a discussion of the.task and what s^ sees, the dialogue 
continues:
ŝ *"*: that's the opposite of what you told
me...right? When I go closer the dots 
come closer? 
s3: it seems further away? 
s^: no, yeah which is the opposite of what 
you told me
s3: are you sure? I thought I told you that 
when you go back it comes closer to you? 
sbt well yeah, that's right, you said^when 
I go back it comes closer to me, it 
doesn't
For the nth time, the monitor has set-up in words the 
relevant dimensions which are to orient the foil. Having 
taken the previous talk-as-heard-as-ground, the monitor has
no way to realize that her rendition has unintentionally 
constructed a new dimension on which the foil locates a 
difference. And with no access to the original subtext, 
there is just as much the introduction of new perceptual 
details as there was when the disparity was masked.
Being able to find a difference by being located in 
the wrong-world is a twist introduced in transcript 23, 
study ty. The recipient-hearer is told that the shape to 
be seen is a triangle, and so orients the foil:
s3+: now in that square there is a 
triangle 
sty*'*: do I have to?...Oh
s3: can't ask him any questions 
sty: yeah
s3: in that square there' s a triangle 
and you, you have to find where 
that triangle is 
sty: Ok, the (inaudible) where in the 
square is the triangle? 
s3s it's in the center
a bit later
sty: I see, you know what I see? I see 
a, I see a diamond 
s3: you see a diamond? 
sty: a rhombus. You know geometry? 
s3: yeah
sty: it's right in the center... it's a, I,
I, suppose you could call it a triangle 
if you divided it into two parts, but 
then you'd have two triangles not one 
s3: that's right...so then there isn't a 
triangle there 
s^: I don't see a triangle, I mean, I, I
suppose, I, I, can't even really stretch 
my imagination I don't see a triangle... 
it looks like there's a rhombus that, 
that's cut-out so that there's an 
empty space which, which is that shape 
you know
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s3i could, did you look at it everywhere, 
all over the square?
and much later:
s3: what do you see? 
s^: nothing 
s3 j nothing?
s^: not a thing, I can|t find the triangle 
s3: there isn't a triahgle? 
s^: no that's right, there isn't a triangle 
s3: there isn't any triangle... but there's 
a rhombus 
■sbs yeah
s3: a distinct rhombus
s^: oh, oh it's more like a square really 
just turned on end, like a diamond 
s3: uh huh
are we done? 
s^: yeah, I guess so 
s3: I think we're done, hey? 
e: Ok?
What has been presented to the recipient-hearer as being 
in the world can not be located, and with no way to uncover 
the error the task is finally terminated. And this leads us 
back to a previous point: while talk can set forth some­
place to be located, not any place will work. When no place 
can be found to satisfy the foil's "seeing" and the recipient- 
hearer 's "hearing" the task concludes and we are again reminded 
of the translation problem. A point the .subjects themselves 
are keenly aware of (transcript 27, study 3):
s3s right, I understand what you're saying,
I,* I really don't understand because I 
. don't have the glasses 
s^: yeah, I'm trying, I'll have to explain 
it in the abstract
Regardless of the distinctions which may be made as to
how a disparity is revealed, the later part of each study
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begins with the same problems. That an old member must be
divested of his or her previously ratified presuppositions,
and that the vocabulary of synonyms presumed useable by any-
other must be challenged so what has been kept silent can be
put back into speech. But to notice that the same issues
arise (synonyms, talk-as-heard-as-ground, pragmatic agreements,
translation problem) whether or not a disparity is concealed
is to suggest that we are not just engaging in a tedious
repetition and confirmation of points already made. It is
to advance a much broader claim— that in each encounter talk
has been responsible for what is made known and how it is 
33known. ^ And it is to notice that the position of the "knower" 
binds what can happen when what has been taken-for-granted 
becomes problematic. For with the departure of the culturally 
informed member, there is no way to recover what has remained 
silent and the members are unable to renegotiate the task on 
its original terms.
33^ It is worth repeating a point already made. Questions 
continually arise as to whether some people are more likely to 
find a difference than others: . whether some people are 
hesitant about placing differences in words. The point I want 
to make is broader. There is something that talk is accom-^ 
plishing in each interaction and this question--as to what is 
being accomplished-.-remains even if we knew which members would 
be most likely to uncover a difference. Indeed, even if the 
particular analyses used to explain why no differences occur 
in an encounter suggest some alternative explanation— e.g., 
cognitive.style, demand characteristics, evaluation apprehen­
sion, conformity— the problem at hand still remains. The 
fascinating thing about talk is how it is sensitive to all of 
the personal and situational concerns while it may also be 
constructing some-thing else.
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(e)s Some Further Comments
Let me begin this section by trying to clarify a question 
which has been bothering me: why do the original pair remain
silent about certain details when they transmit the task 
demands to a new member? More specifically, why are the 
role of the goggles so infrequently mentioned? We can begin 
by probing how members decide what to tell and how they tell
i t . 3*
How the task-conveyor initially explains the task 
demands is a point we are familiar with: that the expressions
used are presumed to be unproblematic and useable by any- 
other who enters or remains in the same context as the 
speaker. The members can keep quiet about -certain details 
because what is being referenced and meant is "obvious." In 
a sense, the details are. not worth mentioning. This account 
is somewhat inadequate and we need to extend our analysis. We 
can proceed by considering three instances of transmission, 
each where a difference is found.
First consider transcript k, study 2 (the Repeater):
s2*: Ok, there's a pattern of dots there, 
uh, that you'll see the large, the 
large rectangle is uh (inaudible) 
of squares what we feel is a square 
is a pattern of dots that the 
experimenter has called a pattern 
of dots and it's large. Now what
J The use of "decide" should not be taken as indicating 
some active monitoring system or rule which is used to direct 
talk. •
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you see in front of you immediately 
is what we called the diamond or a 
square on its side on, on one of 
its corners and that’s obviously, 
that you visually see that in front 
of the large pattern of dots. Ok?
You see that?
then transcript 27, study 3 (the Watcher-Hearer), part 2:
s3+: ah, Ok, well you know those two girls 
they were seated over here and they 
saw this and then they put the goggles 
on, but it seems, I didn't have the 
goggles on, but it seems that when 
they put the goggles on that urn the 
dots seem to come closer to them and 
a distance between the dots and the 
backwards...you know...the background, 
and they were trying to come to a come 
. to a conclusion about how far away the 
dots actually were away from you know 
there and uh urn...first they realized 
that uh there was sort of a diamond 
shaped figure that appeared, and that, 
you know they were just trying to just 
see how far it was and they tried 
different angles, and they saw from 
different angles that it appeared 
different distances.-, .urn.. .it was 
hard for them to come to a conclusion 
but they finally realized that from 
different angles it appeared 
differently and the closer up to it 
it seems closer, the dots seem closer 
to the background but the further back 
you go the dots seem closer to you and 
thus further away from the back...and 
...that's more or less...I guess about 
it...do you understand?
and then transcript 20, study k (the Hearer), part 2:
s2*: Ok, he has these goggles over there 
and when you put one on a figure 
shows up in the pattern...and you 
have to decide how far in front of 
the pattern the figure is...
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While what is conveyed may he expressed in terms which 
conceal details, what is initially placed into words at the 
time of transmission is what has been previously discussed 
by the first pair. And when this information is no longer 
adequate, what has not been spoken about, what has been 
taken-for-granted, must be put into speech for the first 
time. When asked to assess the distance in inches, the task- 
conveyor (s2) in transcript 4, study 2 (the Repeater) responds 
with: "I, I'm really, we didn't talk about inches.”
We need then to assess what was discussed during the 
first part of the encounter. While the partners may be silent 
about the specifics of what is viewed, what is spoken about 
begins with the grounds specified in the instructions: that
a figure appears, that it is separated from the rest of the 
display, and that the members must assess the extent of this 
separation. But additional topics will be placed into words 
and for the most part these topics will indicate that the 
members are having some difficulty in reaching an agreement 
about distance.^ They will note that the stereogram is 
"really" an illusion, that their body position influences 
the distance reported, and that their judgments are arbitrary.
^During the first part of the interaction there are 
some comments made which are not related to difficulties.
They usually are descriptions of the stereogram— oh it's cute, 
what nice colors— and occur very infrequently. Sometimes 
these comments are repeated in the next part, but not during 
the first transmission.
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What is added to the conversation are those aspects of the 
task which the partners find problematic. And it is these 
issues which may be added to the transmission when the task 
demands are conveyed.
But look what remains unsaid. V/hen members speak about 
distance and offer comments about how "far away," "in front" 
or "further out" the shape appears, the effect of the goggles 
is silently invoked: the influence of the goggles forms a
background from which all talk proceeds. The goggles make the 
perceptual experience possible, and as there is no reason to 
suspect that this experience will be altered their influence 
can remain in the background, silently relied upon to work 
once more. The rare times that the goggles' are referred to is 
to either note that the figure disappears when one eye is 
closed, or that each eye is covered with a different color 
lens. The frequency of these comments is listed in Table 12.
Yet if the anomaly between the parts is revealed, it is 
precisely what the goggles make possible that becomes 
problematic. All of a sudden a previously unproblematic 
aspect of the task becomes troublesome and a taken-for-granted 
presumption becomes worth mentioning. And for the first time, 
it becomes necessary to explore the effect of the goggles in 
words. But what has not been spoken about before, can not 
be recovered by the indirect knower.
What is it that is told? The task demands and what has 
been considered worth mentioning. How is it told? In a
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Table 12 
Frequency with which the Role 
of the Goggles was Explicitly 








One 0 0 0
Two 2 1 0
Three 2 1 0
Four 0 1 0
n 1* 3 0
N 28 28 28
manner presumed useable by any-other. And as we've seen, as 
long as the task demands are expressed in a vocabulary of 
synonyms which conceals details and unproblematic presupposi­
tions two unintentional consequences occur: members can fit
disparate perceptions under the same terms, and the indirect 
knower is incapable of finding that silence.
Before we can assess the original conjectures, one 
additional issue needs to be addressed: the concept of
typification. It was suggested that type formation would 
result from a backwards glance at lived experience— at points
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of reflection. We sought to expose this thematic grasp at 
three locations? (a) with the task's transmission; (b) with 
the naturally occurring questions; and (c) with the intro­
duction of the perceptual disparity. It was also proposed 
that a typification would conceal the details of its 
construction and be offered to an-other in a public and 
anonymous fashion— as useable by any-one else. Is there any 
evidence of type formation?
One suggestive link with the concept of typification 
is the vocabulary of synonyms which the members use to express 
their knowledge of the task demands. The later part of the 
studies begin with the presumption that what has worked before 
will work again and a range of synonyms are offered which 
function as we thought a type would— in a public and 
anonymous manner. But the transmission is only one instance 
of reflection, and only the task demands— what is seen and 
what is done— seem to possibly reflect type construction.
What occurs when we examine the other times that reflection 
takes place: where questions were asked and disparities are
noticed?
Questions could be asked for many reasons, and in the 
first parts they generally relate to clarifying distances 
and topics which are considered problematic. In the second 
or third part questions still serve to clarify distances, 
directions, and problems. But when a disparity arises the 
queries' acquire a deeper thrust. Further details are
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requested and the public words, the synonyms, begin to 
unravel. For in seeking reasons for the disparity members 
must bring into words what has been previously silent. And 
where possible, this re-examination starts the re-negotiation 
of the task and brings into relief what was previously taken- 
for-granted.
The backwards look at lived experience has worked 
differentially, for it is only the recognition of the 
perceptual anomaly that causes a world thought to be re- 
useable by any other to be re-examined. And with this probe 
what has remained silent becomes visible, and it becomes 
apparent that the list of synonyms were offered matter-of- 
factly: as if any other could use them unproblematically.
If these expressions which emerged during the initial 
encounter are offered matter-of-factly are we justified 
in considering the list of synonyms typifications? And 
furthermore, if these expressions evolved during the initial 
encounter, has type formation occurred without reflection?
The discovery of the disparity reinforces the argument 
that the synonyms are initially offered unproblematically—  
their meanings and references are presumed obvious and 
useable by any other who enters the "same" context. As such 
I would propose that the synonyms which have emerged be 
considered "types." That a vocabulary thought to be useable 
by any other has evolved from the mere exchange of words 
between partners cooperatively engaged with the task-at-hand
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further suggests that typifications were produced without 
reflection.
(f): Assessing the Original Con.jectures
The original conjectures set a broad frame in which to 
explore the consequences o'f using'talk in face-to-face 
interactions, and we are now in a position to determine how 
to support, modify, or reject those entering claims. The 
first conjecture was split into two parts:
Given a problematic context:
la: talk during an interaction provides the 
elements from which a common world can 
be constructed;
and
lb: reflection on this preceding tallr 
generates typifications which select 
from this step-by-step construction 
those elements which permit the 
grasping of a pragmatic result.
If the arguments presented so far carry any weight, (la) 
is supported in each study regardless of the "knower's'* 
orientation to the stereogram, while (lb) requires some 
modifications. While types have been constructed they were 
not the result of reflection and it is not clear that they 
represent a "pragmatic result" of the encounter. What has 
happened is that the members' vocabulary of synonyms expresses 
what they know and saw while concealing the specifics. And 
in some cases it conceals details which were built up step- 
by-step and never spoken of again. This conjecture can then 
be rewritten as:
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lb': during the interaction a vocabulary 
will emerge which will conceal the 
details of what the members see and 
know, and that these words may be 
typifications.
The second conjecture will also require modification. 
Originally it was suggested that:
2: the transmission of this result to 
others omits its social construction 
so that the result can look like 
anyone's .
The term "result" is at issue here, but what is conveyed 
is presented with a series of expressions which take it for 
granted that anyone can unproblematically use them. This 
conjecture should be rewritten as:
2': when the task conveyor presumes that . 
the context is unaltered, the task 
demands will be expressed by a 
vocabulary which conceals details 
but which is presumed useable by 
any-other.
The third and last conjecture was
3: as the knower of the result is 
further and further removed from 
the original situation, the harder 
it is for that recipient to 
renegotiate the result.
The same comment about "result" can be made here. But a
further specification has to be made as to what it is that
is harder to renegotiate. This refers to the distinction we
made between the participants who know the world directly or
only through the talk of others. It is the indirect "knowers"
who are further removed from the initial situation, and as
we've seen there is no way to recover what has been.left out
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of speech. This was true for both the monitor and the . 
recipient-hearer so there does not seem to be any fine 
distinctions to be made between those two indirect knowers. 
Neither could renegotiate the task on its own terms— of 
extension to recession— once the disparity was revealed.
The third conjecture should then be modified to read:
3': as the indirect knower is separated 
from the task-conveyor and handed a 
vocabulary presumed useable by any­
one, (s)he is caught with a public 
terminology which omits the details 
of the original situation and unable 
to renegotiate the task on its 
original terms when those silent 
details are requested.
V/hat are the consequences of talk?
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DISCUSSION
During the first part of the study the members' speech 
has taken those "elements" from the world needed to resolve 
the task-at-hand. And from these initial face-to-face
'if.conversations an experiential short hand has emerged. The 
precise details of the partners' relationship to the display 
(extension) and the figure seen (diamond) are obscured by a 
vocabulary which presupposes that the meaning and reference 
of the expressions, e.g., "it" and "away," are understood 
and shared. With the introduction of a new partner, a 
stranger, we can see that as the short hand vocabulary forms 
the base of the transmission the utterances are offered 
anonymously— as public words useable by any-other who enters 
the same context— and the history of the encounter is masked. 
And if the stranger takes the remarks in the spirit offered 
disparate worlds can remain hidden beneath the "same" 
expressions. The mundane, ordinary, common-place, and 
typically unremarkable use of talk-in-context has the
•^It is important to re-emphasize our concern with, and 
restriction to the use of speech during face-to-face inter­
actions. As Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (197*0 note, this 
is only one example of what they call the speech-exchange 
system. Besides face-to-face encounters, the speech exchange 
system includes lectures, trials, seminars, press conferences, 
therapy sessions, etc. The question as to whether speech has 
the same consequences in those encounters remains open.
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consequence of placing an order in the ’world which is taken- 
for-granted-until-further-notice.
In that the studies presented here have permitted us 
to document the formation of an understanding, view the 
. extent to which the history .of that understanding was 
communicated to a stranger, grasp when the history of the 
initial encounter could he recovered, and suggest when the 
understandingmight he renegotiated or abandoned, we have, 
in some sense, a verbal analog of the "arbitrary tradition" 
literature. For we have seen how a history has been acquired 
and transmitted.
To elaborate and clarify such expressions as order, 
history, context, consequences, and social construction, it 
is helpful to recognize and distinguish between two levels of 
the argument: a context dependent one and a context
independent one. That is, we need to understand that in 
any face-to-face encounter context and interests will 
influence what is talked about and made known (context 
dependent), and that conversation is presumed to make some­
thing known in any face-to-face interaction (context 
independent). But it must be stressed that this division 
is formed for the purposes of analysis only and fragments 
what is otherwise whole. For whatever is made known, socially 
created, always occurs in some context.
Before pursuing the context independent arguments, we 
need to reiterate how the initial instructions sustained
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a particular context and formed the background for what was 
put into words and made known--to self and other. It should 
be clear that it was the experimental protocols in each of 
the studies reported here that informed the participants as 
to the nature of the interaction which would prevail 
(cooperative), that prepared the members as to what would be 
seen (extension, figure), and which specified how what was 
seeri was to be assessed (distance).
By establishing domains of relevance— distance and 
extension— on which to appraise the stereogram, but by not 
specifying what would be viewed when the goggles were worn • 
and by not detailing what solution should be reached, the 
initial instructions frame and open a future which only 
conversation can close. By placing their orientation to the 
display into words each member to the interaction makes
Tpublic his or her perspective and permits the other the 
occasion to comment and co-operatively co-construct, 
negotiate some resolution to the task-at-hand--e.g., reach 
a decision about distance. And in each and every interaction, 
the experimental chore was resolved with an exchange of words.
But note that the partner's use of expressions such as 
"away," "it," and "further than” do more the describe what 
is seen. It directs the partner on what to look for and how 
to use what is seen— as a visual display which is to be 
assessed in terms of distance rather than color or the number 
of dots. In designating how the stereogram is to be taken,
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we come to an integral part of what it means to "know" the 
world through talk. We are informed what "elements" are to 
be selected from the world and how these "elements" are to 
be used: words order the world for both speaker and hearer.
Yet recall that this use of the stereogram can not be 
separated from the task specified in the instructions 
provided by the experimenter. For as noted it is only from 
this sometime silent subtext that the words and numbers 
exchanged make sense. And what becomes known here represents 
a convention just as Sherif's autokinetic effect does: how
the stereogram is used and the knowledge formed is a 
consequence of the purpose-at-hand. As such the stereogram 
itself contains a future in that the- same visual display can 
satisfy a multitude of purposes and, hence, uses— some of 
which surface with the indirect knowers (the abstracter- 
hearer and the recipient-hearer) during the second and third 
parts of studies 3 and
Besides providing the background on how to use the 
stereogram, the protocols also indicate how the interaction
37*̂ fIt is the "norm" of distance which is generally thought 
of as the convention in Sherif's research. That is not being 
questioned. What is being noted is that the norms which 
evolved are dependent on a particular use made of the auto­
kinetic effect— how far the light moves. And as here, the 
numbers offered by the Ss take this use for granted. One 
could just as easily have requested judgments about how often 
the light goes up or down, or how often it moves to the left 
or the right.
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is to proceed— cooperatively. The members' talk is 
exquisitely responsive to these contextual constraints and 
the discourse in the first part of each encounter reflects 
these restrictions— implicitly or explicitly. It should 
be apparent that an exchange of words under altered controls 
would change how talk proceeds, what is made known,, and what 
becomes taken-for-granted-until-further-notice. By 
formulating zones of relevancies and irrelevancies, the 
instructions define the context and present the members 
with a purpose at hand--the protocols offer a set of concerns
O O
or interests which guide the members' talk. And by placing 
in words how the material before them is to be ordered, we 
„ can begin to see what it means to co-construct social 
reality.
It is from this notion of order and social co-construc­
tion that the unintentional consequences of engaging some-one 
in a dialogue can be brought into relief. The short hand 
vocabulary which emerged during the first part of the studies 
assumed that the reference and meaning of the words are clear 
and held in common. But for the members to rely on this 
presumption two related points must be made. First, by not
•^Using instructions as a substitute for interests— as 
a way to. focus the subjects looking and concerns— is a 
standard practice in the literature (e.g., Cohen & Ebbesen, 
1979; Loftus, 1975» Neisser, 1975» 1976). Indeed I would 
argue that any set of experimental instructions serve this 
purpose.
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raising a challenge to the use of the world involved in 
such expressions as "away," the partner has accepted, for 
the moment, the definition of use offered. And second, as 
long as the partner presents no evidence to the contrary,
"it" ratifies that the same visual world is being viewed 
and "away" that they have the same relationship to the 
stereogram. Even in those cases where verification was 
sought, these terms evolve and become part of the talk and 
continue to be accepted without further question.
As long as these utterances remain uncontradicted, 
they are spoken with assurance: in a manner which supposes
that their reference is obvious and their applications 
unproblematic. An unintentional consequence, then, is that 
the reference and meaning of the vocabulary of synonyms is 
taken-for-granted-until-further-notice.
Whether members appeared to "trust" the instructions 
and utilize them as a silent background for their dialogue, 
or whether members found it "helpful" to first ratify their 
perceptual sameness, the expectations established by the 
protocols were confirmed in the first part of the study.
With the move to a later part of the study there is no 
reason to suspect that what has worked before will not 
work again. And to the extent that one starts where (s)he 
has previously ended— with the assumption that the task 
can be unproblematically repeated and that the meaning and 
reference of the utterances are straight forward--we see
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the culturally informed member convey the task demands with 
typifications--"it,” "away," "further out," and "closer to." 
As the instructions provided by the experimenter framed the 
task during the first part, the explanation offered by the 
task-conveyor will so orient the new partner in studies 2, 3. 
and ty.
Yet an important distinction must be drawn. The first
part of the studies begins in a symmetrical fashion— each
paterner has equal status and rights and each can contribute
to the decision. In the later parts of studies 2, 3, and *1*
an asymmetry is introduced. The task-conveyor, the monitor,
and the recipient-hearer have the "right" to convey the task
demands and instruct the foil on what will be seen, and, also,
the "right" to suggest that the new member is misperceiving
♦ •
or misunderstanding. But recall that the foil, the new 
member, is directed by a series of public words: a vocabulary
of synonyms which take it for granted that the meaning and 
reference of the spoken word is'unproblematic and useable by 
any-other. We can now note the unintentional consequences 
which occur during the later parts of the studies when the 
disparity remains concealed.
First, when a new partner enters what is thought to be 
the same context, the culturally informed members speak in a 
manner which presumes that the synonyms can again be 
unproblematically re-used by any-other. Second, if the new 
partner accepts these words as offered, (s)he implicitly
recognizes them as public and anonymous words--that any-other, 
regardless of their biography, knows what they mean and can 
use them competently— and attempts to find a way to use the 
stereogram that fits the initial description. Third, as the 
terminology provided by the task-conveyor hides the history 
of the previous encounter, two disparate worlds remain cloaked 
behind the "same" vocabulary. And fourth, as long as the 
descriptions offered are not contradicted they too become 
taken-for-granted-until-further-notice--the reference and 
meaning of the terms are presumed to be shared and understood.
To bring out the perceptual disparity, the unenculturated 
member in studies 2, 3, and ^ must, at a minimum, have 
enough detailed information presented so that the grounds for 
discovering the anomaly are possible. Or this partner must 
place into talk enough details about what is perceived so that 
the culturally informed partner has the possibility of even 
hearing a difference. With the realization that the 
partner's relationship to the visual display has been changed, 
the members in studies 1 and 2 can locate the previously 
silent presuppositions and resolve the task through a further 
exchange of words. But in studies 3 and ty, the indirect 
knower is left only with the public, and short hand, 
expressions of the old member and we see another unintentional 
consequence of discourse: that when the informed partner
departs, there is no way to recover the missing history and 
in the face of trouble no way to renegotiate the task-at-hand
130
on its original, founding concerns. For the resolution 
demands access to those quiet details.
The later part of each study was introduced because 
we wanted to see how the taken-for-granted presuppositions 
acquired in this context would be modified. We know, however, 
that in the majority of the conversations no perceptual 
disparity was revealed and three reasons were offered to 
account for this difficulty: (1) that the anomaly was
successfully masked behind ambiguous words such as "away";
(2) that a difference was placed into words but not heard 
as germane by the culturally informed member; and, most 
generally, (3) that the new member's attempt to use the 
vocabulary offered engendered a search to find some v/ay to 
use the stereogram that could satisfy the task-at-hand. 
However, because of the asymmetry introduced into the 
interactional relationship to place the disparity into 
words is to also: (a) question the culturally informed
member's presumption of sameness; (b) question the culturally 
informed member's assumption that (s)he has the authority 
to direct the new member's looking; (c) question the direct 
knower's visual experience; and (d) question the experimental 
presupposition that the members do continue to see the same 
thing. To suggest that placing the discrepancy into speech 
raises numerous questions is to offer two alternative 
explanations as to why the perceptual irregularity remained 
hidden.
The first alternative is Goffman's (1959) "modus 
vivendi" of interaction which proposes that a member of a 
team will not want to create conflict by challenging the 
definition of the situation. The second is Orne's (1972) 
concept of demand characteristics: that a subject will try
to cooperate with what are perceived as the demands of the 
experiment. In the context of these studies, Orne's position 
suggests that the partners accept and try to behave in accord 
with the experimental suggestions that they see the "same" 
visual array, that the culturally informed member does "know" 
what is being viewed and has the "right" to direct that new 
partner's looking, that the "same" problem can once more be 
unproblematically solved, and that cooperation is required.
Goffman's argument, however, informs us about an 
additional concern. His position implies that the partners 
are not misled by the short-hand terminology, nor that they 
actively seek to fit their perception of the stereogram to 
that vocabulary. Rather the members are thought to be aware 
of the anomaly but from a desire to avoid creating a conflict 
they chose to remain silent about the disparity. In this 
context, it seems plausible to argue that Orne's perspective 
overlaps with that of Goffman's; For-example, it is possible 
that a member does know about the anomaly but keeps quiet 
because (s)he seeks to fulfill the task demand of reaching a 
cooperative solution. An end which may not seem attainable 
if the-altered perspective is put into words. With these
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alternative explanations as to why a disparity may stay out 
of the member's speech, let us re-examine a previously 
discussed transcript (transcript #3, part 2, Study One, 
pages 71-73):
si*: I'd say a foot and a half 
s2**: No it's less...more like * 
si: what
s2: fifteen inches... fourteen 
si: could be ... fifteen? 
s2: (to e) fifteen
In this particular interaction, and for all those in 
Study One (the Base), each participant started by seeing an 
extended diamond. But in the second part of this study, as 
told during the debriefing, s2 knew that her relationship to 
the display had been altered. Yet in the face of a partner 
whose talk appears to presume an unchanged perspective, and 
in the face of experimental instructions which support the 
assumption that the task is repeatable without problems, 
what was s2 to do? In this encounter, the foil remained 
quiet. For as she notes a mutual decision is required. To 
have put the seen disparity into words may have challenged 
the experimental definition and possibly made s2 appear 
uncooperative.
By proposing reasons as to why the foils may have "held 
their tongues" and not forced the issue the criticisms of 
Goffman and Orne obtain some force. Each of these 
explanations as to why the disparity remains hidden seems 
plausible and they may partially explain why a perceptual
133
anomaly would not be put into speech. What is the 
consequence of accepting these alternative explanations?
When we examined the conversations, we emphasized how 
in the second part a new member or foil takes the culturally 
informed partner's talk as ground, how these comments may 
conceal the details of what was seen and how one can not 
know what has been kept out of words. But with the Goffman 
and Orne position we are forced to recognize the possibility 
that the foil has also kept silent about the details of what 
is seen, though for very different reasons; to be a 
cooperative subject or to avoid conflict. In that the foil 
is now assumed to be influenced by a set of interests and 
concerns which are kept out of talk an interesting twist 
to the analysis is raised. The tables, so to speak, are 
turned and the culturally informed member has no way to hear 
this silence as (s)he also has recourse only to what is 
spoken. Each member then hears and exchanges words v/hich 
are divorced from their perceptual grounds and guiding 
concerns, but they are still able to co-construct some 
resolution to the task-at-hand.
It is important then to recognize that when the thrust 
of the Goffman and Orne critique are directed to what does 
not get put into words, each offers a reason why the foil 
may fail to put the disparity into a public domain. However, 
these criticisms do not alter the general analysis of what
m
the conversation has accomplished— that the members'
pragmatic agreement with the task-at-hand will enable them
39to trade words and co-construct some shared reality. 7 Nor
do these alternative explanations challenge the presumption
that the culturally informed member uses terms such as
"away," "further than," and "closer to" because there is a
continuing assumption that the visual display remains
unchanged. In stressing what is kept out of words, the
interdependency between context, interest, and speech is
again highlighted and we are again reminded of the
tenuousness of the agreement reached.
While we've briefly considered why the foil may not
speak about the irregularity, we can also ask whether the
Goffman and Orne arguments offer a reason as to why the
culturally informed partner does not hear the anomaly once
it is put into words— made commentable. Again, let's return
to a transcript we've already discussed (transcript #21,
part 2, study 1, pages 73-76):
si*: see it? 
s2**: yeah, I see it, urn
si: it looks fa, further away than the other 
one
s2: it looks like that, the image is on the
screen and the rest is behind it or
something like that like it's behind it 
si: yeah
s2: does it look like it's cut out? 
si: yes
■^What it is that is shared will be addressed later.
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s2: yeah
si: it moves with you? 
s2: what?
si: and it moves with you? 
s2: yeah
si: this is more like the...um this is 
further 
s2: behind?
si: do you agree with that? 
s2: behind it right? you mean 
si: yeah
s2: yeah that's what I think too 
si: it's further away than the other one 
was right? 
s2: yeah
si: so we said fourteen last time...maybe 
eighteen, twenty inches? 
s2: behind, behind the picture right? 
si: yeah
s2: um...I guess around eighteen? 
si: yeah eighteen 
s2: eighteen...Ok
Has SI accepted the foil's description of the triangle 
as "behind" in order to be a cooperative subject? Or has 
SI kept silent because he does not want to challenge the 
definition of the situation? It's important to realize that 
in this case both the Goffman and Orne positions need to 
presume that (a) the foil has placed enough precise 
information in the conversation for the disparity to be 
heard, and that (b) the other partner understands the 
correction being made but in order to avoid raising a 
challenge and/or to remain a good subject keeps what (s)he 
really knows— that the members no longer see the same 
thing— out of words. But recall that Si's comments suggest 
neither of these tactics, but rather inform us that "behind" 
was misheard. That is, SI thought his parter was confused.
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Furthermore, if the foil does put the disparity into words 
explicitly enough for the partner to hear the challenge, 
the questions and conflicts are already on the floor and 
the force of the Goffman and Orne arguments appears under­
mind. For the thrust of their position appears to be that 
these concerns not be made public.
I want to argue in this case, and in the cases of
mishearing in .general, that where the disparity remains
masked the Goffman and Orne positions are weak alternatives.
First, for the most part the foil rarely puts the difference
into words in an explicit enough fashion. Next we need to
recall that during the first part of the studies, each
participant's perception matched the orientation described
in the protocols. And it seems reasonable to argue that for
those members who do not explicitly verify this orientation,
they take it as a silent background for their utterances as
long as nothing to the contrary is said. The next part of
the studies then begins with the presumption that the
experience is repeatable, and for the members whose
✓
perspective is unaltered the experience is indeed the same 
as before. Even with an explicit description, to success­
fully challenge the presumption of a continuing and 
repeatable world, the foil must (a) overcome the partner's 
assumptions iihat the experience can be done once more and 
(b) implicitly or explicitly suggest that the partner is
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misled by his or her current experience and the experimental 
instructions.
At this point a critical distinction between the direct 
and the indirect knower needs to be drawn. The member whose 
perception is unaltered in Study One (the Base) and Study Two 
(the Repeater) must hear the corrections while personally 
immersed in an unchanged visusil'world. In contrast, the 
indirect knower of studies three and four (the abstracter- 
hearer and the recipient-hearer) are never visually engaged 
and know about the task only through the speech of a now 
departed member. As such a disparity put into speech may 
have different obstacles to overcome. The direct knower's 
current knowledge and engagement as well as-the history of 
the previous encounter must be questioned: the "I" of current
experience as well as the "we" of the prior interaction.
While the recipient-hearer or abstracter-hearer has no visual 
immersion or past history to overcome, only a web of words 
conveyed by a now departed they.
The culturally informed member does not ignore—
mishear— the disparity from a desire to be cooperative or
to avoid conflict. The member's difficulty is that (s)he
hears and sees from a continuing immersion in a repeatable
world and that it takes some effort to bring the member out
/lqof this engagement with the world. The member is involved
,^°This notion of effort is presumed to be different for 
the direct and indirect knower. We presume it is easier,
with something akin to Neisser's (1975. 1976) concept of 
selective hearing and looking, and it is from within this 
preoccupation with a continuing world, and a repeatable 
one, that a first move is to hear "behind" as really meaning 
"in front" or to conclude that the partner is confused or 
misperceiving.
With-the argument that the Goffman and Orne critiques 
are not convincing when applied to the cases of mishearings, 
we are left with the claim that they do manage to offer a 
reason as-to why the members have chosen to stay silent 
about the disparity. The question then arises as to whether 
one of these arguments is better than the other. In Study 
One, where the same members participate in both parts, it is 
hard to assess this question directly, but it becomes clear 
during the debriefings of .Studies Two, Three and Four that 
the members are surprised to learn that their orientation 
to the stereogram differed. This surprise intimates that 
the participants did not conceal something they knew, but 
rather that they were actively attempting to meet the task
less effortful, for the indirect knower to relinquish what 
has been transmitted by a "they" than for a direct knower who 
remains enmeshed in the world. Whether this conjecture is 
reasonable is an issue future research can address.
i t  1 It is unfortunate that a video-tape was not_available 
for then the members' slow pan and looks of disbelief would 
display this point more forcefully. It does become clear 
during the debriefing that the partners are surprised to 
learn and discover that they saw the stereogram differently.
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demands specified by their partner and the experimenter.
If the members were unaware of the disparity, Goffman's 
critique is severely curtailed and Orne's explanation seems 
more plausible. But what can we say when a disparity is 
clearly revealed?
At first glance it seems that even in these cases the 
Goffman position is undercut. For it is clear that the 
members place the issue into a public domain and put the 
conflict on the floor. It could be reasonably argued that 
what we are hearing are the consequences of Orne's demand 
characteristics: that to be cooperative you state what you
see in an earnest attempt to solve the task. But the 
'separation is not that neat. Goffman's position has a 
rejoinder which could claim that the member considered the 
anomaly a "serious" matter and had to put "it" into words, 
even if that meant challenging the definition of the 
situation. Since these claims can not be disentangled in 
these cases, we can not argue which of these explanations 
may be better and which is responsible for what the members 
are placing into words.
Though the Goffman and Orne arguments can not be 
conclusively discounted, note that their effect in this 
context is always directed to what is put into speech. So 
while the general points made about the consequences of 
talk in a face-to-face encounter remain unscathed, if the 
critiques are valid they have their influence over what any
.1^0
partner makes known to any-other partner. And in deciding 
"what is made known by what is said" (Rommetveit, 1979a) 
we can move to another question.
When public claims are exchanged it is possible to 
conceal the details of what is seen and known and make 
disparate worlds accommodate the same expressions. But 
though each encounter will vary in the amount of detail 
provided, each conversation represents some alignment of 
perspectives which enable the individuals to deal with the 
task-at-hand. With all the details which are concealed 
beneath the same expressions what is it that is made known 
by what is said? What do the partners presumably share with 
each other?
Rommetveit (1979a, 1979b, 1979c) has addressed these 
questions and provides a dialogic truth table to explicate 
the conditions under which discourse may enable the members 
of a dyad to achieve a state of "perfectly shared actual 
realty." His definition can begin the analysis 
as it will help to elaborate a series of problems.
Some representation Ri of S constitutes part
of pi's and p2's perfectly shared actual
l<2Rommetveit's truth table is in Appendix D. Briefly 
there are two levels of falsityj fl claims that S is some­
thing other than Ri; while f2 asserts a question about S with 
no alternative beliefs offered. In addition I and U are 
values in the table. U refers to an undetermined state as to 
what S is or is not, and I means that p2 is ignorant about 
which value, t, fl, f2, or U exists for pi. This is 
obviously abbreviated but it does carry the gist of the 
table.
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reality if and only if both of them believe 
that S is Ri and each of them assumes the other 
to hold that belief. (1979a, p. 11)
The statement that S is Ri represents the basic unit of 
analysis for 'which "truth values" are assigned and is "...an 
individual state of belief concerning some fragment of the 
social world" (1979a, p. 11). While we have no data which 
explicitly assess both members' actual and assumed beliefs, 
we will proceed as if we had access to such data. To make 
the analytic task easier and more manageable we will only 
consider the second part of studies one and two and omit 
the question of social control that Rommetveit raises. We 
will act as if a symmetry between pi and p2 prevails: 
listed as pl=p2(111(2); IV(6)) in the dialogic truth table.
For the purposes of analysis we can use a bit of 
dialogue already reviewed (transcript # 15, part 2, study 1, 
page 99) •
s2*: do you see it? 
si**: yeah it's coming...I don't see it that 
well though. Yeah, now I see it 
s2: it's a triangle right? 
si: right
s2: it’s far away right? 
sij what?
(1) s2: it fa, further away than the other one?
(2) si: yeah
and concentrate on the lines marked (1) and (2). We can 
complicate the analysis by considering both levels of 
falsity, fl and f2, but it seems adequate to concentrate 
just on falsity fl and modify line (1) to read as: the
triangle is fa, further away than the other one. We then
Ik2
take the assertion (A), S.is Ri, to mean that THE TRIANGLE 
IS FURTHER AWAY THAN THE OTHER ONE, and we can proceed by 
constructing the following abbreviated version of 
Rommetveit*s dialogic truth table.
Table 13 























One t t t t
Two t fl t t
Three fl fl t t
a. pi in wl represents the old member's 
actual beliefs about assertion (A), while 
p2 in wl refers to the foil's, or remaining 
members in study 1, actual beliefs.
b. p2(pl in wl) represents the new member's 
belief about what the old member thinks of 
assertion (A); while pi (p2 in w2) represents 
the old member's assumption about what the 
new member believes.
A (t) means that the belief is assumed to^ 
be true, while fl assumes that S is not Ri 
but something else.
Recalling the as if nature of the argument and the 
simplifying assumptions, Case One represents an approximate 
version of the argument assumed in the results section.
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The partner whose perspectives is unaltered believes 
assertion (A) as does the foil, as evidenced in line (2).
As there is no evidence to the contrary each participant 
temporarily believes that the other also accepts S is Ri and 
(t) is listed under the assumed belief column. Case Two 
joins the arguments made by Goffman and Orne. The partner 
who remains immersed in an extended perspective offers 
assertion (A) as a statement of his perspective, and while 
the foil can accept this description the more detailed, but 
silent, and actual belief is that S is not just away it is 
in back (S is Rm, in back, not Ri, away). Fl is then listed 
under the actual beliefs of p2. As this detail is never 
mentioned, the old member incorrectly believes (t) for pi 
(p2 in w2). The foil however correctly assumes that (A) is 
(t) for p2(pl in wl). Case Three represents the possibility 
that while assertion (A) can be accepted by each partner 
neither really believes that S is Ri is an adequate 
description. Rather they each believe that something else 
is true of S— S is Rk (in front) and S is Rm(in back)— but 
manage to hide these details from the other. So fl gets 
listed under each member's actual belief but as neither 
partner informs the other about these issues, for whatever 
reason, each "incorrectly" assumes that the other believes 
assertion (A) as it stands and a (t) is listed under assumed 
beliefs.
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As the conjunction of pi in w l ; p2 in w2; pl(p2 in w2) ,• 
and p2(pl in wl) is true only for Case One only it is 
considered as an example of a "perfectly shared actual 
reality." The other cases are imperfectly shared as there 
are "errors" made about what the actual beliefs-are. The 
problem v/ith all this is what represents an adequate account 
of a person's actual beliefs? In a very real sense an 
answer to this question complements the issue of what 
members make known to each other and share. For it asks 
how much detail needs to be placed into the dialogue for an 
other to make a "correct" assumption about the actual beliefs 
of their partner.
Consider the first case. The "old member" uses the
term "away" but remains silent about the details— that "away"
is a short-hand version of "in front." If these specifics
need to be brought into a public domain for us to argue that
we "know" pi's actual beliefs, then Case One is not 
perfectly shared but is better represented by the imperfectly 
shared Case Three. If, however, it is not necessary to 
place these silent presumptions into words, Case One can be 
considered an instance of "perfectly shared actual reality."
It is apparent that a more plausible, and intuitively 
satisfying example of a "perfectly shared" reality is found 
in those cases where differences are found. For here the 
participants were able to proceed from the initial assertion 
that S i s  Ri to the realization that S is not Ri, but
Iks
rather that S is Rk and S is Rra. Each member recognized 
that they have incorrectly assessed their partner's beliefs, 
and through further talk modify their assumptions about what 
the other's actual beliefs are. This seems to be a clear 
instance of what Rommetveit's concern with how members of a 
dyad, through sustained discourse, overcome their private 
interests and temporarily achieve that "perfectly shared" 
reality. The question remains, however, whether given the 
simplifications made about Case One, and the analytic 
outsider's stance which permits us to see that an "error" 
has been made, can we assume that it too fits Rommetveit's 
definition?
Once we raise the issue as to how much- detail needs to 
be placed into words before we can say that members share a 
reality we broach an important issue. For if we accept the 
assumption that individuals live in a pluralistic and 
fragmented social world, it seems that more detail and more 
history can always be provided. We face an infinite regress 
and need some way to cut this problem off so that we can 
agree that enough detail has been presented.
The difference between Cases One and Two, and those 
instances where disparities are discovered reside in what 
the members take as being adequate to resolve the task-at- 
hand— even if this manages to gloss issues and leave the 
future open to the types of problems we've seen with 
pragmatic agreements and the indirect knowers. The critical
IkS
point here is that the other is not thought to mean anything
else than what is said, and neither partner is aware that
the other has glossed details and left a potential for
trouble. I want to suggest that Rommetveit*s definition can
be redrawn, and that the definition of shared reality should
address only assumed beliefs. The definition could be
rewritten as:
Some representation Ri of S constitutes part 
of pi's and p2's shared reality if both of 
them believe the other to hold to the belief 
that S is Ri.
With this definition Case One is represented as a case 
of shared reality even though the members can be considered 
to be mistaken about the other's "actual, beliefs." Four 
points about this redefinition should be noted. One is that 
it is the participant's decision about the level of detail—  
what they take as adequate to resolve the task-at-hand—  
which is given priority. It is critical to realize, both 
in the case of pragmatic agreements and in the examples 
which Rommetveit cites, that the members are not aware that 
their agreement masks a problem. The person who is aware of 
this is the analyst who somehow acquires access to what the 
members "really" know. Two, while there is no explicit 
notion of sharedness in the "arbitrary tradition" literature, 
I think that the research presumes a similar definition. I 
don't think this is surprising since social psychology has 
consistently argued that imagined beliefs about others have
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real consequences for our own "beliefs and actions. Three, 
that what is shared or made known will vary in content during 
any interaction. And four, that this definition may "be too 
weak— it may include cases we would obviously want to 
exclude. Rommetveit's original definition demonstrates a 
set of problems that should not be lost sight of and which 
are repeatedly found in the notion of pragmatic agreement and 
Goffman's "modus vivendi" of interactions.
So what is made known by what is said? What is it that 
the members share? As long as neither partner has any reason 
to presume that an-other means anything else than what is 
said, and as long as the talk exchanged is perceived as being 
sufficient to resolve the task-at-hand a shared belief is 
held for all practical purposes and is taken for granted until 
further notice— even if the "actual beliefs" are misrepresented. 
On the basis of this definition each case describes some 
shared reality about each other's belief about assertion (A):
THE TRIANGLE IS FURTHER AWAY THAN THE OTHER ONE.
We need now to move to the issue of context independency 
and see how the results described here fit into an expanded" 
perspective. To make this transition we need to clarify some 
presumptions about what it means to be a member of a social
Zj,3world, and what it means to talk about that world. ^ The
^These claims about membership are not meant to be 
exhaustive. We are setting up beginning arguments so that 
the function of talk can be put into perspective.
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basic argument about membership is simply that a person's
interests influence how the world before him or her will
be used. Bartlett's (1932) assertion is interesting to cite
in this regard:
We may consider the old and familiar 
illustration of the landscape artist, the 
naturalist, and the geologist who walk in 
the country together. The one is said to 
notice and recall beauty of scenery, the 
other details of flora and fauna, and the 
third the formation of soils and rocks. In 
this case, no doubt, the stimuli being 
selected in each instance from what is 
present are different for each observer, 
and obviously the records made in recall 
are also different. Nevertheless, the 
different reactions have a uniformity of 
determination, and in each case spring 
from established interests, (p. 4)
as is the claim by Schutz (1971):
As we stated before, this world is to our 
natural attitude in the first place not 
an object of our thought but a field of 
domination. We have an eminently practical 
interest in it, caused by the necessity of 
complying with the basic requirements of 
our life. But we are not equally interested 
in all the strata of the world of v/orking.
The selective function of our interests 
organizes the world in both respects— as 
to space and time— in strata of major and 
minor relevancies, (p. 277» Vol. I)
While it may be useful to attempt to discriminate 
between interests, beliefs, attitudes, schemas, intentions, 
plans, engagement, set, attention, and purpose the terms are 
used interchangeably here. I take it that Neisser's (1975» 
1976) argument about attention, Marinis' (1977) self-schemata, 
Goffman's (1974) notion of frame, and Rommetveit's (1979a) 
assertion about engagement and perspective make the same 
point.
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To have some "established interests" in the world 
along "strata of major and minor relevancies" is to propose 
not only that our concerns influence what we take from the 
world, but to argue that our use of the world cannot be 
divorced from our interest in it. At least not without 
risk. For to make such a separation is to leave only the 
public mark accessible. The finding of a knife in a tree 
presents an observable and verifiable event for every 
passer-by, but what is lost are the guiding interests and 
history of the person(s) who put the knife in the tree/1''*
If a question arises as to how that knife is to be under­
stood, it is those silent grounds we seek to retrieve. For 
we attempt to rejoin the subject with his or her object to 
find out how the knife was used and should be taken— as 
indicating hostility, forgetfulness or target practice.
If we stay only with the knife and accept it as a public 
and anonymous expression, the risk is that the knife, as 
the word, will be fit to the possibly disparate world of
^Rommetveit (1979) and Menzel (1978) present an example 
of a man mowing a lawn and cite it as an example of a 
"trivial minimum." It is something that any passer-by can 
agree to but leaves open whether the lawn is being mowed 
to keep up community standards, annoy the neighbors, 
exercise his muscles, or avoid his wife. Obviously, to 
the extent that our purpose is to keep a record of whether 
the lawn is mowed, or how many knives are found in trees, 
the "trivial minimum" suits our purposes and is adequate for 
it. It should also be noted that to seek the person's reasons 
is not to give a priority to that account, we can argue with 
it and assume that there are "hidden" motives. We are just 
noting that there is an interest which guides.
the passer-by. And if the knife was left as an object 
presumed useable by any-other in an unproblematic manner, 
again as with the word, the same "error" is made.
What does it mean then to talk about the world? It is
to place our previously silent interests into a public and
(ac)countable domain— what Berger and Luckmann have called
externalization and objectiviation. So, in speaking we
have temporarily transformed the world, for our utterances
catch our use of the world and order it into "flora" and 
l± 6"fauna." To talk about the world is to snare it, to 
catch it in words for self and others, and convey what 
elements are to be pulled from the ground— how the world is 
to be ordered.
Everyday speech repeatedly warns us, especially at 
times of anger or in the face of authority, to be careful 
about what we put into words and make public. Such phrases 
as "don't say something now you'll be sorry for later,"
"be careful what you say, it'll come back to haunt you," 
and "I knew that once I said it things would never be the 
same" indicate that one is not being warned about semantic 
niceties. You are being warned to keep quiet about "what's 
on your mind," to keep your rendition of the world off the
^Consider Rommetveit (1979a)t "What is easily over­
looked in such an analysis (of understanding what is meant 
by what is said), however, is the 'innocence of silence' and 
the subtle transformation of knowledge which at times seems 
to be part and parcel of the very act of verbalization."
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floor, to keep silent about your interest in and use of the 
material before you. To use "away" or "in front of" is the 
same as using "flora" and "fauna"; our use of the world is 
displayed for others. Expressions such as "away" manage to 
accomplish the same thing, but in their mildness we lose 
sight of it.
But do these other words also function as "away" did?
Are they offered as public words--as types— presumed useable
by any-other in the social unit, and as such conceal a
situational history and personal biography? To the extent
that they do, we are left with a figure separated from its
ground— with the knife in the tree-offered as re-useable by
any-other. And to the extent that we take the words as
offered discrepant perspectives can be tucked beneath the 
47same term. 1
One possible misunderstanding should be considered 
before proceeding. Though the experimental context severely 
constrains the members' activities and defines their concerns, 
interests and contexts are not always known in advance. For 
words can, as G. H. Mead (1935/72) argued, work to form 
them:
^ I t  is interesting to examine in this light the disputes 
that have taken place over the uses of Ms. or Miss, Black or 
Negro, Boy or Man, Girl or Woman. The expressions represent 
not a linguistic argument, but a social and historical one. 
They are fights over how the world should be ordered and 
attempts to make visible what has been concealed.
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Language does not simply symbolize a 
situation or object which is already there 
in advance, it makes possible the existence 
or appearance of that object, for it is part 
of the mechanism whereby that situation or 
object is created, (p. 78)
and Merleau-Ponty:
The search for the 'appropriate word' in • 
order to make something known to somebody 
else may often, in authentic speech, actually' 
serve to make that something known to the 
speaker himself. The latter does not know 
precisely what he intended to say until he 
'hits upon' some word or expression by which 
his thought can be completed. (Rommetveit,
197^, pp. 22-23).
But whether the interests are constrained in advance or 
gradually emerge, if to talk is to order or create an object, 
what does it mean to exchange words with someone--to engage 
in a face-to-face interaction? If we grant the premise 
that no two individuals occupy the same temporal or spatial 
location (Schutz, 1973; Rommetveit, 197^» 1979a), nor have 
identical interests in the world, to participate in a 
dialogue is an attempt to arrive at some mutually agreed 
upon version of reality which can temporarily transcend 
our private perspectives and engagements with the world
|,o
(Goffman, 1976; Mead, 193^/72; Rommetveit, 197^* 1979a)..
First there is Mead (1935/72) " . . .  objects are con­
stituted in terms of meanings within the social process of 
experience and behavior through the mutual adjustment to one 
another of the responses or actions of the various individual 
organisms involved in that process, an adjustment made 
possible by means of a communication which takes the form of 
a conversation of gestures in the earlier evolutionary stages 
of the process, and of language in its later states." (p. 77)
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As William James (Rommetveit, 1979a) asserted: "You accept
my verification of one thing, I yours of another. We trade 
on each other's truth." And by trading words we are engaged 
in an eminently social, and pervasively mundane enterprise. 
This ordinary, routine, and unremarkable activity allows us 
to temporarily move beyond our private perspectives and 
achieve some co-ordinated and shared reality integrally 
connected to the purpose-at-hand.
But not every conversation proceeds with such 
equanimity. For when two people speak, different orders of 
reality are placed on the floor and the issue of social 
control— whose claim to reality will be temporarily accepted—
And then there are the comparable claims of Goffman and 
Rommetveit;
Goffman (1976): "What then is talk viewed inter-
actionally? It is an example of that arrangement by which 
individuals come together and sustain matters having a 
ratified, joint, current, and running claim upon attention, 
a claim which lodges them in some sort of intersubjective, 
mental world." (p. 328)
And finally Rommetveit, 197^: "Once the other person
accepts the invitation to engage in that dialogue his life 
situation is temporarily transformed. The two participants 
leave behind them whatever their preoccupations were at the 
moment when silence was transformed into speech. From that 
moment on they are jointly committed to a shared here and 
now established and continually modified by their acts of 
communication." (p. 23) . . . and . . . "Message structure 
must then be explored within the conceptual framework of the 
spatial-temporal interpersonal coordinates of that act of 
speech: whatever is made known is made known by an I to a
you whose different though partially shared worlds are 
temporarily brought into some state of intersection by 
virtue of the intersubjectively established here and now of 
their dialogue." (p. 39)
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ho ZQsurfaces. ^ But whichever reality claim is accepted, or
fought over, some use of the world is being brought into
relief in any face-to-face enounter.
And from this co-ordinated dialogue a manner of knowing
the world adequate to resolve the purpose-at-hand will 
<51emerge. The positioning of the world according to interest
ho^The issue of social control and its conversational 
implications has been discussed by Rommetveit (1979a, 1979b, 
1979c) in great detail. His dialogic truth table attempts 
to specify what is meant by what is said under varying 
levels of social control. The critical question, in part, 
then becomes how to understand how to. achieve a shared 
reality. "The basic problem of human intersubjectivity is 
. . . a question concerning in what sense and under which 
conditions two persons who engage in a dialogue can transcend 
their different private worlds." (1979a, p. 7)
■^Consider the claim that Goffman (1959) made: "Each
participant is allowed to establish the tentative official 
ruling regarding matters which are vital to him but not 
immediately important to others, e.g., the rationalizations 
and justifications by which he accounts for his present 
activity. In exchange for this courtesy he remains silent 
or non-committal on matters important to others but not 
immediately important to him. We have then a kind of inter­
actional modus vivendi. Together the participants contribute 
to a single overall definition of the situation which involves 
not so much a real agreement as to what exists but rather a 
real agreement as to whose claim concerning what issues will 
be temporarily honored. Real agreement will also exist 
concerning the desirability of avoiding an open conflict of 
definitions of the situation. I will refer to this level of 
agreement as a 'working consensus.' It is to be understood 
that the working consensus established in one interaction 
will be quite different in content from the working consensus 
established in a different type of setting." (pp. 9-10)
^ F o r  simplicity's sake, I am assuming that the encounters 
are cooperative ones. When issues of competitiveness, and 
questions of honesty arise other problems arise as to how the 
talk will be heard. These concerns can be temporarily 
omitted, but even then some rendition of the world is being 
offered. Even if it is not to be believed.
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and purpose is what it means, here, to refer to a socially
constructed reality. Constructed because some aspect of
the material available is selected, "flora" and "fauna,"
and social because the arbitration is a joint venture— by
trading on.the "elements" placed into talk a shared world
can be temporarily attained. But there is a price to pay
for this construction. Consider Schutz (1971):
. . . it is characteristic of the natural 
attitude that it takes the world and its 
objects for granted until counterproof 
imposes itself, (p. 228, Vol. I)
and:
To take the world for granted beyond question 
implies the deeprooted assumption that until 
further notice the world will go on 
substantially in the same manner as before; 
that what has proved valid up to now will 
continue to be so, and that anything we or 
others like us could successfully perform 
once can be done again in a like way and will 
bring about like results, (p. 231, Vol. 2)
Then there is the argument of William James (1971):
To continue thinking unchallenged is ninety- 
nine times out of a hundred our practical 
substitute for knowing in the completed sense.
(p. 39)
and:
. . . any object which remains uncontradicted 
is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute 
reality, (p. 289, Vol. II)
And what is made as a broader claim, that any uncon­
tradicted experience becomes taken-for-granted, works for 
a conversation. A world ordered by speech, which snares 
self and others, becomes taken-for-granted as long as it
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remains uncontradicted. What has been made known with work, 
is presumed known, natural, and obvious to any-other in the 
same social unit. But even though what is made known is 
taken-for-granted, that it suits the here and now of-the 
participants' interests and purpose-at-hand is a way to 
remind us that it is a convention. For with other purposes- 
at-hand the material before us can be utilized differently, 
and previously "hidden" aspects•become visible for the 
first time. The social world that we live in is composed 
of fringes (James, I890) and horizons (Schutz, 1971, 1973): 
what is in focus at one time leaves out of focus something 
else which with a turn of our head becomes clear. What 
exists as a socially co-constructed reality is then located 
neither "out there" in the world, nor "in the head" of the 
individual. It is created and sustained in the .inter­
relationship between the members and their purposes-at-hand 
(Dewey, 1929/60; James, 1971? Mead, 193V72).
In any face-to-face encounter talk mediates between the 
purpose-at-hand and the context and provides the material 
from which a shared world can be co-constructed. And if 
what is made known continues to go unchallenged, it is 
taken-for-granted-until-further-notice. The dialogues 
reported here all fit within this broad framework, but the 
details of the analysis enable us to gauge the specifics 
of the process.
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From their engagement with the task the members begin 
to unproblematically employ a terminology which obscures 
the precise details of what is seen. Yet these expressions 
presuppose a mutually shared and understood use of the 
world, orientation to the stereogram, and interactional 
relationship. That the transmission starts with, or that 
the monitor may overhear, this short hand version of the 
world suggests that the utterances are offered as 
typifications of that encounter and what was made known—  
as anonymous public words useable by any-other in the same 
context. And in the foil's effort to use the words as 
offered, disparate worlds remain unexposed and an agreement 
is. reached which works for all practical purposes.
In seeing how a history is acquired, how it is taken 
as natural and obvious, how it is represented to a stranger, 
and the possible consequences of this transmission we 
approach the concerns of the "arbitrary tradition" 
literature, and have, in a sense, a verbal analog of the 
autokinetic effect.
With the mention of the autokinetic effect, we can 
return to our starting point: the concept of "norm." How
do we relate what talk has accomplished to the formation of 
norms? In watching how the participants' pragmatic 
engagement with the task allowed them to form, share, and 
take-for-granted an understanding, we recover and begin to 
answer a series of questions which prompted the analysis:
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(a) accounting for how a manner of knowing arises in some 
social unit; (b) accounting for how this manner of knowing 
comes to be shared; and (c) accounting for how this manner 
of knowing acquires its apparent naturalness.
Yet the problem of what is shared between the members 
is troublesome. For as we've seen from Rommetveit's dialogic 
truth table, and with the notion of pragmatic agreement, 
disparate, even conflicting, perspectives can be concealed 
beneath what members take to be shared agreements. As the 
presumption that members of some social unit share some 
common frame of reference for their thought and action is 
central to the concept of "norm," we can not just assume 
that some standard is held in common. For to do so begs 
the questions that we need to ask. When we assert that 
members share a norm, what is it that they are thought to 
have in common and what is the level of detail— how specific 
is the thought or behavior shared— that norm is intended 
to account for?
Let me try to clarify this concern by presenting a 
hypothetical case. We undertake a survey and inquire whether 
people believe that "help should be offered to someone in 
need." We find, for the convenience of the example, a 
unanimous yes. Within some social unit people appear to 
share a standard of thought and behavior, and we may argue 
that a norm exists. But as a norm is always invoked in 
some context, what is it that this statement of unanimity
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makes known? Do we assume that the members of the unit 
agree how to offer help, who to offer help to, or how to 
recognize a person in need? Imagine that we return to 
these members and request more information: have they ever
given help to someone in need; what do you consider to be 
an offer of help; are there situations you can think of 
when you wouldn't offer help; are there people you wouldn't 
help even if they were in need; and how do you know that 
some one is in need of help?
I don’t think any one would be surprised if the answers 
encompassed a rather broad and diverse range of responses. 
Indeed our original question would probably have prompted 
the comment, "well, it depends." In any case, we would 
agree that our initially broad base of agreement has been 
narrowed, and explain this narrowing by indicating the 
consequence of making the request more specific— of 
contextualizing it. How broad do-we need the base of 
agreement to be before we consider if normative, and what 
is the level of detail that the members of a social unit 
are presumed to share?
Figure 1 represents a schematic of the problem being 
addressed, and we can consider the hypothetical unanimity 
as occupying space (g)— there is a large base of agreement 
but there is a low level of detail presumed to be shared.
As we obtain more information we moved from space (g) to
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Figure 1. A schematic of the Base of 
Agreement and Level of Detail Shared
(e) and then (c)--as the arrow indicates. The base of 
agreement is a critical issue as norm has its force as an 
explanatory concept precisely because of its assumed ability 
to account for the behavior and beliefs of a large number 
of people. If we argue that the base of agreement is not an 
essential component of norm, we are reduced to suggesting 
that two people who share some reality share a norm. At 
this level norms cannot be distinguished from such concepts 
as attitudes and beliefs and its force as an explanatory term 
is severely diminished. Y/e may then want to be cautious
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about claims which argue that spaces (c), (f), and (i) 
represent norms.^
What about the level of detail that is presumed shared? 
We can use the concept of pragmatic agreements as an analogy. 
If we suggest that the agreement is what the members take , 
as adequate for the task-at-hand, and if we accept that some 
event can be considered shared by pi and p2 as long as both 
of them believe the other accepts the assertion that S is 
Ri, we can pack a great deal of widely disparate, even 
conflicting experiences under the same rubric. And if 
divergent experiences can be called the same thing for all 
practical purposes, the base of agreement is increased to 
a magnitude useful for the cpncept of "norm" though we can 
not set a numerical figure for this base. Many members 
with varied experiences can then agree that "it's nice to 
offer help to someone in need.” There is an important 
implication in arguing that norms may have low specificity, 
and I want to bring this out from another direction.
^ This classification of norms by base and detail should 
be considered suggestive. For example, is a professional 
argot to be considered normative— it has a small base but 
high detail (c). Is the fact that most Americans write from 
left to right, high detail and high base (a), normative? 
Perhaps it is misleading to suggest that norms fall in only 
some spaces, perhaps they can occur at any point and all 
that we need to know, at any point, is what level of detail 
and base that particular norm is to account for. Though as 
we begin to talk of universal norms as contrasted with^ 
particularistic ones, I think we are more likely to be in 
space (g).
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Sherif's discussion of norm formation offered the 
proposition that a norm was a "preparedness to see in the 
nature that surrounds us much to what another period would 
be totally blind" (1935r P* 6k). As no one in the "arbitrary 
tradition" literature appears to question this supposition,
I will assume that they have accepted it. And it is not a 
bad assumption to entertain, but it leaves open the issue 
of what a "preparedness to see" is intended to convey.
I want to propose that the expression should be 
considered as something akin to a social expectation, a 
social preparation. As all of the research in the "arbitrary 
tradition," as well as the current work, has enabled the 
members to come to know something about the" context they 
are immersed in? and as in each of the studies it is the 
experimental instructures which influence what use is to be 
made of the world before them, they each set up a 
"preparedness to see." It becomes interesting to, again, 
consider the experimental protocols for this research to 
assess what it is that is "prepared."
Simply put the instructions open a future which the 
participants close. The expectations, the "preparedness to 
see" did not provide a detailed map as to how to proceed, 
but rather presented a broad frame within which the members 
had to temporarily align the "here" and "now" of their 
interests. Whatever was finally shared and made known was 
an achievement, a consequence, of people interacting in
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context and concert. For members the experiences which 
come to represent the details of that "preparedness" are 
not known until the task is completed. And as I read the 
"arbitrary tradition" literature this process operates in 
each experiment reported.
What then does it mean to consider norm as a 
"preparedness to see"— as a social expectation? It is 
first to return to a point introduced earlier: that the
concept of norm represents a summary term. That many 
members with widely divergent experiences can accept the 
broad claim that "it's nice to offer help to some one in 
need." And next it is to suggest that norms are social 
ideals precisely because they enable the members of a 
social unit to categorize a wide range of disparate instances 
under the same rubric. To consider norms as a "preparedness 
to see" is to indicate that they function as a frame whose 
details are temporarily filled within some context.
And in that context it is a member's continuing and 
repetitive problem to determine the appropriateness or 
inappropriateness of the linkage between action and thought 
and norm— between context and ideal. There is then an inherent 
vagueness with "norms," for any context contains the 
possibility that members will argue about how to use the 
particulars before them. And in this argument "norms" are 
bandied about as are words: to select and order the material
in the world. For talk is being used to make sense of the
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context as it describes it— "the coherent, organized and 
meaningful sense of the environment is contingent upon the 
'describing' that members do" (Wieder, 197*0. As Garfinkel 
and Sacks (1970) note, maintaining a recognizable order is 
through and through a member's accomplishment.^
And for all practical purposes these summary terms, 
ideals, are offered as adequate descriptions of what has 
been seen or done— e.g., I offered help. But in that these 
pronouncements gloss the details of the specific encounter, 
they function as did the synonyms that the members developed 
in these studies— as public terms assumed useable and 
comprehensible by any-other in the social unit regardless 
of their biography. And as what is known is not specified 
in advance, it is managed in retrospect. ̂
C3-'•'Two senses of order have slipped in with this account. 
One is how the members use and select the material before 
them, while the other is how their talk makes the environment 
appear orderly— coherent and rational. Talk manages both 
senses, but we've been primarily concerned with the first 
sense. This is probably closer to what Garfinkel and Sacks 
(1970) have called formulating; "saying in so many words what 
we are doing." I think there is a subtle, but real difference
between order and formulating, for with order we don't tell
you what we are doing, we assume you know.
■^This point can be made in a number of ways and occurs
all the time. We can consider a case where talk is not
involved. There was the recent boxing fatality, the Classen 
case, in New York City where an entire audience witnessed 
the death. The question asked was when should the fight 
have been ended. The outcome made it clear that what was 
originally taken as a trading of blows should have been 
considered as something else— a trading of fatal blows. At 
what point was the alteration in the nature of the punchy to 
be noticed? Each blow as it occurred "appeared" to be like
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What is concealed beneath the summary term are the 
specific elements of the world used, and it is these details 
which stand for the ideal, the norm, until further notice.
As such a future is left opens when trouble arises the use 
of the world, the details of the encounter, are open to 
reformulation. To say that the members share a standard 
of thought and action is to suggest that they share summary 
terms— ideals, types— which for any particular context 
leaves open how the material will be ordered. It is a 
sharedness for all practical purposes which cloaks an 
essential fragility about the social world.
'any of the preceding blows. Yet when the fight was over, 
"everyone" saw that this was not how the blows should have 
been seen. The outcome influenced what had come before. The 
same issue arises in child abuse issues— when is a bruise 
an indication of parental neglect and when an accident? Again, 
many times we can not know until some future opens which 
enables us to re-evaluate the first bruise.
Consider again the Kitty Genovese incident for the 
party who is listening to the screams before the death occurs. 
What does the first scream represent? It can still be a 
fight between friends that is very loud, it could be a prank, 
or it could be serious. Once the event ended it was clear 
that the screams should have been taken as serious cries for 
help. I would suggest that to the hearer in context this was 
not at all clear. And the common expressions such as "you 
had to be there" repeatedly point to this pervasive problem.
"Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be 
lived forwards." Kierkegaard
-^Wilson (1970) has called this approach to norms an_ 
interpretive view: "It is apparent that in the interpretive
view of social interaction, in contrast with the normative 
paradigm, definitions of situations and actions are not 
explicitly or implicitly assumed to be settled once and for 
all by literal application of a preexisting culturally
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This claim about the fragility of the social world 
enables us to introduce some remaining concerns. Can we 
assume that the understanding which individuals form during 
an experimental encounter is an adequate representation of 
norm formation? It is the presupposition of the "arbitrary 
tradition" literature, and the research presented here, that 
it is. Yet it is just this presumption that we should be 
concerned with.
Each of the studies in the literature, including this 
one, proceeds by having some number of individuals inter­
acting with each other, and by replacing culturally smart 
members with cultural naifs. V/hat they come to share may 
be known in greater or lesser detail, but have we accounted
established system of symbols. Rather, the meaning of 
situations are interpretations formulated on particular 
occasions by the participants in the interaction and are 
subject to reformulation on subsequent occasions." (p. 69)
The normative view which this is contrasted with states:
". . . the normative paradigms require an empirical 
assumption of substantial cognitive agreement among inter­
acting members." (p. 61) In our consideration of the base 
of agreement and detail specified, it is this presumption of 
substantial agreement that is at question. And from the 
perspective taken here it is a presumption assumed but never 
documented.
Zimmerman and Wieder (1970) also express this inter­
pretive view: " . . .  the ways that members employ rules 
requires that they continually develop v/hat a rule means when 
they come to treat actual cases and when they find that they 
must defend the rationality of their choices. . . . The work 
of making and accepting such descriptions of conduct makes 
social settings appear as orderly for the participants, and 
it is this sense and appearance of order that rules in use, 
in fact, provide and that ethnomethodologists, in fact, 
study." (p. 292)
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for norm formation? Perhaps we have just witnessed how
members categorize an event or form an attitude. Moscovici
(1972) addressed a similar concern when he inquired whether
the research in social psychology had an adequate conception
of social if that term was always employed to represent one
person in interaction with another.
One wants to examine, for example, "social movements"
and "intergroup conduct." But the move to this level of
social is with the same intent pursued here:
The study of cultural processes which are 
responsible for the organization of knowledge 
in a society . . . which creates a common social 
reality with its norms and values the origins of 
which are to be sought again in the social 
context. (1972, p. 57)
Whatever is known and shared is still constrained and managed
by some social context, but the situation is expanded beyond
that of face-to-face encounters.
There is another side to the question about the adequacy
of the context employed here. Even if we can demonstrate the
formation of some shared reality as a consequence of people
interacting, can we account for the presumed durability of
norm?^' It is here that our notion of "social" may be
66J "When the ’social' is studied in terms of the presence 
of other individuals or of 'numerosity' it is not really the 
fundamental characteristics of the system that are explored, 
but rather one of its subsystems— the subsystem of inter- 
individual relationships. " (p. 55)
-^Rommetveit (1979a) raises the interesting hypothesis 
that the achievement of a perfectly shared actual reality will 
result in a more enduring reality. This claim is worth con­
sidering as a topic for future research.
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impoverished and require elaboration. Moscovici's warning
about the level of social utilized, suggests that we should
be wary of presuming that the understandings displayed here
adequately represent "norm" formation. It is a point well
taken, but 'we should note that even when we expand our
horizons,
Culture is created by and through 
communication, and the organizing 
principles of communication reflect 
the social relations which are implied 
in them (1972, p. 57)
we are re-introduced to the issues already discussed: what
is it that members have in common; what level of detail are
they presumed to share? What is it that these other modes
of communication— e.g., media, theater, and books— make
known? Indeed, I want to suggest that the question of
durability may be misleading. If we assume that there is a
"substantial cognitive agreement," we have to account for
a sameness in detail which appears to me and to others as
brute facts, the same for all of us over time. If we
challenge that substantial agreement, and consider what we
agree to is an agreement for all practical purposes what
is shared are labels, public typologies, under which
disparate specifics are concealed. And with that wide
range of varied behaviors lumped under the same topic,
"norms" may only appear as durable because we have glossed
the changes which have taken place. One interesting area
for future research are those durable, expanded contexts
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where the members are continually informed about how to 
use the world before them: family, school, and work.-*®
It is important to realize that the thrust of these 
concerns is directed to the issue of how much we can come 
to know about the social world if we restrict our attention 
to face-to-face encounters. It is not a criticism of how 
these interactions influence what the members come to know. 
And if we assume that what members share is not identical 
in detail, but rather represents an amalgam of behaviors 
and thoughts what is achieved in face-to-face encounters 
may take us further than we think. Furthermore, as it is 
words which will be exchanged in those broader contexts, 
we can anticipate consequences similar to what has been 
displayed here on a small scale.
But the point must be made that it is an interpretive 
paradigm which is assumed operative. Whatever the context,
^  Halliday (1978): "in the development of the child
as a social being language has the central role. Language 
is the main channel through which the processes of living 
are transmitted to him. Through which he learns to act as 
a member of society— in and through the various social 
groups, the family, the neighborhoods, and so on— and to 
adopt its 'culture,' its mode of thought and action; its 
beliefs and values." (p. 9)
Bandura (1977): "It should be emphasized again that
most rules of action are conveyed by instruction rather than 
discovered by direct experience." Bandura qualifies this 
argument to assert that what is directly experienced is 
more durable than what is learned verbally. Again another 
research area is to consider behavior accompanied by talk 
and that which is not. Which is more durable?
and however "norms" are acquired the members will still have 
to decide how any particular context represents the ideal. ^  
As it relates to conversation, the task, in part, remains 
as Rommetveit (1979a) described it: to understand ". . . i n
what sense and under what conditions two persons engaged in 
dialogue . . . transcend their different private worlds."
And it is necessary to repeat that while any context 
influences what is made known and shared, it is talk-in- 
context which will offer the "elements" from which a common 
world can be constructed. For in mediating between interests 
and context, talk pulls some figure from the ground and 
offers it to self and others for comment.
. Yet the "elements" offered for comment in these studies 
occurred in highly restrictive environments. The members 
v/ere told how to interact, and how to use the visual world 
before them. The results need to be heavily supplemented, 
and numerous studies and analyses conducted to probe in more 
detail the work begun here. For example by using Tables 1 
and 2 in Appendix B we can ascertain what transpires when 
the original members begin by being differently oriented to 
the display. Will a difference be more readily unearthed
^ I f  we begin to argue that there is a separate norm to 
account for all of the details, and that all of this is 
substantially shared and known in advance of a context, the 
argument begins to become perverse and reminiscent of 
McDougal's instincts. Why did he help, because there is a 
norm. How do you know that there is a norm, because he 
helped. And sô  on and so on.
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in this case? Will less "be taken for granted when a new 
member enters the room? What occurs when both members have 
the same orientation, but differ from what they have been 
led to anticipate? How will they convey this information 
to a new member who will see what they could not? We can 
repeat the same studies, but use a confederate to make sure 
that the disparity is made public. We can also alter the 
interaction so cooperation and agreement are not forced.
A fifth study can be added: the task-conveyor in the
second part will not see the display, but speak with a foil 
who does. How easily will this task-conveyor relinquish 
what has been previously and directly experienced? And to 
make sure the difference is made known, we can use a 
confederate. Another possible way to bring out the disparity 
is to let the foil describe it, before (s)he. is told what is 
being seen.
We can also begin to collect additional data on what 
each member's actual beliefs are, and what (s)he assumes 
the partner believes. We can also obtain the member's degree 
of confidence in these beliefs about the others. In addition, 
we may want to consider altering the stimulus material. Is 
a'short hand vocabulary used to convey what has occurred 
only because the visual display has very few items to be 
separated? If more objects were present and had to be 
described, would the transmission rely less heavily on 
synonyms? Perhaps the stereogram is not social enough?
Rommetveit (195*0 h&s suggested that the autokinetic
effect was not an effective "social" stimulus. V/hat would
be made known under more "social" conditions could provide
an interesting contrast, but Rommetveit's (195*b 1979a) own
research with more social material suggests findings that
are. quite similar to what has occurred here. Indeed, even
more appeared to be masked. An essential issue for further
research is that of the pragmatic agreements and what
Goffman has called "working consensus." Is it the case
that most interaction proceeds by keeping a variety of topic
off the floor, and as such shared realities are constructed
which hide essential details from the members?
But words should be kept in perspective, and pointed
out that they are only part of the communicative picture,
even in a face-to-face encounter. Dore and McDermott (1980)
show how easily non-verbal behavior can contradict a verbal
claim and be taken by the participants as the claim to be
"listened" to. And as Goffman notes:
Words are a great device for fetching speaker 
and hearer into the same focus of attention 
and into the same interpretation schema that 
applies to what is thus attended. But that 
words are the best means to this end does not 
mean that words are the only one or that the 
resulting social organization is intrinsically 
verbal in character. (1976, p. 309)
So in studying what any member knows and assumes shared, we
need to step beyond an exchange of words.
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But in inquiring what it is that talk manages in a
face-to-face encounter, we have started to probe the
question which "haunts" social psychology:
How can the individual be both a cause and 
consequence of society? That is to say: 
how can his nature depend indisputably upon 
the prior existence of cultural design and 
upon his role in a pre-determined social 
structure, while at the same time he is 
clearly a unique person, both selecting 
and rejecting influences from his cultural 
surroundings, and in turn creating new 
cultural forms for the guidance of future 
generations? (Allport, 1968, p. 9)
For we have acquired a beginning grasp of how members 
engaged with the pragmatic and mundane considerations of the 
task-at-hand have developed a manner of knowing the world: 
with an exchange of words they order the world, and construct 
an experiential short hand which expresses v/hat is known by 
presuming a history of the encounter. And in watching how 
that history is represented to a stranger, we've seen how 
disparate worlds are concealed beneath the same, rubric and 
how another, new, layer of the social world has emerged. And 
in indicating the unintentional consequences of speaking with 
an-other, we've displayed how words used to create knowledge 
order the world in a manner which becomes taken for granted 
if not challenged, and how the indirect knower is left 
without access to the history of the encounter when the 
founding member departs leaving only a public word presumed 
useable by any-other.
After examining what is an exceptionally common and 
pervasively routine activity, we can re-ask the "oldest" 
question in social psychology: " . . .  how does one
generation impose its thought forms upon the next?" (Allport, 
1968). With words.
Appendix A: The Experimental Instructions
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STUDY #1 (Instructions) 
Part I
Hi. I'd like you to take a seat at the table and listen to a 
short description of the experiment which you'll be engaged 
in. I would appreciate it if you would not touch the equip­
ment until you are told to, and if you would hold all your 
questions until this description is oyer.
In this experiment we are concerned with how individuals 
reach solutions to problems. The experiment has two parts 
to it. In the first part you will be asked to cooperatively 
solve a problem that will be projected on the wall (screen) 
in front of you. The second part of the experiment will have 
you coming to a cooperative solution about the same problem 
but with a different projected image.
Let me explain the first part of the experiment in more detail. 
As I have said we are concerned with how individuals reach 
solutions to problems. The pattern of dots that is now 
projected on the wall (screen) provides the-problem that you 
will have to solve. On the table in front of you are a pair 
of goggles. When you place the goggles over your eyes a . 
figure which is not apparent without the goggles will appear.
It may take some time for the figure to become clearly visible. 
The tape recorder is present to record how you both go about 
solving the experimental problem.
Once the figure appears the problem that you must solve is to 
mutually come to an agreement on how far in front of the 
pattern of dots the figure that appears is. This part of the 
experiment is over when you have cooperatively agreed on how 
far in front of the dots the figure is. The problem must be 
solved jointly, and in no case can the experimenter be asked 
for assistance once the experiment has begun.
When the lights are shut off you may place the goggles on.^
Take a few moments to adjust to wearing them. You can begin 
to solve the problem as soon as the shape has become^clearly 
visible. So you do not forget what the problem is, it is 
typed on the index card in front of you. Again, the problem 
is to mutually come to an agreement on how far in front of the 
pattern of dots the figure that appears is.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
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If there are no questions I will shut the lights off and you 
can put your goggles on. Begin whenever you are ready.
Part II
At the point of solution: Why don't you remove your goggles
and give your eyes a few minutes of rest.
E: Place the second image on the projector and project it on 
the wall. When this is done return the goggles to SI and S2 
but give to the subject who has seated himself/herself in the 
chair with the yellow index card on the bottom a pair of 
goggles that has green acetate on the right eye. The other S 
retains the goggles with red on right.
You can proceed as you did in the first part of the experiment. 
Your task is again to mutually come to an agreement on how far 
in front of the pattern of dots the figure that appears is.
The experiment is over when you have both agreed on a solution.
ANY QUESTIONS?
O.K. I'm going to shut the lights and you can begin when you 
are ready.
Part Is both Ss wear red over right eye.
Part II: the S who sat in the chair with the yellow index card 
fastened to the bottom now gets goggles with green on right and 
the other S retains the original pair of goggles.
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STUDY #2 (Instructions)
I appreciate your participating in this experiment. The 
research is concerned with how individuals reach solutions to 
problems and is run in two parts. The first part of the 
experiment is conducted using a pair of subjects, and the 
second part is set up so that one of the subjects who has 
taken part in the first half of the experiment will be replaced 
by a third subject who has remained here in the waiting area. - 
This third subject will then participate in the second half 
_ of the study with one of the subjects who. has already gone 
through part I of the experiment.
As the experiment is run in parts it is necessary to assign 
subjects to different parts. We can determine which part of 
the research you will participate in if you would each select 
one of the colored toothpicks. (E places down three tooth­
picks on the table and asks each S to select one.)
O.K. The people who have selected the yellow and red tooth­
picks will participate in the first part, and the person who 
has chosen the blue will take part in the second part of the 
-study. You may have to wait outside for about 15 minutes.
At that time one of these two subjects will return here and 
ask you to come to the experimental room.
Part I-
I'd like you to take a seat at the table and listen to a short 
description of the experiment that you'll be engaged in. I 
would appreciate it if you would not touch the equipment until 
you are told to, and if you would hold all your questions 
until this description is over.
As I have told you, we are concerned with how individuals 
reach solutions to problems. The experiment has two parts to 
it. In the first part you will be asked to cooperatively solve 
a problem that will be projected on the wall (screen) in front 
of you. The second part of the experiment will have one of 
you explain to a new subject— the person sitting outside— what 
the problem was that you had to solve, how you solved it, and 
then solve .the..same._problem that you had ..in ..this....part of the 
experiment with that person.
Let me explain the first part of the experiment in more detail. 
As I have said we are concerned with how individuals reach 
solutions to problems. The pattern of dots that is now
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projected on the "wall (screen) provides the problem that you 
will have to solve. On the table in front of you are a pair 
of goggles. When you place the goggles over your eyes a 
figure which is not apparent without the goggles will appear.
It may take some time for the figure to become clearly visible. 
The tape recorder is present to record how you both go about 
solving the experimental problem.
Once the figure appears the problem that you must solve is to 
mutually come to an agreement on how far in front of the 
pattern of dots the figure that appears is. This part of the 
experiment is over when you have cooperatively agreed on how 
far in front of the dots the figure is. The problem must be 
solved jointly, and in no case can the experimenter be asked
for assistance once the experiment has begun.
When the lights are shut off you may place the goggles on.
Take a few moments to adjust to wearing them. You can begin 
to solve the problem as soon as the shape has become clearly 
visible. So you do not forget what the problem is, it is 
typed on the index card in front of you. Again, the problem 
is to mutually come to an agreement on how far in front of
the pattern of dots the figure that appears is.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
If there are no questions I will shut the lights off and you 
can put your goggles on. Begin whenever you are ready.
Part II
At the’point of solution; Why don't you remove your goggles 
and give your eyes a few moments rest. I'd appreciate it if 
the person with the yellow toothpick would go outside and ask 
the subject sitting there to enter the room. Please do not 
tell him/her about the experiment and please wait outside 
until this part of the study is completed. When it is over I 
will ask you to come back so I can answer any^questions you 
may have and explain the reason for the experiment.
NEW S ENTERS
E addresses S3: As you know the person you are seated next
to has participated in the first part of this experiment.
This individual will now explain to you what the experimental 
task was that had to be solved, and how it was solved in the
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first part of the study. When this is done both of you will 
have to reach a cooperative solution to the same problem that 
was solved in the first part. In no case can the experimenter 
be asked for assistance once the experiment has begun.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
O.K. I'm going to shut the lights and you can begin when you 
are ready.
E: E has returned the same pair of goggles to the subject who 
has remained from part I— red on right. The new S has been 
given a pair of goggles with green on right.
The subjects who participate in part I are those who have 
selected the yellow and red toothpicks. In this part both Ss 
are presented with goggles that have red acetate over the 
right eye and green on the left. At the solution, E asks the 
S with the yellow toothpick to leave and ask the other S 
(blue toothpick) to enter the lab. After S is introduced,
E provides the new S with a set of goggles which have green 




I appreciate your participating in this experiment. The 
research is concerned with how individuals reach solutions to 
problems and is run in two parts. The first part is conducted 
by having two subjects solve a problem while a third person 
watches them. The second part of the research requires the 
two individuals who have solved the problem leave the 
experiment and be replaced by the subject who has remained 
here in the waiting area. This subject will then participate 
in the second part of the study with the subject left in the 
room.
As the experiment is run in parts it is necessary to assign 
subjects to different parts. We can determine which part of 
the research you will participate in if you would each select 
one of the colored toothpicks. (E places down four toothpicks 
on the table and asks each S to select one.)
O.K. The people who have selected the yellow and red tooth­
picks will solve the problem in the first part, and the person 
with the blue toothpick will watch them solve the problem.
The individual with the green toothpick will participate in 
the second half of the study. I'd appreciate it if the 
individuals with the yellow and red toothpicks would enter the 
experimental room with me. In a few minutes I'll come back 
and ask the person with the blue toothpick to enter the room. 
The subject with the green toothpick may have to wait about 
15 minutes before part II begins.
Part I
I'd like you to take a seat at the table and listen to a short 
description of the experiment that you'll be engaged in. I 
would appreciate it if you would not touch the equipment until 
you are told to, and if you would hold all your questions until 
this description is over.
As I have told you we are concerned with how individuals reach 
solutions to problems. The experiment has two parts to it.
In the first part you will be asked to cooperatively solve a 
problem that will be projected on the wall (screen) in front 
of you. The second part of the experiment is set up so that 
the person who has watched you solve the problem is required 
to explain to another subject what the problem was that you 
had to solve and how you went about solving it. This person
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is then required to solve the same problem that you have 
solved here with a new S.
Let me explain the first part of the experiment in more detail. 
As I have said we are concerned with how individuals reach 
solutions to problems. The pattern of dots that is now
projected on the wall (screen) provides the problem that you
will have to solve. On the table in front of you are a pair
of goggles. When you place the goggles over your eyes a
figure which is not apparent without the goggles will appear.
It may take some time for the figure to become clearly visible. 
The tape recorder is present to record how you both go about 
solving the experimental problem.'
Once the figure appears the problem that you must solve is 
to mutually come to an agreement on how far in front of the 
pattern of dots the figure that appears is. This part of the 
experiment is over when you have cooperatively agreed on how 
far in front of the dots the figure is. The problem must be 
solved jointly, and in no case can the experimenter be asked 
for assistance once the experiment has begun.
When the lights are shut off you may place the goggles on.
Take a few moments to adjust to wearing them. You can begin 
to solve the problem as soon as the shape has become clearly
visible. So you do not forget what the problem is, it is
typed on the index card in front of you. Again, the problem
is to mutually come to an agreement on how far in front of the
pattern of dots the figure that appears is.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
O.K. If there are none I will ask the subject who is to watch 
you solve the problem to enter.
(E goes and recruits S3)
E to S3 s As the other subjects work on the experimental^ 
problem you will watch them and hear them solve it. It is 
important that you pay attention to their efforts for even 
though you will not be wearing goggles it is your responsibility 
in the second part of the study to explain to the subject now 
waiting outside what the experimental task was and how it was 
resolved. After you do that you will be asked to solve with 
that person the same problem that was solved here.
During this part of the experiment you can not offer advice, 
nor can the subjects ask for your help. Once they have solved
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the task feel free to ask them any questions you think are 
necessary to know for the second part of the experiment.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
O.K. If there are no questions I will shut the lights off and 
you can put your goggles on. Begin when you are ready and in 
no case can the experimenter be asked for help.
Part II
At the point of solution: Why don't you remove your goggles
and give your eyes a few moments rest. To S3: are there any 
questions you would like to ask these subjects?
After questions are asked, or if there are none: I'd
appreciate it.if the individuals with the yellow and red tooth­
picks would leave the room and ask the subject waiting outside 
to come in. Please do not tell him/her about the experiment 
and please wait outside until this part of the experiment is 
completed. When it is over I will ask you to come back so I 
can answer any questions you may have and explain the reason 
for the experiment.
NEW S ENTERS
E addresses S^: As you know the person you are seated next to
has participated in the first part of this experiment. This 
individual will now explain to you what the experimental task 
was that had to be solved and how it was solved in the first 
part of the study. When this is done both of you will have to 
reach a cooperative solution to the same problem that was 
solved in the first part. When I shut the lights off youcan 
put your set of goggles on. The other person is not wearing, 
and can not wear, the goggles. In no case can the experimenter 
be asked for assistance once the experiment has begun.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
O.K. I'm going to shut the lights- off and you can begin when 
you are ready.
E has given to S*f a set of goggles with green over the right 
eye. SI and S2 had goggles with red on the right eye.
The subjects who participate in part I are those who have 
selected the yellow, red, and blue toothpicks. Red and yellow
Study #3
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enter the room first and are explained the problem. Blue 
then enters, is seated behind SI and S2, is explained his/ 
her role and the experiment begins with SI and S2 wearing 
goggles with red on right. At the task's conclusion S3 is 
given the opportunity to question these Ss. After this the 
original pair leave and S4 enters. This S is the one who had 
selected the green toothpick and is given a pair of goggles 
with green on the right. S3 and s.it at the table where 
SI and S2 sat.
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I appreciate your participation in this experiment. The 
research is concerned with how individuals reach solutions 
to problems and is run in three parts. The first part is 
conducted using a pair of subjects, and the second part is 
set up so that one of the subjects who has taken part in the 
first* third of the experiment will be replaced by a third 
subject who has remained here in the waiting area. The third 
and last part is run by having one of the subjects from the 
second part of the experiment leave and ask the remaining 
subject to enter the laboratory and participate in the study 
with one of the subjects who has taken part in the second 
part of the research.
As the experiment is run in parts it is necessary to assign 
subjects to different parts. We can determine which part of 
the research you will participate in if you would each select 
one of the colored toothpicks. (E places down four tooth­
picks on the table and asks each S to select one.)
O.K. The people who have selected the yellow and red tooth­
picks will participate in the first part, the person who has 
selected blue in the second, and the person with green in 
the third. The people with the blue and green toothpicks may 
have to wait about 10 to 20 minutes before it is their turn 
to participate.
Part I
I ’d like you to take a seat at the table and listen to a 
short description of the experiment that you'll be engaged in. 
I would appreciate it if you would not touch the equipment 
until you are told to, and if you would hold all your 
questions until this description is over.
As I have told you, we are concerned with how individuals 
reach solutions to problems. The experiment has three parts 
to it. In the first part you will be asked to cooperatively 
solve a problem that will be projected on the wall (screen) 
in front of you. The second part of the experiment will have 
one of you explain to a new. subject— the person sitting out­
side with the blue toothpick— what the problem was that you 
had to solve and how you solved it. The third part will then 
have this new subject explain to the remaining subject, the 
one with the green toothpick, what the problem was, how it 
was solved, and then solve the same problem you had in this 




Let me explain the first part of the experiment in more 
detail. As I have said we are concerned with how individuals 
reach solutions to problems. The pattern of dots that is now 
projected on the wall (screen) provides the problem that you 
will have to solve. On the table in front of you are a pair 
of goggles. When you place the goggles over your eyes a 
figure which is not apparent without the goggles will appear.
It may take some time for the figure to become clearly visible. 
The tape recorder is present to record how you both go about 
solving the experimental problem.
Once the figure appears the problem that you must solve is to 
mutually come to an agreement on how far in front of the 
pattern of dots the figure that appears is. This part of the 
experiment is over when you have cooperatively agreed on how 
far in front of the dots the figure is. The problem must be 
solved jointly, and in no case can the experimenter be asked 
for assistance once the experiment has begun.
When the lights are shut off you may place the goggles on.
Take, a few moments to adjust to wearing them. You can begin 
to solve the problem as soon as the shape has become clearly 
visible. So you do not forget what the problem is, it is 
typed on the index card in front of you. Again, the problem 
is to mutually come to an agreement on how far in front of the 
pattern of dots the figure that appears is.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
If there are no questions I will shut the light off and you 
can put your goggles on. Begin whenever you are ready.
Part II
At the point of solution: Why don't you remove your goggles
and give your eyes a few moments rest. I'd appreciate it if 
the person with the yellow toothpick would go outside and ask 
the subject sitting outside with the blue toothpick to enter 
the room. Please do not tell him/her about the experiment, 
and please do not talk to the remaining subject about the 
experiment. Wait outside until the research is completed. 
When it is over I will ask you to come back so I can answer 





E addresses S3' As you know the person you are seated next 
to has participated in the first part of this experiment.
This individual will now explain to you what the experimental 
task was that had to be solved, and how it was solved in the 
first part of the study. This part of the study is completed 
when you think that you understand the experimental task and 
could explain the task to the subject still waiting outside 
and then solve the problem with him or her. The only con­
straint in this part of the experiment is that neither of you 
can wear goggles.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?
O.K. If there are none begin when you are ready. This part 
of the experiment is over when S3 feels he can complete the 
task required in part three.
Part III
At the completion of Part II: Ifd appreciate it if the person
with the red toothpick would go outside and ask the subject 
sitting outside with the green toothpick to- enter the room. 
Please do not tell him or her what the experiment was about, 
and please wait in the waiting area until the experiment is 
over. When it is completed I will ask you to come back so I 
can answer any questions you may have and explain the reason 
for the experiment.
NEW S ENTERS
E addresses S^: As you know the person you are seated next to
has participated in the second part of this experiment. This 
individual will now explain to you what the experimental task 
was that had to be solved and how it was solved in the first 
part of the study. When this is done both of you will have to 
reach a cooperative solution to the same problem that was 
solved in the first part of the study. When I shut the lights 
off you can put your set of goggles on. The other person is 
not wearing, and can not wear, goggles. In no case can the 
experimenter be asked for assistance once the experiment has 
begun.
DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS?




E has given to a set of goggles with green over the right 
eye. SI and S2 had goggles with red on the right eye.
The subjects who participate in part I chose red and yellow 
toothpicks and wore goggles that had red acetate on^ the right 
eye. In part II the subject with the yellow toothpick is 
asked to leave and S3, blue, enters. Neither S is wearing 
goggles in this part of the experiment. For part III S2, 
red, is.asked to leave, and S^ enters, green. S ^ i s  given 
goggles contrary to that of SI and S2— green on right. The 
third subject still does not wear goggles.
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Instructional Set: How far in front of the pattern of dots is
the figure that appears.
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Dcnnlliom and examples of conversational acts
REQUESTS solicit Information, action. or acknowledgment.
frs-iVo questions mk true-false judgment about ptopoiitioni: "It this an apple?”Il'h-qurstlons tteek tpcclfic factual infomtalion (include eilhet-ot and fill-ln-lhe- 
blank question formi): "Where's'John?"Clarification questions seek clarification nf the content of a prior utterance: "What did you say?”Action rtquttts solicit a listener to perform (or cease to) an act (or process): 
"Ciire me tome juice!"Permission requests solicit a listener to pant permission In the speaket to per­
form an act: “May I go?"Rhetorical questions reek an acknowledgment from a listener to allow the speaker to continue "You know what I slid?"
RESPONSES provide information directly complementing prior requeue.
Yes-Snanssvert supply true-false judgments nf propositions: "Mo."W'h-aniners supply the solicited factual information: "John's here."Clarifications supply the relevant tcpfllllnn: "I said no."
Compliances verbally express acceptance, denial, or acknowledgment of a prior 
Action or Permission request: "Okay, I'll do it.”Qualifications supply unsolicited Information In relation to the soliciting 'ques­
tion: "But I wasn’t the one who did it.”Repetitions tcpeat part of print utterances
DESCRIPTIONS eaptest observable tut verifiable) facts, past or prevent.
Identifications label objects, events, etc.: "That's a house.”Events describe acts, events, processes, etc.: "I*tn making plua."Properties describe traits nr conditions of objects, events, etc.: "That's a red 
house."locations captess direction or location nf objects, events, eta: 'The 100 is far 
away."
STATEMENTS eapress facts, rules, attitudes, feelings, beliefs, etc.
Rules eapress rules, procedures, definitions, facts, etc.: "You have to share your 
things with ethers."Evaluations eapress attitudes. Judgments, etc.: "That's nice."Internal Reports eapress emotions, sensations, mental events, etc.: "I tike to 
play." (also Include intents to perform future arts).Attributions report beliefs about another's internal state: "He doesn't know the 
answer."Explanations express reasons, causes and predictions: "It will fall.”
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS recognize and evaluate responses and nontequcsllrcs.
Acceptances neutrally rrcognice answers or nnnrequestlves: "Yes," “Oh." ApprovalsfApeemmts positively recognize answers, etc.: "Right," "Yes." PitappmvalsfOlsapcemenrs negatively evaluate answers or nonrequeatlves: "No," 
"Wrong." "I disagree."Returns acknowledge rhetorical questions and soma nonrequesilves, returning the 
"llror'' to the speaker: "What.” “Really."
ORGANIZATIONAL DEVICES regulate contact ami conversation.
Rotmdary markers Indicate openings, closings and changes In topic: "III," "Bye," 
"By the way "Altenllon-fetters solicit attention: "Hey," "John." "Look."Speaker selections explicitly label speaker of next turn: "John," "You."Politenes markers indicate ostensible politeness: "Thanks," "Sorry." Accompaniments maintain verbal contact, typically conveying Information re­
dundant with respect to context: "Here you are."
PERFORMATIVES accomplish facts by being said.
Protests register complaints about the listener's behavior: "Slop."Jokes display nonbelief tuward a proposition fur a humorous effect: "We throwed 
the soup in tire ceiling."
Claims vtiablhh rights by being said: 'That's inirn-," "I'm first." h'jeniucr alert she listener of impending hum; "Watch out!"Teases annoy, num. or playfully provoke a listener "Yon tan I do it."
MISCELLANEOUS COOES
to answers to questions (after two seconds of-.iier.cei.IJninicrprrtaHr or uniurcllicihle, incomplete, nr anomalous uiierin.-ci Exclamations express cnintlom! reactions and other nnnpri.porilioni! informs- lion.




E: You can put your goggles on and begin •whenever you are
ready.
si: See it? 
s2: yeah
si: How far do you think it is? 
s2: mmm...mmmmm...a foot...what do you say? 
si: Less...it's like eight inches, nine inches? I thought 
it was a foot first
•
9
sl: you don't think it's any less than a foot? 
s2: Uh...no...I'd say it's really about a foot?...turn 
your head a little bit and see if you can make the 
background come out before and then see how much... 
can you see that? 
sl: Nnnno
sl: I still think it's like...you know, a little less 
s2: I'd say ten inches...is a little less, no more than,
not less than ten inches
Sl: No, I figure it's like ten
s2: ten inches?
sl: yeah






e: why don't you take your goggles off
introduction, part two
e: any questions? Just begin whenever you are ready, 
sl; I'd say a foot and a half. 
s2: No it's less...more like 
sl: V/hat?
s2: Fifteen inches, fourteen? 
s2: Could be...fifteen? 
s2: yeah...fifteen? 




E: Why don't you put your goggles on and just begin
whenever you're ready. If you wear glasses, those 
will fit over your glasses because you won't be 
able to see without your glasses.
sl: you want to know it in feet?
e: that's up to you...just talk amongst yourselves,
sl: What do you say? It's a couple of feet 
s2: I don't think it's more than a foot 
sl: it matters how far you're back 
s2: Ok...is he talking about all those dots in the 
white paper or that little thing in the middle? 
sl: how far the little thing in the middle 
s2: oh
sl: is from the back 
s2: from 
sl: yeah
s2: as you move back it goes further back 
sl: oh...a foot? 
s2: Ok
sl: Ok (inaudible),
s2: what are we supposed to say
e: excuse me?
s2: we came to an agreement
instructions, part 2 begins
e: do you have any questions?
S3**-: noe: Ok, you know what you're supposed to do? Let me give
you your goggles back, put them on, and just begin, 
sl: you see the triangle? It's like a triangle, a diamond, 
whatever, right in the middle? 
s3: yeah
sl: well, we had to find out how far the diamond is from 
the back 
s3: from the back of what? 
sl: (at the same time) you understand?
you know the background...uh how far it is front of it 
s3: uh, I get it
sl: we came to an agreement that it was like around a foot 
how do you feel 
s3: how far in front it is? 
sl: yeah, when you look at it 
s3: yeah I know
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sl: it's not like right on top of it
s3: yeah, I know...it looks it, it's in back of it
sl-: no, how far the diamond is in front of it
s3: yeah, I know
s3: doesn't it look like it's cut out? and it's in back 
of the background? 
sl: the diamond's in back of the background? 
s3: yeah 
sl: not really 
s3: it does to me
sl: you saying the diamond's in back of the background?
the background's in front of the diamond? With a hole 
(inaudible) to see the diamond? 
s3: yeah
s3: don't it look like that?...it does to me. 
s3 • maybe it’s these glasses?
9
s3: the diamond ain't in front of it, it's in back of it
s3: how far in front? (looking at the index card)
sl: I'd say you're off
s3*. I'm telling ya.. .ha ha
sl: let me see...you still don't see it?
s3i It's not in front of it
I know why. The red and the green on the glasses
are messed up. 
sl: (laughs)
s3s it's on different sides...it's not in front of it.
sl: can I try these?
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s3• that's the way I see it
s3 j can we switch glasses
e: I'm sorry, I can't give you any information. Try and
reach a decision 
sl: switch glasses 
s3: we can't 
e: do you both agree?
s3: he agrees that the diamond's in front of it, I think 
it's in back of it. 
e: what do you want to do?
sl: want to switch glasses? 
e : do whatever you want to reach a solution
s3: check it out with these 
sl: that's right 
s3: now it's in front 
sl: I see it in back 
s3: the glasses are mixed up
s3: so we can't reach a mutual decision 
sl: I say it's a couple of feet in back 
s3: yeah, like a hole is cut out, right? 
sl: yeah
s3: now, this looks in front 
•
s3: we mutual on that?
e: whatever you want to do. It's up to you
sl: we can't really 
s3• it's the glasses
t
s3: we figured out its problem
sl: yeah, now this way it's the same thing
s3 we figured it out
e : what?
s3: we decided that it's different, the glasses, it matters 
on the glasses you use 




e: do you have any questions about what you have to do?
If there are no questions I'll ask the next person to 
come in, Ok?
e: (instructions to s3)...do you have any questions about
what you have to do? 
s3: No, I got it.
e: Ok, so you can start whenever you're ready, just put
the goggles on and begin...if you wear glasses you'll 
need to continue wearing the glasses the goggles will 
fit over them
sl: you understand the problem? 
s2: yeah right in the middle, a diamond 
sl: a diamond? 
s2: yea
sl: it's like in a square? 
s2: yes
s3: could you speak up
s2: but it's turned at an angle
sl: yes, yes, it’s more like a uh diamond
s2: yes
s2: we're judging distances...Ok it does not seem to be 
more than a foot, does it?...does it to you? 
sl: yes it does
it's more than a foot? 
s2: more than a foot? 
sl: no, more like ten inches 
s2: Oh, Ok
sl: we're saying that it's the shape of...it looks like 
uh...a diamond... and it's almost about a foot away 




s2: Is that all we have to do? 
sl: is that all we have to do?
e: did you reach a decision...um...what did you decide?
s2: it's about approximately a foot away from the dots, 
sl: yes
e: Ok...do you have any questions you'd like to address
to them?
s3: well, what, what did you have to decide?
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sl: well, we see a shape like a square, a diamond shape, 
and we have to decide how far it is from the dots and 
it's about a foot away, we said it's about a foot away
s3: is that it
e: Ok, if you feel you have enough information to carry on
the next part of the experiment, that's it. 
s3: I have to tell what they were discussing? 
e: what the experimental task was and how they solved it
s3: I know what the task was, but I don't know how they 
solved it 
e: Ok, do you want to ask them?
s3: what were you discussing between you? 
s2: we were discussing the fact that this diamond shape
or the thing that moves toward you, the square remains 
back there, what's the distance between 
s3: right
s2: and we decided it's about approximately about a foot 





e: Ok, why don't you start whenever you're ready 
s3: Ok you should put them on first right?
now supposedly there's some sort of a diamond shaped 
object 
ski yeah
s3: somewhere in the middle of those dots, I don't see it 
because 
sk: right
s3: and two people had to decide how far away from the 
dots it was 
ski uh huh
s3: and they, they, they started to wait for it to come
towards it, it's supposed to, is it coming towards you 
s^: No 
s3: Or is
s^: No it's stationary right now
s3: it's not? It's stationary right now.
ski yeah
s3: and they were discussing how far away it was 
sk: uh huh
s3: and...I don't know
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sty: what do we have to do, we have to decide
s3 j we have to, I think we have to
sty: how many inches?
s3s we have to discuss the same thing but...I can't see it 
obviously and uh 
ski Ok, hold that well Ok it's a
s3: but I think we have to...I think we have to, I'm
supposed to, we have to figure it out...but you 
understand what they had to do? 
ŝ l-: yeh, yeh
s3*. do I get a pair of goggles in the next part, or
e: Once the whole experiment is over
s3: so I have to help him decide without seeing it, right?
e: just solve the problem however you see fit, I can't
offer any help 
s3: Ok so how far away do you suppose 
sty: uh, it seems to be about uh...I don't...eight feet 
from the...it seems to be behind the screen 
s3: it seems to be behind? 
sty: yeh, behind the screen
s3: cause, they, they kept saying that it was
sty: uh uh
s3: in front of
sty; no, it isn't coming out...it’s about uh...it's a foot 
square 
s3: a foot square
sty: standing on it's end, right?... directly in the middle of 
the uh
s3• cause it says here...how far in front...it appears to 
be
sty*, oh oh
s3* so, maybe they were sitting at a different angle.
I don't know 
sty: laughs 
•
sty: in front? huh...it seems to...wait, oh yeah, right
it's in front of the uh...it seems to be a hole cut out, 
like a diamond shape 
s3 i right
sty: with the pattern set back 
s3: right, so how far is the diamond in front? 
sty: from the front of the pattern it's uh...it could be about 
two feet
s3: sounds alright...we're finished 
e : Ok?
s3: yeah
e: did you reach a decision
s3: about two feet
Transcript #6
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e: Do you have any questions about how to proceed? Ok,
why don't you put the goggles on and start whenever 
you're ready.
Ok, if you wear glasses the goggles should fit over 
your glasses.
sis What do you see? I see a triangle 
s2: what?
sl: I said you see a triangle? 
s2: yeah 
sl! right?
s2: not, not a triangle, a, a diamond? 





sl: and it's very much above, I mean before 
s2: uh huh
sl: the uh...square picture, right? 
s2: uh huh
sl: and it has the same exact pattern? 
s2: uh hum
sl: I think...as...the big picture, right? 
s2: yup
sl: now, how far would you say it is?
s2: uh, I don't know about a foot?
sl: maybe a little less, I think?
s2: a little less?
sl: yeah. You think so?
s2: yeah, Ok
sl: so we, around eight
s2: if you close one eye it goes away, so? 
sl: around eight to ten inches? 
s2: Ok
sl: yeah, I think so
s2: ten inches
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e: do you have any questions about how to proceed?
s2: no, do you?
s3: yeah, I have a question. You mean that I will understand
from what she will tell me, and from what she will tell 
me? 
e : right
s3: this other person coming in? Is this the person who was
in the first part of the experiment, too?
e: No, the person who will come in
s3 j yeah
e: after she finishes her part
s3• yeah
e: will be the other man sitting outside
s3: and I will have to tell him what the experiment
e : right
s3: how it was solved
e: what the experiment was, how it was solved
s3: tell him what she told me?
e: right, what the problem was, how it was solved, and
then help that person solve the problem 
s3: right 
e : 01c do you
s2: yeah this has nothing to do with the solution to the
problem, just tell him what was done? 
e: what it was, what, how it was done, and if you want
tell him how you solved it 
s2: Ok,...1 can tell him what the answer was? 
e : sure
s2: Oh, Ok
s3: yeah, tell me everything 
s2: (laughs) Ok
e: Ok, whatever, and you proceed as long as you want until
you feel that you know enough to go on 
s3 s yeah Ok
e: Ok? So just begin whenever you're ready
s2: Ok
s2: Ok, what happens is he gives you these goggles that 
are red on one side and green on the other, Ok? and 
when you put them on...even though you don't see 
anything, you only see one figure now, it looks like 
a diamond, a diamond shape, like this comes out of the 
screen and it comes at you...Ok? And what he asks you is 
how far in front...does that diamond shape appear... 
to be in front of the screen Ok? In other words, when 
you're looking at that thing right it just looks like 
there is one flat surface, right, but, but... 
s3: right
s2: when you put on the glasses with two different colors
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it looks like something comes out and is standing 
right in front of you, like that 
s3 j I see
s2: in front of that! So you see that and you see a diamond 
shape in front of it 
s3 j Ok
s2: and he wants to know how far away that shape is 
s3: the diamond shape? 
s2: from the screen 
s3: uh huh
s2: Ok?...and uh, I thought it was twelve inches and she 
thought eight so we all, we decided 
s3 s. yeah
s2: it was ten inches away from the screen. Ok? 
s3: yeah 
s2: got it?
s3: you say what? he gave you two goggles
s2: one for each
s3 ’• a red and a green
s2: no, one. One pair of goggles with red on one side and 
green on the other 
s3: Ohh, and green on the other side 
s2: right
s3: is the glass white, or is it red glass 
s2: it's colored, it's red plastic
s3: ohh the glass is colored
s2: right
s3: with a red plastic and green plastic
s2: right
s3: Ok and the
s2: and when you look through it
s3: when you look through it...at those goggles...at those 
things there, those patterns 
s2: yeah •
s3: you saw diamonds shapes that were
s2: one diamond shape
s3: one shape?
s2i one shape
s3: Ohh, only one?
s2: right, one shape
s3s that came off the screen towards you 
s2: towards us, right
s3 j right, and he asked you how near, how far from the 
screen do you think it was? 
s2: right, from the screen, right 
s3‘* I see that's all? 
s2: that's all
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s3 : was there any problem in the pattern then?...anything 
to solve, just that alone? 
s2: that's it 
e: Ok? You're ready?
s3 s uh hum 
e: fine
instructions, part three
e: do you have any questions?
s3 : could you repeat that again?
e: yeah. Your task in this part is to explain to him
s3i yeah
e : what the experimental problem was
s3: right
e: in the first part, how it was solved, once you do that
you're to help him 
s^: solve the 
e: solve the problem
s^: following problem 
s3s Ok
e: the problem that's projected on the screen
s3: So I tell him everything I know 
s^: yeah
e: right, you tell him what you know
s3: I see
e: Ok, why don't you put the glasses on and take a few
minutes to adjust to wearing them, just look at the 
center and you begin whenever you're ready. 
s3 j Ok, um, well you know, you have on the glasses,. right? 
s4*: yeah
s3 : you're looking at those patterns...now what you're
supposed to see, you're supposed to see a diamond shape 
coming off the screen towards you 
s^: yeah
s3 : right in front of those goggles 
s^: yeah
s3: before you had the goggles on you saw a flat screen 
didn't you? 
s^ j yeah
s3 : there was no shape, now you have the goggles on you see 
a diamond shape coming off the screen towards you, right 
s^: yeah
s3 : now, the problem is how far do you think that, that 
diamond is from the screen? 
s^: how far I think 
s3 * yeah
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sty: the diamond is from the screen?
s3 : yeah, the diamond shape, how far do you think it's from 
the screen, twelve inches, ten inches, eight inches, how 
far do you think it is? 
sty: the diamond is? 
s3 s right
sty: I would say approximately about two and a half feet 
s3: Two and a half feet? The diamond is towards you two and 
a half feet?
sty: you're saying how far the diamond is from me? 
s3 •* no, from the screen
s^: yeah, yeah there's a pattern in the back and there's a 
diamond 
s3: right
sty: in front, right? 
s3: right
sty; you're saying how far that diamond is from .the back of 
the pattern 
s3 : right
sty: I'd say about two and a half feet
s3 : that it you're saying it is...thirty inches, right?
thirty inches? 
sty; uh...that's...
s3 : two and a half feet is thirty inches 
sty; yeah thirty inches
s3 : so you're saying it's thirty inches away from the screen? 
sty: I'm not sure, but that's what it looks, it seems 
about 
s3: yeah
sty: about that far. I mean I don't think I’m sure
s3• yes, well you said thirty, well I guess that's that's it
sty: that, that's what I think it is... something like thirty 
inches away 
s3: Ok
e: Ok you agree that it's thirty inches?
sty; right 
e : Ok
sty: I mean you agree with me?
s3: well I never look at it, they-told me, the people
sty: I see
s3 i in the last,
sty: I see, I see
s3 : well-they said, well they didn't say thirty, one said 
twelve, one said eight and they agreed to ten. 
sty; Oh, I see
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s3s I mean and you have twenty inches more than they do 
s*H yeah I know...it doesn't seem to be that close...it's 
ten inches you know...it depends how you look at it 
from what angle I guess.... 
e : Ok
Appendix F: Rommetveit's Dialogic
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